a political problem for the FCDO
In the long reckoning of nations that witness atrocity and choose silence, the United Kingdom now faces a particular accounting: a Yale human rights investigator will tell Parliament that British officials, aware of foreign support for a genocidal militia in Sudan, suppressed that knowledge to preserve ties with the United Arab Emirates. The testimony of Nathaniel Raymond — built from encrypted messages, phone records, and internal memos — places the UK's diplomatic calculations against the backdrop of at least 60,000 civilians systematically killed after the fall of El Fasher. As the UN Security Council's penholder on Sudan, Britain held unusual power to shape the international response; the question now before its lawmakers is whether that power was surrendered not by failure, but by choice.
- A Yale investigator tracked mobile phones moving between Ethiopia and RSF-controlled territory, finding handsets traveling to UAE addresses linked to the militia's deputy commander — including one that reached Abu Dhabi in four hours with no matching commercial flight.
- FCDO officials privately asked Raymond to release the damning phone data himself, acknowledging that UAE pressure was preventing the UK government from acting on its own intelligence.
- When Raymond briefed Parliament's international development committee that at least 60,000 civilians had been systematically killed after El Fasher's fall, an FCDO official challenged the figure — a challenge Raymond came to interpret as political rather than methodological.
- A British UN official expressed despair to Raymond just before El Fasher fell, describing the Starmer government as unable or unwilling to act even as mass atrocities were assessed as imminent.
- The UK's role as UN Security Council penholder on Sudan — the position Raymond called 'our best hope' for intervention — now sits at the center of questions about whether diplomatic and economic interests with the UAE systematically overrode genocide prevention obligations.
Nathaniel Raymond, director of Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab, is preparing to tell British lawmakers that the UK government received intelligence in 2024 linking Ethiopia to the arming of Sudan's Rapid Support Forces — a paramilitary group investigators have documented as committing genocide — and chose to withhold it publicly under pressure from the United Arab Emirates.
Raymond's testimony, drawn from three years of encrypted messages, internal memos, and phone records, centers on a May 2024 meeting with FCDO officials in London. He had tracked mobile phones traveling between Addis Ababa and RSF-controlled territory, some reaching UAE addresses his team believed were shell companies linked to the RSF's deputy commander. One handset made the journey from Ethiopia to Abu Dhabi in four hours with no matching commercial flight — a detail suggesting deliberate concealment. The FCDO officials told Raymond the UAE was applying significant private pressure on the UK, and asked him to release the data independently so it could enter the public record without British fingerprints. He declined, unwilling to compromise his sources, and instead shared the intelligence secretly with the United States to support sanctions.
The suppression of intelligence was not the only concern Raymond will raise. After El Fasher fell to the RSF following an eighteen-month siege, he briefed Parliament's international development committee that at least 60,000 civilians had been systematically killed — a figure that excluded deaths from famine or bombardment during the siege itself. An FCDO atrocity-prevention official subsequently questioned whether the number was too high. Raymond, after further exchanges, concluded the estimate had become 'a political problem for the FCDO.'
As El Fasher was on the verge of falling in late September 2025, a British UN official communicated despair to Raymond about the Starmer government's apparent paralysis, even as intelligence pointed to imminent mass atrocities. Britain held the penholder role on Sudan at the UN Security Council — the lead position Raymond describes as 'our best hope' for halting what he believed would become one of the largest mass-casualty events of the century. His testimony will argue that the UK instead placed its economic, security, and diplomatic relationships with the UAE above the prevention of genocidal slaughter. The FCDO has not yet responded to requests for comment.
A Yale human rights investigator is about to tell British lawmakers something that will test their appetite for uncomfortable truths: the UK government knew Ethiopia was arming a genocidal militia in Sudan as early as 2024, but chose silence to protect its relationship with the United Arab Emirates.
Nathaniel Raymond, director of Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab, will testify to Parliament's international development committee on Tuesday with evidence drawn from three years of encrypted messages, internal memos, and phone records. The story he will tell is one of diplomatic calculation overriding moral obligation at a moment when tens of thousands of lives hung in the balance.
