We know that we are not customer number one.
For decades, the security of Europe rested on an unspoken assumption: that American arsenals were bottomless and American commitment was unconditional. Two simultaneous wars — in Ukraine and against Iran — have quietly exhausted that assumption along with the stockpiles themselves. As NATO leaders convene in Ankara, the alliance confronts not a political disagreement but a physical one: the weapons Europe was promised no longer exist, and the factories that might replace them will not be ready for years. What begins as a logistics crisis is revealing itself as a civilizational turning point — the moment Europe must decide whether it can learn to defend itself.
- Russian ballistic missiles killed at least 21 people in Ukraine this week because Ukrainian air defenses had run out of interceptors — a shortage with a direct address in Washington and Brussels.
- The US has quietly delayed or cancelled deliveries of Tomahawks, Himars, and PAC-3 interceptors to European allies, not out of political will but because the weapons were spent in Iran and Ukraine faster than they can be made.
- Roughly 20 nations are queued for Patriot missiles with a 42-month wait; one European diplomat summed up the alliance's standing bluntly — 'We know that we are not customer number one.'
- The Trump administration is simultaneously demanding NATO allies spend 5% of GDP on defense while signaling troop withdrawals, pushing Europe toward self-reliance before it has the industrial capacity to achieve it.
- Co-production agreements and new European factories are being discussed, but diplomats estimate five to ten years before independent production lines are viable — a dangerous window of neither-nor.
- The NATO summit in Ankara may name the crisis openly, but as one former senior official observed, there is very little anyone can do about it in the near term — the missiles are simply gone.
The weapons Europe counted on are running out. In recent months, the United States has delayed or cancelled deliveries of Tomahawk cruise missiles, Himars rocket systems, and PAC-3 interceptors to NATO allies. The cause is not political — it is industrial. The wars in Ukraine and Iran have consumed American stockpiles faster than factories can replenish them. By April, the US had expended roughly half of its estimated Patriot missile supply in the conflict with Iran alone. The question facing NATO leaders gathering in Ankara this week is no longer whether America will arm Europe. It is whether America can.
The human cost of this shortage is already visible. A Russian bombardment killed at least 21 people in Ukraine on Monday. President Zelenskyy reported that Ukrainian air defenses failed to intercept approximately 23 ballistic missiles — not for lack of skill, but for lack of interceptors. His appeal to the NATO summit was direct: strong decisions are needed, and lives depend on them.
The arithmetic is unforgiving. About 20 countries are waiting for Patriot deliveries, with a 42-month replenishment timeline estimated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. European diplomats have grown quietly furious. One described five or six simultaneous pressures draining the supply — the pivot to Asia, Israel's priority access to new interceptor stocks, and the ongoing consumption in two active conflicts. 'We know that we are not customer number one,' the diplomat said.
Germany's case is illustrative. Planned Tomahawk deliveries to Berlin are now cancelled — not deprioritized, but physically impossible. As former national security adviser Phil Gordon put it: 'The US shot 1,000 Tomahawks in Iran, so like it's not that they're not prioritising Germany, they don't exist.'
The Trump administration is demanding allies spend 5% of GDP on defense and channel much of that back into American weapons purchases — even as the reliability of those purchases is in open doubt. Co-production agreements and European factories are being proposed, but diplomats estimate five to ten years before the continent can supply itself. That gap — between American depletion and European readiness — is the most dangerous terrain in the alliance's modern history. Europe will have to learn to defend itself. The summit in Ankara may say so plainly. What it cannot do is close the gap.
The weapons that Europe counted on are running out. In the past months, the United States has delayed or cancelled deliveries of some of the most critical arms in its arsenal—Tomahawk cruise missiles, Himars rocket systems, and the PAC-3 interceptors that can stop incoming ballistic fire. The reason is blunt: the wars in Ukraine and Iran have consumed the stockpiles faster than American factories can replenish them. By April of this year, the US had expended roughly half of its estimated 2,330 Patriot missiles in the conflict with Iran alone. Now, as NATO leaders gather in Ankara this week, including President Trump, the alliance faces a reckoning that goes beyond the usual tensions between Washington and its European partners. The question is no longer whether America will arm Europe. It is whether America can.
