Two billion reais would have gone to Master if they had not stepped in.
Em meados de 2024, o Banco Master buscava, por meio de lobistas com histórico controverso, direcionar recursos públicos municipais para sua carteira de ativos. O esforço revelou uma tensão antiga entre a fragilidade das salvaguardas institucionais e a força da vigilância política: em Maricá, a cautela prevaleceu; em Itaguaí, cinquenta e oito milhões de reais encontraram caminho livre por dentro de um sistema que deveria protegê-los. A investigação da Polícia Federal agora coloca em evidência uma questão que transcende o caso específico — até que ponto os fundos públicos municipais estão vulneráveis à captura por interesses privados.
- Mensagens interceptadas revelam que o banqueiro Daniel Vorcaro usava um lobbyista com passagem pela Lava Jato para tentar acessar o fundo soberano bilionário de Maricá.
- O prefeito Washington Quaquá bloqueou pessoalmente a operação após ser alertado por contatos do setor financeiro de que o Banco Master estava à beira do colapso.
- Em Itaguaí, a ausência de resistência política abriu espaço para que uma gestora transferisse R$ 58 milhões sem realizar as análises técnicas obrigatórias — um ato que a Polícia Federal classifica como fraude.
- O padrão sistemático de abordagem a fundos municipais sugere que Maricá e Itaguaí não eram casos isolados, mas alvos dentro de uma estratégia mais ampla de captação de recursos públicos.
- A investigação agora ameaça expor fragilidades estruturais na governança de institutos de previdência municipais em todo o país.
Em julho de 2024, Daniel Vorcaro enviou uma mensagem ao lobbyista Ricardo Siqueira Rodrigues perguntando se o negócio em Maricá havia avançado. Rodrigues — que acumulava um histórico de sanções pela CVM por fraudes ligadas ao Trump Hotel e uma passagem pela Lava Jato — respondeu que ainda trabalhava no assunto, que a cobertura jornalística havia criado turbulências, mas que controlava a situação. O esforço, no entanto, fracassou.
Maricá, reduto petista no Rio de Janeiro governado por Washington Quaquá, vice-presidente nacional do PT, possui um fundo soberano de aproximadamente dois bilhões de reais. Quaquá relatou que um emissário vindo de Brasília — identificado por ele como Renato — chegou à cidade propondo que o fundo fosse depositado no Banco Master. O prefeito e seus aliados intervieram após serem alertados por fontes do mercado financeiro de que o banco era instável e poderia quebrar. Dois bilhões de reais foram preservados.
O mesmo roteiro teve desfecho oposto em Itaguaí. Fernanda Pereira da Silva Machado, ex-gestora da Rioprevidência, assumiu cargo no Itaprevi, o instituto de previdência do município, e autorizou a transferência de R$ 58 milhões ao Banco Master sem realizar as revisões técnicas obrigatórias. A Polícia Federal descreve sua conduta como credenciamento fraudulento — uma chancela que abriu as portas do fundo para transações irregulares.
As mensagens recuperadas pelos investigadores apontam para uma estratégia sistemática de aproximação a fundos municipais por meio de intermediários. O contraste entre os dois municípios é revelador: onde havia vontade política e alerta financeiro, o dinheiro público foi protegido; onde as salvaguardas institucionais foram contornadas, ele fluiu. A investigação agora busca determinar se Itaguaí foi uma exceção ou um elo em uma cadeia mais longa.
In the middle of 2024, a banker named Daniel Vorcaro was working through intermediaries to steer public money toward his institution, Banco Master. The intermediary was a lobbyist named Ricardo Siqueira Rodrigues, a man with a complicated history—he had been caught up in the Lava Jato investigation years earlier and had been sanctioned by Brazil's securities regulator for fraud tied to the Trump Hotel. On July 30, 2024, Vorcaro sent Rodrigues a simple question: had the Maricá deal gone through?
Maricá is a municipality in Rio de Janeiro and a stronghold of the Workers' Party. It is run by Washington Quaquá, who serves as vice president of the PT. The city has a sovereign wealth fund worth approximately two billion reais—substantial money that could be attractive to a banker looking to grow his institution's assets. Rodrigues responded to Vorcaro that he was still working on it, that the recent news coverage had created some turbulence, but that he was managing the situation and would have updates soon. The effort ultimately failed. Unlike other municipalities, Maricá did not send money to Banco Master.
Quaquá himself later explained why. In January of this year, the mayor recounted how someone from Brasília—he named the person as Renato—had come to Maricá proposing that the city's sovereign fund be deposited with Banco Master. Quaquá said he and his allies intervened. They had been warned by contacts in the financial sector that the bank was unstable, that it might fail. They told the city's leadership not to do it. Two billion reais would have gone to Master if they had not stepped in.
But the same pattern played out differently in Itaguaí, another Rio de Janeiro municipality. There, a woman named Fernanda Pereira da Silva Machado moved from a senior position at Rioprevidência, a state pension fund, to become a manager at Itaprevi, the pension institute for Itaguaí. Under her watch, Itaprevi transferred fifty-eight million reais to Banco Master. Federal Police investigators have characterized her actions as fraudulent credentialing—she signed off on Master's registration with the fund without conducting the mandatory technical reviews that should have preceded such a move. The police say she essentially rubber-stamped the bank's entry into the system to enable irregular transactions.
The intercepted messages between Vorcaro and Rodrigues, recovered by Federal Police, show a pattern of systematic outreach to municipal funds. The investigation suggests that Banco Master, through its representatives, was targeting public money held by cities and their pension institutes. In Maricá, the effort was blocked by political will and financial caution. In Itaguaí, it succeeded—at least temporarily—because the institutional safeguards that should have protected the fund were bypassed. The question now is whether this was an isolated instance or part of a broader scheme to channel public resources into a private bank that, by the accounts of people in the financial sector, was heading toward collapse.
Citações Notáveis
Two billion reais would have gone to Master if we had not intervened, after being warned by financial sector contacts that the bank was unstable.— Washington Quaquá, mayor of Maricá
I was in the field managing the situation; the news coverage created turbulence but there is a fix.— Ricardo Siqueira Rodrigues, lobbyist, in message to Vorcaro on July 30, 2024
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why did Maricá succeed in blocking this investment when Itaguaí didn't?
Maricá had a political structure that was paying attention. Quaquá and his allies had connections in the financial world who were warning them about Master's stability. They acted on that intelligence. Itaguaí had the same opportunity to protect itself, but the person in charge of the pension fund didn't apply the required scrutiny.
So this wasn't about party loyalty or ideology—it was about who was watching?
Partly. Quaquá is PT leadership, and he was protecting a PT-controlled city. But his reasoning wasn't ideological. He was protecting the fund because people he trusted told him the bank was unsafe. In Itaguaí, there was no such warning system, or it wasn't heeded.
What does it tell us that they used a lobbyist with a criminal record to do this?
It suggests they knew what they were doing was questionable. Vorcaro didn't go directly to city officials. He used an intermediary with experience in financial operations—someone who had moved money around before, who knew how to navigate these spaces. It's a layer of distance.
And the woman in Itaguaí—was she complicit or negligent?
The police say she signed off on credentialing without doing the technical analysis she was required to do. Whether that was intentional corruption or gross negligence, the effect was the same: the safeguard failed, and fifty-eight million reais went somewhere it shouldn't have.
What happens to that money now?
That's the open question. The investigation is still moving. But the money is gone from Itaguaí's pension fund, and the people who depend on that fund are the ones who bear the loss.