Both sides have sold the ceasefire as a victory, but neither has fully convinced their own people.
After more than a hundred days of military conflict, Iran and the United States have signed a ceasefire agreement — a pause that both governments are calling a victory, though history suggests the silence after the guns fall quiet is often more demanding than the fighting itself. The memorandum halts hostilities across all fronts, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, and opens a 60-day window for negotiations over the question that started it all: Iran's nuclear programme. What has been agreed is less a resolution than a threshold — a moment where the promises made to domestic audiences must now be reconciled with the compromises that durable peace will require. The hardest reckoning, for both Tehran and Washington, lies ahead.
- Both governments are claiming victory simultaneously, yet neither has silenced the critics at home who believe too much was surrendered in exchange for too little.
- Iran's hardliners spent weeks declaring triumph over America and Israel, raising public expectations so high that any nuclear compromise in the coming talks risks being framed as a betrayal of that declared victory.
- Trump faces his own insurgency from the right — Senator Ted Cruz condemned the $300 billion reconstruction fund, and Tucker Carlson called the deal a humiliation — while the MOU is conspicuously silent on Iran's missiles and proxy networks.
- The Strait of Hormuz will reopen and oil prices may fall, giving Trump a political lifeline, but the core nuclear questions — enriched uranium stockpiles, enrichment capacity, damaged facilities — have been deferred rather than resolved.
- With a 60-day negotiating clock now running, the ceasefire itself may not survive if either side cannot find a way to compromise without appearing, to their own people, to have lost.
More than a hundred days of bombing have stopped. On both sides of the table, officials are calling it a win — but the silence after a ceasefire is often the loudest part, the moment when promises made to your own people begin to feel like debts.
The Memorandum of Understanding signed by President Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian halts fighting across all fronts including Lebanon, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts the US naval blockade, and establishes a 60-day framework for nuclear negotiations. On paper, both sides have something to show. In reality, both are bracing for the backlash that comes when victory claims meet the actual terms of the deal.
For Iran, the core win is survival. Tehran never expected to defeat the United States and Israel militarily — what mattered was emerging with the Islamic Republic intact and its negotiating position not destroyed. The MOU delivers that: sovereignty recognition, sanctions relief on the table, and talk of a $300 billion reconstruction fund. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei allowed the deal to proceed while carefully framing his acceptance as a responsibility delegated to the president — a distance that gives him room to maneuver if things collapse.
But Iran's negotiators face a trap of their own making. State media and the Revolutionary Guards spent weeks telling their base that Iran had defeated the Americans and Israelis. The hardest issues — the future of Iran's highly enriched uranium, the scale of its enrichment industry, the rebuilding of damaged nuclear facilities — have been deferred, not resolved. Any compromise could be portrayed as a concession made after victory was already declared. Refusing to compromise could collapse the process entirely. Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian have 60 days to thread that needle.
In Washington, Trump is selling the deal as a major victory — the Strait reopened, oil prices falling, a nuclear-armed Iran prevented. That matters politically; Americans had grown exasperated with high gas prices as the conflict dragged on. Yet critics within his own party are already circling. The MOU says nothing about Iran's missiles, and the promise to end Iran's support for proxy groups has been quietly abandoned. Vice-President Vance told reporters that ceasefires are 'a little messy' and flare-ups can be expected — language that reads, to many Republicans, as a retreat.
The comparison to the 2015 nuclear agreement is unavoidable. That deal collapsed under pressure from hardliners who accused President Rouhani of conceding too much. The same voices are watching now. The next 60 days will determine whether either side can hold its political base together long enough to reach a final agreement — and whether the ceasefire itself can survive the peace it was meant to begin.
More than a hundred days of bombing have stopped. On both sides of the negotiating table, officials are calling it a win. But the silence that follows a ceasefire is often the loudest part—the moment when the real work begins, and when the promises made to your own people start to feel like debts.
The Memorandum of Understanding signed by President Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian does what a ceasefire is supposed to do: it halts the fighting across all fronts, including Lebanon. It reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts the US naval blockade on Iranian shipping, and sets a 60-day framework for negotiations over Iran's nuclear programme. On paper, both sides have something to show their publics. In reality, both sides are bracing for the backlash that comes when victory claims meet the actual terms of the deal.
