China controls more than eighty percent of the world's tungsten supply
For nearly a decade, the United States has mined no tungsten of its own, leaving a quiet but consequential gap in the foundation of its industrial and military capacity. This summer, American researchers traveled to a dormant mine in South Korea — one that may soon supply half the world's non-Chinese tungsten — to ask a question that nations rarely confront until it is urgent: where does the material that holds civilization together actually come from? The visit marks a moment when the abstraction of supply chain vulnerability becomes a concrete diplomatic and geological reckoning.
- China's grip on over 80% of the global tungsten supply has left the U.S. exposed on a mineral essential to weapons, semiconductors, and industrial tools — with no domestic production since 2015.
- A Canadian-operated mine in South Korea is preparing to restart, with projections suggesting it could supply half of all tungsten produced outside China — a shift significant enough to draw a formal U.S. government delegation.
- The American visit was not symbolic: senior mineral researchers from the U.S. Geological Survey traveled to assess whether the Sangdong Mine's ambitions match its actual capacity.
- Beijing's demonstrated willingness to weaponize export controls has shattered Washington's long-held assumption that global supply chains are stable, accelerating the search for alternatives across multiple critical minerals.
- A 'significant update' on the mine is promised in the USGS 2025 annual report — language that signals this assessment could directly shape U.S. critical minerals policy in the months ahead.
American mineral specialists traveled to South Korea this summer to examine the Sangdong Mine, a long-dormant facility operated by Canadian company Almonty Industries that is preparing to resume production. Their mission was pointed: to determine what that restart could mean for a country that has not commercially mined tungsten since 2015.
Tungsten rarely enters public conversation, yet it is woven through the modern economy — indispensable for weapons manufacturing, semiconductor production, and the cutting tools that drive industrial work. China controls more than eighty percent of the global supply chain, a dominance that has quietly become a strategic liability for Washington.
Leading the delegation was Sean Xun of the National Minerals Information Center within the U.S. Geological Survey. The visit carried real stakes: Almonty projects the mine could supply half of all tungsten produced outside China once operations resume — a figure that would meaningfully redraw the map of a critical material's geopolitics.
The trip reflects a broader recalibration in how Washington thinks about resource security. Trade tensions and Beijing's use of export controls as leverage have forced policymakers to take seriously which materials underpin national security and where they originate. Tungsten now sits firmly on that list.
The USGS has committed to a 'significant update' on Sangdong in its first-quarter 2025 report — language that suggests the findings will carry policy weight rather than serve as routine notation. Whether that assessment confirms the mine as a genuine solution or a promising but uncertain option will depend on what the researchers found, and on whether Almonty can deliver on its timeline against the real-world friction of engineering, permitting, and markets.
A team of American mineral specialists made the journey to South Korea this summer to examine a mine that could reshape the global tungsten market. The Sangdong Mine, operated by a Canadian company called Almonty Industries, is preparing to restart production after years of dormancy—and U.S. government researchers want to understand exactly what that restart means for American interests.
Tungsten is not a household word, but it is everywhere in the modern economy. The metal's extreme hardness makes it essential for weapons manufacturing, semiconductor production, and the cutting tools that shape industrial work. It is, in other words, a mineral the United States cannot afford to depend on a single source for. Yet that is precisely the position the country finds itself in. China controls more than eighty percent of the world's tungsten supply chain. The United States, meanwhile, has not mined tungsten commercially in nearly a decade—not since 2015.
That vulnerability is what brought Sean Xun and three other mineral resource scholars to South Korea. Xun, an assistant chief at the National Minerals Information Center within the U.S. Geological Survey, led the delegation to assess the Sangdong Mine's potential. The visit was not ceremonial. Almonty Industries, the Canadian parent company operating the mine, announced that the facility is expected to begin operations again this year. If the company's projections hold, the mine could supply half of all tungsten produced outside China—a figure that would fundamentally alter the geopolitics of a critical material.
The timing of the American visit reflects a broader shift in how Washington thinks about resource security. For years, the assumption was that global supply chains would remain stable and diversified. That assumption has fractured. Trade tensions with China, combined with Beijing's willingness to use export controls as a strategic tool, have forced policymakers to reconsider which materials matter most and where they come from. Tungsten is one of several metals now classified as critical to national security.
The U.S. Geological Survey, the federal agency responsible for tracking the nation's mineral resources and availability, is taking the assessment seriously. The organization has committed to issuing what it describes as a "significant update" on the Sangdong Mine in its 2025 annual report, due to be released in the first quarter of next year. That language suggests the findings will carry weight—that this mine is not a minor development but something that could influence how the United States approaches its mineral strategy going forward.
What happens next depends partly on what the researchers found during their visit and partly on whether Almonty can actually deliver on its restart timeline. The company has made bold claims about the mine's capacity. But claims and reality often diverge in resource extraction. There are engineering challenges, permitting hurdles, and market conditions to consider. Still, for a country that has watched its domestic tungsten production fall to zero, even the prospect of a reliable non-Chinese source represents a meaningful shift. The American team's assessment, when it arrives early next year, will likely shape whether policymakers see the Sangdong Mine as a genuine solution or merely a hopeful option.
Notable Quotes
Almonty Industries claims the mine could potentially produce 50% of the rest of the world's tungsten supply— Almonty Industries
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does tungsten matter so much that the U.S. government sends researchers across the Pacific to inspect a mine?
Because the country has no domestic supply and China controls the spigot. If Beijing decides to restrict exports—which it has done with other critical minerals—American manufacturers of weapons, chips, and industrial tools simply stop. It's a vulnerability that keeps strategists awake.
But couldn't the U.S. just mine its own tungsten again?
Theoretically, yes. But it stopped in 2015 because it wasn't economically competitive. Mining is expensive, and Chinese tungsten was cheaper. Now the calculus has changed—security matters more than pure cost. But building a mine takes years. South Korea's Sangdong Mine could be operational much faster.
So this Canadian company is basically solving an American problem?
In a way. Almonty sees a market opportunity. The U.S. sees a way to reduce dependence on China. Their interests align, at least for now. But the company still has to prove it can actually restart the mine and hit its production targets.
What does that "significant update" in 2025 really mean?
It means the government researchers found something worth reporting on. Whether it's optimistic or cautionary, we won't know until the report comes out. But the language suggests this mine is being taken seriously as part of the solution.
If this mine produces half the world's non-Chinese tungsten, doesn't that just shift the dependency problem to South Korea?
It does, somewhat. But it's a different kind of dependency—with an ally rather than a strategic competitor. And it's not total reliance on one country. It's diversification, which is the whole point.