Very few of the projects make economic sense
In the long contest over who shapes the developing world's future, the United States has stepped back onto a stage it largely vacated for a decade. A Biden administration delegation traveled through Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama in late September 2021, listening for infrastructure needs that might anchor Build Back Better World — a G7 initiative designed to offer an alternative to China's Belt and Road. The effort acknowledges both the scale of what has been ceded and the difficulty of reclaiming it, arriving as developing nations face a $40 trillion infrastructure gap and a dominant partner already deeply embedded in their economies.
- China's Belt and Road Initiative has spent nearly a decade weaving railways, ports, and highways across more than 100 countries, leaving the United States as a largely absent competitor in the global infrastructure race.
- The Biden administration's Build Back Better World program exists mostly on paper — the Latin American listening tour is the urgent attempt to give it bones before rivals and skeptics define it first.
- American officials are deliberately framing B3W around climate resilience, health, digital access, and gender equity, positioning these values as a direct rebuke to what they describe as China's opaque, labor-weak development model.
- With G20 and COP26 summits imminent, the administration is racing to establish B3W as a credible alternative before those global stages force a comparison it isn't yet ready to make.
- The initiative's most consequential question remains unanswered: how much money will the United States actually commit, and whether political will can outlast the long arc that infrastructure demands.
In late September 2021, a delegation of American diplomats led by Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh traveled through Colombia, Ecuador, and Panama on a mission that blended diplomacy with strategic urgency. Their task was to identify infrastructure projects that could give real shape to Build Back Better World — the Biden administration's answer to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
When Xi Jinping launched Belt and Road in 2013, it drew more than 100 countries into a web of railways, ports, and highways, becoming the dominant vehicle through which developing nations accessed large-scale capital. The United States had largely stepped away from that competition, and the administration now saw both a threat and an opening.
B3W had been announced at a G7 summit in June but remained largely theoretical. The listening tour was designed to change that — engaging not just government leaders but private sector actors and civil society groups historically excluded from development decisions. The program's focus areas — climate resilience, health systems, digital infrastructure, and gender equality — were chosen both for their genuine development value and as a deliberate contrast to Chinese projects, which American officials characterized as economically questionable and environmentally weak.
The stakes were immense. Developing nations face roughly $40 trillion in infrastructure needs through 2035, and China had already positioned itself as the primary source of that capital. A formal B3W launch was planned for early 2022, when financial commitments would finally be made public.
The tour's timing was also calibrated for the diplomatic calendar. Within weeks, American officials would face Chinese counterparts at the G20 and COP26 summits — moments when the B3W narrative would need to hold up on a global stage. Yet the deeper uncertainty remained: whether the United States could sustain the political will and private capital needed to compete in a race that China had been running, largely unopposed, for nearly a decade.
In late September, a delegation of American diplomats and development officials fanned out across three South American nations on a mission that was part listening tour, part strategic repositioning. Led by Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh, the group met with Colombian President Iván Duque on Monday before moving on to Ecuador and Panama later in the week. Their assignment was concrete: identify infrastructure projects that could anchor a new American investment initiative designed to compete directly with China's sprawling Belt and Road Initiative.
The effort had a name—Build Back Better World, or B3W—and it represented the Biden administration's answer to more than a decade of Chinese infrastructure expansion. When Xi Jinping launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, it set in motion a global development strategy that would eventually draw more than 100 countries into agreements involving railways, ports, highways, and other major projects. By 2021, the initiative had become the dominant framework through which developing nations accessed capital for large-scale infrastructure. The United States, by contrast, had largely stepped back from this arena, and the administration saw an opening—and a threat.
The B3W program had been announced just months earlier at a Group of Seven summit in June, but it remained largely theoretical. The listening tour was meant to transform it into something real. American officials would speak not just with government leaders but with private sector actors, civil society groups, and communities that had historically been excluded from major development decisions. The focus areas were deliberately chosen: climate resilience, health systems, digital infrastructure, and gender equality. These were not random priorities. They reflected both genuine development needs and a calculated contrast with Chinese projects, which American officials characterized as economically questionable and often marred by weak labor and environmental protections.
The scale of what the administration was attempting to address was staggering. Developing nations would need approximately $40 trillion in infrastructure investment between that moment and 2035 just to meet basic growth and climate goals. China's Belt and Road Initiative had positioned itself as a primary source for that capital. The United States was now trying to offer an alternative, though the administration had not yet determined how much money B3W would actually commit to the effort. A formal launch was planned for early 2022, when initial projects would be unveiled and the program's actual financial commitments would become clear.
The timing of the Latin American tour was strategic in another way. Within weeks, American officials would be sitting across from Chinese counterparts at both the Group of 20 summit and the COP26 climate conference in Europe. These would be opportunities to advance the B3W narrative on a global stage. Later, in December, Biden planned to host a Summit for Democracy that would provide another venue for building support among allied nations. The administration was essentially opening multiple channels simultaneously—bilateral conversations in the region, multilateral forums in Europe, and democratic alignment meetings at home—all aimed at establishing B3W as the credible counterweight to Chinese infrastructure dominance.
What remained uncertain was whether the initiative could actually deliver. The listening tours would generate a list of potential projects, but translating those into funded, implemented infrastructure required sustained political will, private capital, and the kind of long-term commitment that had allowed China's program to take root across so much of the developing world. The American approach emphasized different values and standards, but it also faced a fundamental challenge: it was arriving late to a competition that had already been underway for nearly a decade.
Citações Notáveis
Very few of the projects make economic sense and they often have very poor labor and environmental standards— Biden administration official, describing China's Belt and Road Initiative
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does the U.S. care so much about what China is doing in Latin America? Isn't infrastructure investment just infrastructure investment?
Because infrastructure is how you build relationships and influence. When China finances a port or a railway, they're not just building a bridge—they're creating economic ties, employment relationships, and political goodwill that can last for decades.
But the administration says Chinese projects have poor labor and environmental standards. Shouldn't that be enough to make countries choose American projects instead?
You'd think so, but it's not that simple. When a country needs money now and China offers it with fewer conditions attached, the long-term environmental cost can feel abstract. The U.S. is trying to say we'll do it better, but we have to actually show up with capital and speed.
So this listening tour—is that just diplomacy theater, or does it actually change anything?
It's both. The tour signals that the U.S. is serious and willing to listen to what countries actually need, not just impose a predetermined agenda. But the real test comes in early 2022 when they announce actual projects with actual money attached.
What happens if B3W doesn't work? If countries still choose China?
Then the U.S. essentially cedes infrastructure development in the Global South to China, which means ceding influence. That's the stakes underneath all this diplomatic language.