For Iran, the core win is survival. Tehran's objective was never to defeat the United States and Israel in conventional military terms—that was never realistic. What mattered was emerging from the conflict with the Islamic Republic intact, its government still functioning, its negotiating position not completely destroyed. The MOU delivers that. Iran's sovereignty is recognized. The blockade will be lifted. Sanctions relief is explicitly on the table. There is talk of a $300 billion reconstruction fund. Iran's supreme leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, allowed the deal to proceed, though he was careful to frame his acceptance as a responsibility delegated to the president rather than a full embrace of the agreement itself. That distance matters. It gives him room to maneuver if things fall apart.
But Iran's negotiators now face a trap of their own making. For weeks, state media, the Revolutionary Guards, and hardline figures have been telling their base that Iran defeated the Americans and Israelis. Expectations are sky-high. Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the speaker of parliament and head of Iran's negotiating team, has tried to frame the coming talks in defiant terms, telling state television that he knows how to make America understand. The problem is that the hardest issues—the future of Iran's highly enriched uranium, the scale of its enrichment industry, the rebuilding of damaged nuclear facilities—have been deferred, not resolved. Any compromise on these points could be portrayed by critics as a concession made after victory had already been declared. But refusing to compromise could collapse the entire process and push both sides back toward war. Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian have 60 days to thread that needle.
In Washington, Trump is framing the deal as a major victory that accomplishes his central war aim: preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. More immediately, he is selling the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and the prospect of lower oil prices. That matters politically. Polls showed Americans growing exasperated with high gas prices as the conflict dragged on. Dissatisfaction with the economy was a primary reason voters sent Trump back to the White House in 2024, and the war he chose to initiate had become politically damaging. The deal gives him breathing room and a chance to portray himself as the figure who brought the conflict to a quick close, avoiding the endless foreign entanglements he campaigned against.
Yet critics within his own party are already circling. Senator Ted Cruz called the $300 billion reconstruction fund a dangerous gift to what he termed "theocratic lunatics." Conservative commentator Tucker Carlson was blunter: "This is a pretty humiliating loss for the United States." Trump has been forced to clarify that none of the reconstruction money will come directly from the US—it will come from international partners—but the damage to his narrative is done. More troubling for his base is what the deal does not contain. Early in the conflict, Trump vowed to destroy Iran's missiles and obliterate its missile industry. The MOU says nothing about that. Similarly, Trump promised to ensure Iran could not arm, fund, and direct proxy groups outside its borders. That aim has been abandoned. Vice-President JD Vance told reporters that the US "expects" Hezbollah will refrain from firing on Israelis, but ceasefires are "a little messy" and "flare-ups" can be expected. For Republicans who view US commitment to Israel as ironclad, that language is a retreat.
Both sides have sold the ceasefire as a victory, but neither has fully convinced their own people. The comparison to the 2015 nuclear agreement is unavoidable. That deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, collapsed under pressure from hardliners in Iran who accused President Hassan Rouhani of making too many concessions. The same voices are watching now. In Washington, some argue Trump has accepted a framework that gives Iran sanctions relief and economic benefits while postponing the hardest nuclear questions—a worse outcome than the 2015 deal. The next 60 days will determine whether either side can hold its political base together long enough to reach a final agreement. If they cannot, the ceasefire itself may not survive.
Citações Notáveis
I am not a diplomat, but I know well how to make America understand.— Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, speaker of Iran's parliament and head of negotiating team
This is a pretty humiliating loss for the United States.— Tucker Carlson, conservative commentator
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does Iran need to claim victory so badly? They lost the military conflict.
Because the alternative—appearing to have surrendered—would destabilize the government itself. The Islamic Republic's legitimacy rests partly on the idea that it can stand up to the West. Surviving intact, with sanctions relief on the horizon, lets them tell that story.
But doesn't that trap them? If they've already declared victory, how do they compromise on nuclear issues without looking weak?
Exactly. That's the trap. Ghalibaf and the negotiators have to satisfy Washington without crossing lines their own supreme leader hasn't fully endorsed. It's a very narrow space.
What about Trump's side? He's claiming victory too, but his own party is attacking him.
He's selling the deal on two things: preventing Iran's nuclear weapon and reopening the Strait of Hormuz, which means cheaper oil. But he promised to destroy Iran's missiles and stop their proxy networks. He's delivered on neither. For his base, that's a betrayal.
So both sides are vulnerable to their own hardliners.
Yes. And the hardest negotiations haven't even started. They've got 60 days to work out Iran's enriched uranium and nuclear programme. If either side can't move without appearing defeated, the whole thing collapses.
What happens then?
The ceasefire itself comes under pressure. You go back to war, or you get a frozen conflict that lasts for years. Neither side wants that, but neither side can afford to look like they lost.