Iran has tasted its power and won't soon give it up
Through five weeks of conflict, Iran has found in the Strait of Hormuz not merely a waterway but a fulcrum — one narrow passage through which a fifth of the world's oil flows and through which Tehran now bends the calculus of a far more powerful adversary. American intelligence has concluded that Iran, having discovered the leverage of economic coercion over military confrontation, will not willingly loosen its grip. What began as a war to diminish Iran's power may have instead revealed a new and durable form of it.
- Iran's closure of the Strait of Hormuz — the 21-mile chokepoint carrying one-fifth of global oil — has sent energy prices to multi-year highs and stoked inflation fears across oil-dependent economies.
- Military analysts warn that the strait's 2-mile shipping lanes make any forced reopening extraordinarily dangerous, as Iran can disable traffic with just one or two drones launched from deep inside its own territory.
- Trump publicly declared the strait could be opened easily and profitably, but intelligence assessments contradict that confidence, and he has since quietly shifted the burden to Gulf states and NATO allies.
- Iran's leverage is not merely tactical — former CIA Director Bill Burns warns Tehran will seek to institutionalize passage fees and long-term security guarantees in any postwar settlement, turning a wartime chokehold into a permanent geopolitical instrument.
- The US now faces a narrowing set of options: negotiate under conditions it did not anticipate, pursue a ground campaign it sought to avoid, or watch the Strait of Hormuz become contested terrain for years to come.
American intelligence has reached a stark conclusion: Iran will not voluntarily surrender its control of the Strait of Hormuz. The waterway — through which one-fifth of the world's oil passes — has become Tehran's most potent instrument in a five-week conflict that began February 28 with the stated goal of degrading Iran's military. Instead, the war handed Iran something arguably more valuable than weapons: a chokepoint capable of bending global energy markets to its will.
Since hostilities began, Iran's Revolutionary Guard has made commercial passage through the strait prohibitively dangerous through vessel attacks, mine-laying, and fee demands. Oil prices have climbed to their highest levels in years, fuel shortages have spread across oil-dependent nations, and inflation risks have mounted for an American economy whose president faces poor polling ahead of November's midterms. As one analyst put it, in trying to prevent Iran from building weapons of mass destruction, the US may have inadvertently handed Tehran a weapon of mass disruption.
The military option offers little comfort. The strait narrows to just 2 miles of usable shipping lane in each direction, making ships and troops easy targets. Even if American forces seized Iran's southern coast and nearby islands, the Revolutionary Guard could sustain its stranglehold through drones and missiles launched from deep within Iranian territory — it takes only one or two to render the waterway impassable.
Trump's posture has shifted accordingly. Having initially made reopening the strait a ceasefire precondition, he has since called on Gulf states and NATO allies to take the lead — a notable retreat. A White House official acknowledged that other nations have far more at stake in resolving the closure than America does, a tacit concession that the burden may fall elsewhere.
What complicates matters further is Iran's postwar calculus. Former CIA Director Bill Burns has outlined Tehran's likely strategy: charge passage fees to fund reconstruction, and convert wartime leverage into long-term security guarantees in any peace settlement. Having discovered the power of economic coercion, Iran is unlikely to surrender it willingly — and the question of who ultimately controls the Strait of Hormuz may define global energy politics for years to come.
The American intelligence community has reached a sobering conclusion: Iran will not voluntarily relinquish its stranglehold on the Strait of Hormuz anytime soon. The waterway, through which one-fifth of the world's oil passes, has become Tehran's only meaningful leverage against the United States—and the Iranians know it.
This assessment comes as the conflict between the U.S., Israel, and Iran enters its sixth week, a war that began on February 28 with the stated aim of degrading Iran's military capacity. Instead, the fighting has handed Tehran something arguably more valuable than weapons: control over a chokepoint that can bend global energy markets to its will. Since the war began, Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has made commercial passage through the strait prohibitively dangerous through attacks on civilian vessels, mine-laying, and demands for fees. The result has been predictable—oil prices have climbed to their highest levels in years, fuel shortages have rippled through oil-dependent nations, and inflation risks have mounted for the American economy at a moment when President Trump faces poor polling numbers heading into November's midterm elections.