The human cost of this shortage is already visible. On Monday, a Russian bombardment killed at least 21 people in Ukraine and wounded dozens more. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported that Ukrainian air defenses had been unable to intercept approximately 23 ballistic missiles in the salvo. The reason, he said plainly, was the lack of interceptor missiles. In a statement directed at America and Europe, he called for strong decisions from the NATO summit to support Ukraine's defense of its airspace and, by extension, the protection of ordinary lives.
The arithmetic of scarcity is unforgiving. About 20 countries are waiting for Patriot deliveries. The Center for Strategic and International Studies estimates it will take 42 months—three and a half years—for the US to rebuild its own depleted stocks. Meanwhile, European capitals have grown quietly angry. One European diplomat described the problem with unusual candor: there are five or six simultaneous pressures draining the supply. The US is shifting defense resources toward Asia. Israel, as a key ally, receives priority access to new interceptor stocks. And the conflicts in Iran and Ukraine continue to consume what remains. "We know that we are not customer number one," the diplomat said.
The Trump administration is demanding that NATO allies increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP for a second consecutive year, and that much of that money flow back into purchases of American weapons. But European leaders now face a harder question: if they commit billions to American arms systems, will those commitments actually be fulfilled? The administration has announced plans for co-production agreements and new factories in Europe, but these take time. Diplomats estimate five to ten years before Europe can ramp up its own production lines. That is a dangerous window—a period when Europe will be neither supplied by America nor capable of supplying itself.
The case of Germany illustrates the problem starkly. The US had planned to deliver Tomahawk missiles to Berlin. Those deliveries are now off. As Phil Gordon, a former national security adviser, put it with dry precision: "The US shot 1,000 Tomahawks in Iran, so like it's not that they're not prioritising Germany, they don't exist." The missiles are gone, expended in another war. This is not a matter of preference or alliance politics. It is a matter of physics and industrial capacity.
What emerges from this crisis is a shift in the architecture of European security. For decades, NATO allies have relied on American supply and American commitment. That model is now visibly strained. European countries are beginning to look elsewhere—to each other, to new suppliers, to the possibility of genuine independence in defense production. It is a transition that no one wanted and that will take years to complete. In the meantime, the gap between what Europe needs and what America can provide will only widen. The NATO summit in Ankara will address this openly, but as Gordon noted, there is not much anyone can do about it in the short term. Europe will have to learn to defend itself.
Citações Notáveis
The reason for this is precisely the insufficient supply of interceptor missiles. It is very important that the world, especially America and our European partners, come out of the NATO summit in Ankara with strong decisions to support our defence of the sky.— President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, following Russian bombardment of Ukraine
The US shot 1,000 Tomahawks in Iran, so like it's not that they're not prioritising Germany, they don't exist.— Phil Gordon, former national security adviser
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter that the US used half its Patriot missiles in Iran? Couldn't they just make more?
Because making missiles takes time—factories, supply chains, skilled workers. The estimate is 42 months just to refill what was used. Meanwhile, 20 countries are waiting. It's not like ordering from a catalog.
So Europe is just stuck without air defense?
Not entirely. But there's a dangerous gap. Ukraine is feeling it right now—they couldn't intercept 23 missiles in one attack because they didn't have enough interceptors. That's the real-world consequence.
Is Trump deliberately withholding weapons from Europe?
No. The administration is actually pushing Europe to buy more American arms and invest in joint production. But the supply itself is genuinely depleted. It's a constraint, not a choice.
What's the five to ten year timeline about?
That's how long it takes Europe to build its own factories and production lines. Until then, they're dependent on whoever can supply them—and right now, that's not America.
So Europe will turn to other countries?
That's the implication. They're being forced toward self-reliance and alternative suppliers. It's a historic shift in how NATO has worked.
Will this actually happen, or is it just talk?
The shortage is real. The gap is real. Whether Europe actually builds independent capacity or finds other suppliers—that's still being decided. But the pressure is there now.