a way for miscalculation to flourish in the space between what each side thought the other was thinking
In the long arc of great-power rivalry, moments of deliberate contact carry as much weight as moments of confrontation. Following a November summit between President Biden and President Xi, senior military officials from the United States and China will meet by secure video conference in early January — Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin facing counterparts Xu Qiliang and Wei Fenghe across the digital divide. The meeting is less about resolution than about preservation: keeping the space between two armed, competing powers from filling with the kind of silence that precedes catastrophe.
- Months of Pentagon frustration preceded this breakthrough — Washington had been unable to reach Chinese officials with actual influence over military decisions, leaving a dangerous gap between available contacts and real decision-makers.
- Both nations are accelerating an arms race in hypersonic weapons, advanced conventional forces, and nuclear capabilities, with China's twin hypersonic tests last summer sharpening regional anxiety.
- Beijing has complicated any path to arms control by insisting Russia must be included in any bilateral treaty, ensuring January's talks will open a channel rather than close a competition.
- Taiwan remains the sharpest edge of the agenda, though a subtle signal has emerged: Chinese military sources suggest the PLA has quietly reduced its objections to U.S. warship transits through the Taiwan Strait.
- The January dialogue is being measured not by what it might achieve, but by what it might prevent — a miscalculation, an unintended clash, a silence that hardens into crisis.
The diplomatic machinery between Washington and Beijing is turning again. A November summit between Biden and Xi produced one concrete commitment: a mechanism for the two powers to speak when tensions rise. That commitment takes shape in early January, when Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will meet via secure video conference with China's Vice Chair Xu Qiliang and Defense Minister Wei Fenghe — senior figures close enough to Xi's inner circle to actually matter.
Reaching this point was harder than it looks. For months, the Pentagon found itself speaking with Chinese officials who lacked real influence over military decisions. Kurt Campbell, the White House's Indo-Pacific coordinator, said plainly in May that the contacts Beijing made available were nowhere near Xi's actual advisers. That structural gap — between who was willing to talk and who could actually decide — had become a liability in itself, a space where miscalculation could quietly take root.
The two militaries are racing each other across multiple domains: hypersonic weapons, advanced conventional forces, nuclear capability. China tested hypersonic weapons twice last summer, and Austin acknowledged the tests had raised regional tensions. Beijing has signaled it won't engage in arms control talks with Washington alone — any serious agreement, Chinese sources indicated, would require Russia's inclusion. January's talks won't end the race, but they might at least give each side a place to explain its intentions.
Taiwan will dominate the conversation. The island's government has grown confident in American support, while U.S. warships continue regular transits of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has historically protested those transits loudly — but something has shifted. Chinese military sources recently suggested the PLA has softened its objections, acknowledging the strait is international waters and the route saves considerable distance. It is a small concession, but in a relationship defined by mistrust, small concessions carry meaning.
What matters most about January's meeting may not be what is agreed, but what is avoided. A secure line between rivals is sometimes the most consequential thing either side can offer the other.
The machinery of great-power diplomacy is grinding back to life. After President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping sat down for three and a half hours in November, they agreed on something both sides desperately needed: a way to talk to each other when things get tense. Now, in early January, that commitment will take concrete form. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin will sit down—via secure video conference—with two of China's most powerful military figures: Xu Qiliang, who serves as vice chair of the Central Military Commission, and Wei Fenghe, China's defense minister. It's the kind of conversation that doesn't make headlines until it fails to happen.
Getting to this point required more work than it might appear. For months, the Pentagon had struggled to reach anyone in Xi's inner circle who actually mattered. The problem wasn't a lack of Chinese diplomats willing to talk; it was that the ones available to Washington had no real influence over Beijing's military decisions. Kurt Campbell, the White House's Indo-Pacific coordinator, put it bluntly in May: the senior officials China made accessible were "nowhere close" to Xi's actual advisers. That gap between available contacts and decision-makers had become an obstacle in itself—a way for miscalculation to flourish in the space between what each side thought the other was thinking.
The two militaries are locked in a competition that has no clear finish line. Both the United States and China are racing to develop hypersonic weapons, advanced conventional forces, and nuclear capabilities. Last summer, China tested hypersonic weapons twice. Austin acknowledged the tests and said they raised tensions across the region. Beijing, for its part, has made clear it won't negotiate arms control with Washington alone. Any serious agreement, Chinese sources told the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post, would have to include Russia. That's a significant condition—it means the bilateral talks in January won't solve the arms race, but they might at least create a channel where both sides can explain what they're doing and why.
Taiwan will almost certainly dominate the conversation. The island's democratic government has grown increasingly confident that American support won't waver, no matter how tense U.S.-China relations become. But confidence and reality don't always align. The United States has been sailing warships through the Taiwan Strait with regularity, a show of support that Beijing has traditionally protested loudly. Recently, though, something has shifted. Chinese military sources told the Post that the People's Liberation Army has toned down its objections to these transits. The warships, they noted, are simply using international waters on a route that cuts about a third off the journey from the South China Sea to the American base in Japan. It's a small thing—a military calculation about efficiency—but it suggests that even in an era of intense competition, both sides are finding ways to live with each other's presence.
What happens in these talks will matter less for what gets agreed than for what gets prevented. Biden has warned that competition between the superpowers must not "veer into conflict." He knows, as does Xi, that the risks of an unintended military clash are real and growing. The January meeting won't resolve the fundamental tensions between two powers competing for influence in the Pacific. But it might keep those tensions from boiling over into something neither side can control. In a relationship defined by mistrust, a secure phone line is sometimes the most important thing either side can offer the other.
Citações Notáveis
Competition between the U.S. and China should not 'veer into conflict'— President Joe Biden
Senior Chinese officials accessible to the U.S. were 'nowhere close' to Xi's inner circle— Kurt Campbell, White House Indo-Pacific coordinator
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter that these talks are happening virtually instead of in person?
Because it signals both sides want to talk but aren't ready to signal warmth or trust. A virtual meeting is safer—less ceremonial, easier to walk away from if things go wrong. It's practical, not symbolic.
The article mentions that China won't do arms control bilaterally. What does that really mean?
It means Beijing doesn't want to be isolated in negotiations. By insisting Russia be included, China avoids looking like it's capitulating to American pressure. It's a way of saying: we're not the weaker party here.
You mentioned that the PLA has "toned down" opposition to U.S. warships. Is that a sign things are getting better?
Not better—just more pragmatic. Both sides are accepting that the other will operate in these waters. It's not reconciliation. It's exhaustion with the performance of outrage.
Why was it so hard for the Pentagon to reach Xu Qiliang before?
Because China controls access deliberately. They keep lower-level diplomats available to Washington, but the people who actually advise Xi on military matters stay insulated. It's a way of maintaining leverage—you can't negotiate with someone you can't reach.
What's the real risk here that both sides are trying to manage?
Accident. A miscalculation. A warship collision, a misread signal, a weapons test that looks like an attack. When you're competing this intensely, the margin for error shrinks. These talks are about keeping that margin from disappearing entirely.