In May 2024, Raymond met with officials from the UK's Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in London. He came bearing data his team had compiled by tracking mobile phones moving between Ethiopia's capital, Addis Ababa, and territory controlled by the Rapid Support Forces—a paramilitary group waging what investigators have documented as genocide in Sudan's civil war. Some of those phones moved to addresses in the UAE that Raymond's team believed were shell companies linked to the RSF's deputy commander, Abdul Rahim Dagalo. One handset traveled from Addis Ababa to Abu Dhabi in four hours, with no matching commercial flight records—a detail suggesting deliberate evasion. The FCDO officials, according to Raymond's account, made an unusual request: they asked him to publicly release the phone data analysis himself, since the UK government could not. Their explanation was blunt. The UAE was applying "significant private pressure" behind the scenes, they said, constraining Britain's ability to act. If Raymond's research lab released the information independently, perhaps it could help neutralize the emirates' efforts to keep the UK silent about their role in arming the RSF.
Raymond could not comply. Releasing the telecommunications data would have compromised his sources and operational methods. Instead, he shared it secretly with the United States to support sanctions against Dagalo-linked companies. The public remained in the dark about Ethiopian and Emirati involvement until February 2026, when Reuters reported that Addis Ababa was hosting a training camp for RSF fighters, backed by the UAE. Both countries denied the allegations.
But the suppression of intelligence was only part of what Raymond will describe to MPs. He will also detail how the UK government appeared to downplay the human cost of the RSF's assault on El Fasher, a city that fell to the militia after an eighteen-month siege. After the city's capture, Raymond privately briefed the international development committee with his assessment: at least 60,000 civilians had been systematically killed by the RSF. An FCDO atrocity-prevention official contacted him to question whether that figure was too high. Raymond explained his methodology—the 60,000 did not include deaths from famine or from the RSF's bombardment during the siege itself. "In reality," he wrote in testimony to be presented to the committee, "the number of people that the RSF systematically killed after capturing the city could have been higher." After further discussion, Raymond came to a stark conclusion: "I came to believe that this estimate of at least 60,000 people killed by the RSF was a political problem for the FCDO."
On September 26, 2025, as El Fasher was about to fall, a British UN official expressed despair in communications with Raymond about the Starmer government's apparent inability or unwillingness to act, even as intelligence indicated that mass atrocities were imminent. The UK held the position of penholder on Sudan at the UN Security Council—the lead role that gave it outsized influence over the international response. It was, Raymond will tell Parliament, "our best hope at that time for stopping what we believed would become one of the single largest mass-casualty events of the 21st century." Instead, the UK prioritized what Raymond describes as its "economic, security and diplomatic relationships with the UAE above preventing the intentional starvation and genocidal slaughter of tens of thousands of civilians." The FCDO has been asked for comment but has not yet responded.
Notable Quotes
They told me that the UK was facing significant private pressure behind the scenes from the UAE, limiting its ability to affect the situation.— Nathaniel Raymond, describing what FCDO officials told him in May 2024
I came to believe that this estimate of at least 60,000 people killed by the RSF was a political problem for the FCDO.— Nathaniel Raymond, in written testimony about an FCDO official's response to death toll estimates
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why would the UK suppress intelligence about the UAE's role in Sudan? What was at stake in that relationship?
The UAE is a major economic and security partner for Britain—defense contracts, trade, counterterrorism cooperation. The calculus appears to have been that publicly linking the emirates to arming a genocidal militia would damage those ties irreparably. The FCDO officials were explicit about it: they called it "significant private pressure."
But Raymond had the evidence. Why didn't he just release it himself?
He couldn't without burning his sources. His team's power comes from being able to track phone movements, infiltrate communications networks, build cases that hold up. Release the methodology, and you lose the ability to do it again. So he was trapped—he had proof of something catastrophic, but the only way to use it would have destroyed his capacity to gather intelligence in the future.
The FCDO official who questioned the death toll—was that person trying to cover something up, or genuinely uncertain?
The testimony suggests it was political. Raymond didn't say the official was lying about the numbers. He said the official seemed concerned that the figure itself was becoming a "political problem." That's different. It's the discomfort of a number that won't go away quietly.
What does it mean that the UK was penholder on Sudan at the Security Council?
It means the UK had the formal authority to shape the international response. It could have pushed for sanctions, investigations, military intervention. Instead, it stayed quiet. That's not just a failure of one government office—it's a failure at the highest level of international accountability.
Will this testimony actually change anything?
That depends on whether Parliament takes it seriously. Raymond is presenting evidence, not opinion. But evidence only matters if people act on it. The question now is whether MPs will demand answers about why diplomatic comfort mattered more than genocide prevention.