US urges Asian allies to match Europe's 5% defence spending amid China threat

Pete Hegseth stood before the region's defence leaders in Singapore on a Saturday morning in late May with a simple but pointed message: Asian countries were spending too little on their own security. The US Defence Secretary, addressing the 22nd Shangri-La Dialogue, argued that nations facing China and North Korea directly should be matching the defence commitments that Washington now expects from Europe—roughly 5 percent of gross domestic product annually. The comparison was deliberate and, by Hegseth's own admission, somewhat unusual. "It is hard to believe I can say this," he told the audience, "but Asian allies and partners should look to countries in Europe as a newfound example."

The Trump administration's pivot toward demanding greater burden-sharing from allies has been consistent since returning to office in January. When Hegseth first made similar arguments to European leaders at the Munich Security Conference in February, there were genuine fears the US might withdraw from NATO itself. But the message has only hardened. In Singapore, he framed the expectation as common sense: if Germany and other NATO members were pledging to spend 5 percent of their GDP on defence, how could it make sense for Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and others to spend far less while facing what he described as a more formidable threat? "How can it make sense," he asked, "for countries in Europe to do that while key allies and partners in Asia spend far less in the face of a far more formidable threat from communist China, not to mention North Korea?"

Hegseth's address was notable for what it affirmed and what it conspicuously did not say. China's defence minister did not attend the forum—the first absence since 2019—and Hegseth made a pointed remark about the empty chair without naming it directly. "We are here this morning. And somebody else isn't." More significantly, the Pentagon chief offered what may have been the Trump administration's first explicit reaffirmation of US commitment to Taiwan's defence, a commitment that had grown murky under Trump's recent rhetoric about the island stealing American thunder on semiconductors and his imposition of tariffs against it. "Let me be clear," Hegseth said. "Any attempt by communist China to conquer Taiwan would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world." He cited intelligence suggesting Chinese President Xi Jinping had ordered the military to be ready to invade by 2027, and he invoked Trump's own statement that "communist China will not invade Taiwan on his watch."

The broader framing of the speech drew on a comparison between Trump and Singapore's founding Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew—both pragmatists willing to challenge established ways of thinking. Hegseth emphasized that the US was not in the region to impose ideology or lecture allies on climate or culture, only to work where interests aligned. Yet the demand for higher defence spending is precisely the kind of pressure that will force difficult choices across Asia. Japan estimates its defence outlay will reach only 2 percent of GDP by 2027. South Korea spent about 2.8 percent in 2024. The Philippines and Thailand hovered just above 1 percent. Singapore has capped its defence spending at roughly 3 percent of GDP annually.

Experts consulted by The Straits Times suggested the pressure would land differently across the region. Dr. Adam Leong, director of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies in Malaysia, noted that the message was primarily targeted at Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, with countries like Singapore expected to follow later. But the implications are complex. Thailand's concerns are particularly acute: as a traditional American ally, the country faces internal tensions between its military and civilian government, and external pressure to spend more on defence could tip the balance toward military dominance. Dr. Jittipat Poonkham, an associate professor at Thammasat University in Bangkok, warned that such pressure, while framed as security necessity, could actually accelerate Thailand's drift toward China. "Thailand may not have much choice, given that it's also trying to negotiate with the US on the tariffs," he said. "But in the longer run, this may simply accelerate its pro-China trajectory."

The deeper tension Hegseth acknowledged but did not resolve is the economic bind facing Asian nations. China is the world's second-largest economy, and many countries in the region depend heavily on trade with Beijing. Hegseth argued that "economic dependence on China only deepens their malign influence and complicates our decision space during times of tension or conflict," suggesting that the Communist Party weaponizes economic ties. But breaking that dependence is not a matter of policy choice alone—it requires years of economic reorientation that most Asian nations cannot afford. The US demand for higher defence spending, then, arrives at a moment when Asian allies are already caught between two powers with incompatible visions for the region's future. Hegseth's message was clear: choose sides, and choose soon. What remains unclear is whether the region's nations have the economic or political space to answer as Washington hopes.