Trump has publicly minimized the difficulty of the situation. "With a little more time, we can easily OPEN THE HORMUZ STRAIT, TAKE THE OIL, & MAKE A FORTUNE," he posted on Truth Social. But the intelligence reports tell a different story. Three sources familiar with the assessments said Iran understands that its grip on the strait provides leverage far more potent than any weapons system. As Ali Vaez, director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group, put it: in trying to prevent Iran from building weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. has inadvertently handed Tehran a weapon of mass disruption.
The military option carries costs that few analysts believe are worth paying. The strait separates Iran and Oman, narrowing to just 21 miles at its widest point, but the actual shipping lanes compress to only 2 miles in each direction. Ships and troops would be sitting targets. Even if American forces managed to seize the southern Iranian coast and nearby islands, the Revolutionary Guard could maintain its stranglehold through drones and missiles launched from deep within Iranian territory. One expert noted that it takes only one or two drones to make the waterway impassable and deter commercial traffic entirely.
Trump's position has shifted noticeably. He initially made reopening the strait a precondition for any ceasefire, but has since called on Gulf states and NATO allies to take the lead—a significant retreat from his earlier bravado. A White House official, speaking anonymously, insisted that Trump remains confident the strait will open soon and that Iran will not be permitted to regulate traffic after the war. But the same official acknowledged that other countries "have far more at stake in preventing this outcome" than America does, a tacit admission that the burden may fall elsewhere.
What makes Iran's position even more entrenched is what comes after the fighting stops. Former CIA Director Bill Burns, speaking on a Foreign Affairs podcast, laid out Tehran's likely calculus: the country will need to rebuild, and charging passage fees to commercial shipping would provide a steady revenue stream for reconstruction. More importantly, Iran will seek to convert its newfound leverage into long-term security guarantees and deterrence agreements in any peace settlement. This transforms what might have been a temporary wartime tactic into a permanent feature of global energy politics—and sets up what Burns called "a really difficult negotiation right now."
The intelligence assessment suggests that Iran has discovered something it did not fully possess before: the ability to shape world events through economic coercion rather than military might. Having tasted that power, the sources said, Tehran is unlikely to surrender it willingly. The question now is whether the Trump administration can find a way to pry open the strait without triggering the very ground war it sought to avoid, or whether the Strait of Hormuz will remain contested terrain for years to come.
Notable Quotes
In trying to prevent Iran from developing weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. handed Iran a weapon of mass disruption— Ali Vaez, director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group
Iran is going to look to maintain the leverage that they have rediscovered by disrupting traffic through the strait, and will use it to win long-term deterrence and security guarantees in any peace deal— Former CIA Director Bill Burns
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why would Iran hold onto control of the strait even after a war it's losing? Doesn't that just invite more military pressure?
Because for the first time, Iran has something the U.S. actually needs and can't easily take by force. A nuclear program is abstract—you can debate whether it's a real threat. But the strait? That's concrete. It moves oil. It moves money. It moves global stability. Iran learned it can throttle the world economy with a few drones.
But Trump says he can open it easily. Why would intelligence analysts disagree with the President?
Because they're looking at the geography, not the rhetoric. The shipping lane is two miles wide. Iran controls one side. Even if American forces seize territory, the Revolutionary Guard can attack from miles inland. It's not a problem you solve with confidence or willpower.
So what does Iran actually want? Just money?
Money, yes—they'll need to rebuild. But more than that, they want security guarantees. They want the U.S. to agree never to do this again. They want a seat at the table as a regional power. The strait is their ticket to that conversation.
And if the U.S. tries to force the issue militarily?
Then you're looking at a protracted conflict in terrain that favors the defender. The war was supposed to end Iran's military strength. Instead, it's shown the world how strong Iran's leverage actually is. That's the real strategic loss here.
What happens to oil prices while all this gets negotiated?
They stay high. That's the point. High prices are Iran's negotiating tool. They hurt the U.S. economy, they hurt Trump politically, and they give Iran time to extract concessions. It's leverage that compounds the longer it's held.