The regime had posted 'Wanted: Dead or Alive' billboards of him in Tehran
In the long and troubled history of states reaching beyond their borders to silence dissenting voices, a London courtroom has rendered a rare and explicit verdict: the Iranian regime, through hired proxies, attempted to murder a journalist on British soil. Pouria Zeraati, a presenter for the regime-critical channel Iran International, was stabbed three times outside his Wimbledon home in March 2024 by two Romanian nationals acting, a judge concluded, on Tehran's behalf. The sentencing of Nandito Badea and George Stana marks not only a moment of legal accountability but a warning about the quiet, outsourced violence that authoritarian states increasingly deploy against those who dare to speak.
- A journalist marked 'Wanted: Dead or Alive' on billboards in Tehran was left bleeding in a London street after a meticulously planned stabbing carried out by men who had surveilled his home eight times across five separate dates.
- The attack bore the unmistakable architecture of a state operation — a getaway car, coordinated roles, international travel, and attackers who laughed on their way to catch a flight to Geneva hours after the assault.
- Defense teams argued their clients were ignorant foot soldiers who didn't understand what they were part of, but the judge found the weight of evidence — planning, surveillance, precision — too deliberate to excuse.
- Zeraati survived but has been forced to flee Britain entirely, living abroad in fear, his physical wounds healing while the psychological damage of being hunted by a government remains unresolved.
- British authorities are now fast-tracking legislation to confront what they describe as a rapidly accelerating pattern of hostile foreign states using criminal proxies to conduct violence on UK soil.
On the morning of March 29, 2024, Pouria Zeraati stepped outside his Wimbledon home and was stabbed three times in the thigh by two men who left him bleeding in the street before making their way calmly to Heathrow and boarding a flight to Geneva. He was not a random victim. He was a television presenter for Iran International, a Persian-language channel that had built its reputation on criticizing the Tehran regime — and the regime had made its feelings known, posting billboards bearing his photograph in Tehran with the words 'Wanted: Dead or Alive.'
Nandito Badea, 21, and George Stana, 25, both Romanian nationals, were convicted of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb sentenced Stana to twelve years and Badea to eight, ruling unambiguously that the attack had been carried out on behalf of Iran. A third man, David Andrei, who had conducted surveillance alongside Badea on eight occasions across five separate dates, remains in Romania and was not tried. Prosecutors argued the planning had begun more than a year before the stabbing.
The operation had the shape of a state-directed assassination attempt. Stana waited in a getaway car while the others approached. CCTV captured the reconnaissance. The stab wounds — three, to the thigh — were precise enough to incapacitate without guaranteeing death, the kind of violence designed as much to terrorize as to harm. Defense teams argued that Stana was functionally illiterate and unaware of any Iranian connection, and that the court couldn't be certain Badea had held the knife. The judge was unconvinced.
Zeraati described the aftermath as a life transformed by fear. He has since relocated abroad, unable to return to the country where he was attacked. British counter-terrorism officials say his case is not an outlier — the use of criminal proxies by hostile foreign states is accelerating. Security Minister Angela Eagle announced that new legislation would be fast-tracked to address the growing threat of state-linked organizations operating through hired agents on British soil.
On the morning of March 29, 2024, Pouria Zeraati stepped outside his home in Wimbledon and was set upon by two men who stabbed him three times in the thigh, leaving him bleeding in the street. Zeraati worked as a television presenter for Iran International, a Persian-language news channel that had made its name broadcasting criticism of the Tehran regime. The attack was not random. It was, a judge at the Old Bailey would later conclude, a calculated act of violence ordered by the Iranian state and carried out by proxies—a method that British security officials say is becoming disturbingly common.
Nandito Badea, 21, and George Stana, 25, both Romanian nationals, were convicted of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. On Friday, Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb sentenced Stana to twelve years in prison and Badea to eight. The judge's ruling was unambiguous: the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrated that the attack had been carried out on behalf of Iran. Stana, she said, "ought to have known" the nature of what he was participating in. Badea and a third man, David Andrei—who remains in Romania and was not tried—had conducted surveillance of Zeraati's property on eight separate occasions across five different dates. Both men had flown into the country specifically for the purpose of the attack, prosecutors argued, and the planning had begun more than a year before the stabbing took place.
The operation had the hallmarks of a state-directed assassination attempt. Stana waited in a Mazda getaway car while Badea and Andrei approached their target. CCTV footage captured the reconnaissance missions. After the stabbing, the attackers were seen laughing as they made their way to Heathrow Airport and boarded a flight to Geneva. The violence itself was precise and brutal—three stab wounds to the thigh, the kind of injury designed to incapacitate and terrify.
Zeraati's prominence made him a target. He was a recognizable face on Iran International, which the Tehran regime had designated as a terrorist organization. The regime's hostility toward him was not subtle. A billboard bearing his photograph had appeared in Tehran with the words "Wanted: Dead or Alive." His family had received threats. He was, in the eyes of the Iranian state, an enemy worth eliminating.
The defense arguments fell short. Stana's barrister argued that his client was "functionally illiterate" and unaware of current affairs, and therefore could not have known he was working on behalf of Iran. Badea's legal team contended that the court could not be certain their client had been the one who wielded the knife. The judge was not persuaded. The evidence of planning, surveillance, and coordination pointed to a deliberate operation.
Zeraati, in a victim impact statement to police, described the aftermath in stark terms. The attack had left him "scared and anxious." He had been forced to relocate abroad, living in fear of reprisals. The physical wounds would heal; the psychological ones were less certain.
The case has become a focal point for British security concerns about what officials call the use of "proxies" by hostile foreign states. Kris Wright, head of protective security operations for counter-terrorism policing London, said the trend is accelerating. "Our recent casework shows an increasing use of so-called proxies by hostile foreign states to conduct illegal activity and attacks in the UK," he stated. Security Minister Angela Eagle promised that new legislation would be fast-tracked to introduce powers to clamp down on state-linked organizations and those who act as their agents. The message was clear: the UK would not tolerate foreign regimes using hired hands to conduct violence on British soil.
Citas Notables
I am sure that this was an attack carried out for and for the benefit of a foreign power.— Mrs Justice Cheema-Grubb, Old Bailey
Our recent casework shows an increasing use of so-called proxies by hostile foreign states to conduct illegal activity and attacks in the UK.— Kris Wright, head of protective security operations for counter-terrorism policing London
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would Iran go to such lengths—the surveillance, the planning, the international coordination—to attack one journalist?
Because Zeraati was doing something the regime found intolerable: broadcasting criticism of Iran to Iranians. Iran International reaches people inside the country. A face on a billboard, a voice on the news—that's influence the regime couldn't control or silence.
But sending two men from Romania seems like an odd choice. Why not use operatives closer to home?
That's the whole point of using proxies. You create distance. If something goes wrong, the regime has plausible deniability. You hire people who are expendable, who can be prosecuted without directly implicating the state apparatus. It's a way of exporting violence while keeping your hands technically clean.
The judge said the evidence "overwhelmingly" pointed to Iranian involvement. What was that evidence?
The coordination was too precise to be coincidental. Eight surveillance visits. Flights booked specifically for the attack. A getaway driver waiting in a car. The timing, the planning over more than a year—this wasn't two random men deciding to stab a journalist. Someone ordered it, funded it, and directed it.
And Zeraati had to leave the country afterward?
Yes. He was terrified of reprisals. One attack doesn't end the threat; it announces it. He had to go.
What does this mean for other journalists critical of Iran?
It means the threat is real and it's mobile. It doesn't stop at Iran's borders. If you're a prominent critic of the regime, you're potentially a target anywhere.