Civil war conditions are probable, which could lead to a reconstitution of Al Qaeda
En los primeros días de septiembre de 2021, el general Mark Milley, máximo jefe militar de Estados Unidos, ofreció una evaluación sin ambigüedades: Afganistán marchaba hacia la guerra civil. Tras dos décadas de ocupación y el retiro apresurado de las fuerzas estadounidenses, el Talibán había tomado el control del país en cuestión de semanas, pero controlar un territorio no equivale a gobernarlo. En ese vacío entre la conquista y la gobernanza, Milley veía renacer los mismos fantasmas que justificaron la intervención original: Al Qaeda, ISIS y el eterno ciclo de la violencia extremista.
- El Talibán tomó Afganistán con una velocidad que sorprendió incluso a los analistas más pesimistas, dejando solo la provincia de Panjshir como último reducto de resistencia armada.
- El general Milley advirtió sin rodeos que la probabilidad de guerra civil es alta, señalando que el Talibán carece de capacidad real para gobernar una nación étnicamente fragmentada.
- El verdadero peligro no es solo el conflicto interno: Milley alertó que una guerra civil abriría la puerta a la reconstitución de Al Qaeda y a la expansión del ISIS en un plazo de doce a treinta y seis meses.
- La ironía histórica es brutal: Estados Unidos invadió Afganistán en 2001 precisamente para evitar que fuera un santuario terrorista, y ese mismo escenario amenaza con repetirse tras su retirada.
- Los gobiernos occidentales observan con alarma creciente, mientras Washington promete mantener capacidad para neutralizar amenazas desde la región, aunque sin presencia militar sobre el terreno.
El general Mark Milley, presidente del Estado Mayor Conjunto de Estados Unidos, se presentó ante Fox News en septiembre de 2021 con una conclusión que no dejaba espacio para la interpretación: Afganistán se dirigía hacia la guerra civil. El retiro de las fuerzas estadounidenses tras veinte años de ocupación había abierto un vacío que el Talibán llenó con una velocidad asombrosa, barriendo provincia tras provincia hasta controlar casi todo el país en cuestión de semanas. Solo Panjshir, una provincia montañosa en el norte, resistía bajo el mando de combatientes que se negaban a aceptar el nuevo orden.
Pero Milley no veía en esa conquista una victoria consolidada. "Mi estimación militar es que las condiciones para una guerra civil son probables", declaró, subrayando que el Talibán carecía tanto de la capacidad como de la voluntad para mantener unida a una nación profundamente dividida por etnias y lealtades históricas. Gobernar, advirtió, es una tarea radicalmente distinta a conquistar.
Lo que más inquietaba al general era lo que podría crecer en ese caos. Un conflicto civil prolongado ofrecería condiciones ideales para que Al Qaeda reconstruyera sus operaciones, para que el ISIS expandiera su presencia en la región, y para que otros grupos extremistas echaran raíces. Milley estimó que en un plazo de doce a treinta y seis meses, el mundo podría enfrentarse a una nueva ola de terrorismo con alcance internacional.
La paradoja histórica resultaba difícil de ignorar. Estados Unidos había justificado dos décadas de guerra, billones de dólares y miles de vidas precisamente para impedir que Afganistán volviera a ser un refugio para el extremismo. Con las tropas retiradas y el Talibán de regreso en el poder, ese mismo escenario amenazaba con materializarse. Washington prometía mantener la capacidad de responder a las amenazas emergentes desde la región, pero las palabras del general dejaban claro que el costo de esa vigilancia a distancia aún estaba por calcularse.
General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sat down with Fox News on a Saturday in early September 2021 with a stark assessment: Afghanistan was headed toward civil war. The American military establishment, having just overseen the withdrawal of U.S. forces from a twenty-year occupation, was now watching the Taliban consolidate control over a country that had resisted them for two decades—and Milley believed the consolidation would fail.
The speed of the Taliban's advance had been stunning. As American troops pulled out, the militant group swept across the country in what amounted to a lightning campaign, seizing province after province with minimal resistance. By the time Milley made his remarks, only Panjshir, a mountainous province in the north, remained outside Taliban hands, held by fighters who refused to accept the new order. The rest of Afghanistan had fallen under Taliban rule in a matter of weeks.
But control and governance are not the same thing. Milley expressed serious doubt that the Taliban, still in the process of forming a government, possessed either the capacity or the inclination to hold the country together. "My military estimate is that civil war conditions are probable," he told the network. The general was not hedging. He believed the Taliban lacked the ability to consolidate power and maintain effective governance across a fractious, ethnically divided nation.
What made this assessment particularly alarming was what might fill the vacuum. Milley warned that civil conflict would create conditions for terrorist groups to resurge. Al Qaeda, which had sheltered in Afghanistan before 2001 and whose attacks had triggered the entire American intervention, could rebuild. ISIS, the Islamic State group that had emerged in Iraq and Syria, could expand into the region. Other extremist organizations could take root. "There is a very strong probability of a civil war," Milley said, "which could lead to a reconstitution of Al Qaeda or a growth of ISIS or other terrorist groups."
The timeline was urgent. Milley predicted that within twelve to thirty-six months, the region would likely see a resurgence of terrorism aimed at targets beyond Afghanistan's borders. This was not speculation about distant possibilities—it was a military professional's assessment of probable near-term threats.
The irony was sharp. The United States had invaded Afghanistan in 2001 specifically to destroy Al Qaeda and remove the Taliban government that had harbored the group after the September 11 attacks. Two decades of war, trillions of dollars spent, and thousands of American lives lost had been justified by the need to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist sanctuary. Now, with American forces gone and the Taliban back in power, that very outcome seemed likely.
Western governments understood the stakes. They feared a return to the days when Afghanistan served as a base for extremist groups plotting attacks against the West. The U.S. government insisted it would be capable of countering any security threat emanating from Afghanistan, but the general's words suggested the challenge ahead would be substantial. The country that had just withdrawn its military presence was now bracing for the consequences of that withdrawal to unfold across the next few years.
Citas Notables
My military estimate is that civil war conditions are probable.— General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
There is a very strong probability of a civil war which could lead to a reconstitution of Al Qaeda or a growth of ISIS or other terrorist groups.— General Mark Milley
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When Milley says civil war is "probable," is he describing something that's already happening, or something he thinks will happen?
He's describing something he believes will happen—but it's rooted in what's already visible. The Taliban controls most of the country, but they're facing armed resistance in Panjshir, and Milley doubts they can actually govern effectively. Civil war isn't inevitable; it's what he thinks is most likely to emerge from that instability.
Why would the Taliban struggle to govern? They just won.
Winning militarily and governing are different problems. Afghanistan is ethnically fractured, economically devastated, and the Taliban has no track record of managing a modern state. Milley seems to be saying they'll face resistance from groups that won't accept their rule, and that resistance could metastasize into broader conflict.
And that's when the terrorists come back?
That's the concern. When a state collapses into civil conflict, the space opens up. Al Qaeda and ISIS don't need to conquer Afghanistan—they just need ungoverned territory to operate in. Milley is essentially saying the Taliban's weakness becomes everyone else's opportunity.
But the U.S. says it can still counter threats from there. How?
Probably through intelligence, drone strikes, special operations—tools that don't require boots on the ground. But it's reactive, not preventive. You're managing a threat rather than preventing it from forming in the first place.
So the withdrawal created the conditions for the very thing the original invasion was supposed to prevent?
That's the tension Milley is pointing to, yes. Twenty years of war to keep terrorists out of Afghanistan, and now the assessment is that they'll likely return within a few years of leaving.