After nearly five months of war, Trump is in a worse position than when he started.
Five months after launching a military campaign meant to assert control over the Strait of Hormuz, the United States finds itself holding less than it started with — the waterway still in Iranian hands, 6,000 sailors still stranded, and a $100 billion expenditure with no clear return. A hastily proposed shipping toll, abandoned within hours under pressure from allies, cabinet members, and international law, laid bare the absence of any coherent American vision for the strait's future. What began as a bid for decisive leverage has become a lesson in the limits of force when strategy is absent — a reminder that geopolitical order, once disrupted, does not reassemble simply because a powerful nation wills it so.
- A 20 percent toll on Strait of Hormuz transit was floated and killed within 24 hours, exposing a White House unable to align its improvised tactics with its own stated commitments to international law.
- Six thousand American sailors remain trapped in the strait, oil prices are climbing toward $90 a barrel, and a $100 billion military campaign has produced no measurable strategic gain.
- The June memorandum of understanding with Iran — Trump's implicit admission that five months of bombing had failed — is already unraveling, with an August 17 negotiating deadline that few believe is achievable.
- Iran has grown politically stronger since the campaign began, its chief negotiator consolidating power in parliament, while American credibility erodes among Gulf partners and international maritime institutions alike.
- Oman's foreign minister has publicly argued that forty-five years of American containment policy were always a myth, and that the real threats to regional stability originate not in Tehran but in decisions made in Tel Aviv and Washington.
- With midterm elections approaching and no exit strategy in sight, Trump faces the compounding risk of a global recession, a fractured coalition, and a conflict he initiated by abandoning negotiations that had kept the strait open.
Five months after Donald Trump launched military strikes on Iranian positions, the Strait of Hormuz remains under Tehran's control, 6,000 American sailors are still caught in the waterway, and the administration has spent an estimated $100 billion without achieving its core objective. What was promised as a swift, decisive campaign has become a grinding stalemate — and the confusion at the top has only deepened.
The most revealing moment came in mid-July, when Trump announced a plan to levy a 20 percent toll on ships transiting the strait. By the following day, the proposal was dead. Shipping companies, cabinet members, regional partners, and the international maritime community all pushed back simultaneously. The damage ran deeper than a policy miscalculation: just days earlier, the U.S. ambassador to the IMO in London had pledged America's vigorous defense of freedom of navigation, and the IMO had just reaffirmed that the strait must remain toll-free. Secretary of State Marco Rubio had himself called tolls incompatible with international law. The reversal made all of that rhetoric instantly hollow.
What the episode exposed was the absence of any coherent American vision for the strait's future. Workable international models existed — frameworks drawn from the Strait of Malacca or the Bosphorus arrangements — and both Iran and Oman had signaled willingness to discuss them. Washington had nothing to offer in return. Trump attempted to reframe the retreat by claiming Gulf leaders had pledged major investments in the U.S. economy, but no such commitments materialized.
The strategic picture had already darkened in June, when Trump signed a vague memorandum of understanding with Iran — effectively acknowledging that five months of military force had failed. He told CNBC he didn't want a depression on his résumé, a candid admission that prolonged closure of the strait risked serious global economic harm. Oil prices were already climbing toward $90 a barrel. The MoU's August 17 deadline for nuclear negotiations now looks entirely unrealistic, and fighting has resumed as both sides have drifted further from its terms.
The financial and human costs keep accumulating. American bases in Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain continue to absorb Iranian strikes. Inside Iran, chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has consolidated his position in parliament, while facing daily pressure to justify talks with a counterparty that discards agreements without warning.
Trump's deepest vulnerability is that he created this crisis himself. The strait was open until he took Benjamin Netanyahu's advice, abandoned diplomacy, and began bombing. Now, nearly five months later, he is in a worse position than when he started — unable to articulate what he wants from the strait or how he intends to get it. Oman's foreign minister, writing in Le Monde, argued that forty-five years of American containment had always been a myth, and that the real threats to Gulf stability came from decisions made outside the region. That observation captures the core of Trump's predicament: he inherited a fragile equilibrium, chose to shatter it, and is now discovering that the pieces do not fall back into place on command.
Five months into a conflict that was supposed to be quick and decisive, Donald Trump finds himself trapped in a strategic dead end of his own making. What began in February with military strikes on Iranian positions has devolved into a grinding stalemate punctuated by policy reversals so sudden they leave even his own officials scrambling to explain them. The core problem is simple and damning: the waterway Trump set out to control remains in Iranian hands, the 6,000 sailors caught in the Strait of Hormuz are still there, and the president is no closer to achieving his stated objectives than when the bombing campaign started.
The clearest sign of the administration's confusion came in mid-July when Trump announced a plan to charge a 20 percent toll on ships transiting the strait—a proposal he had apparently been considering for some time, according to White House briefings on Tuesday. By Wednesday, it was dead. The revolt came from everywhere at once: shipping companies, members of his own cabinet, regional partners, and the international maritime community. The embarrassment ran deeper than a simple policy miscalculation. Just days earlier, the U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom had stood before the International Maritime Organization council in London and pledged that America would "vigorously" defend freedom of navigation as a cornerstone of international law. The IMO itself had just passed a motion reaffirming that passage through the strait should remain free of tolls. Trump's own secretary of state, Marco Rubio, had previously stated that tolls were incompatible with international law. The toll proposal made all of that rhetoric instantly hollow.
What makes the reversal particularly damaging is what it reveals about the state of American policymaking. The administration had no coherent vision for the strait's future. International models existed—frameworks based on the Strait of Malacca, or the Bosphorus and Dardanelles arrangements, both of which the IMO had studied. Iran and Oman, the two countries with actual stakes in the waterway, were willing to discuss these alternatives. But Washington had nothing to offer except an improvised tax scheme that collapsed within hours of announcement. Trump tried to cover the retreat by claiming Gulf leaders had pledged substantial investments in the U.S. economy, but the claim rang hollow. No such commitments materialized.
The deeper strategic picture is worse. When Trump signed a vague memorandum of understanding with Iran on June 17, he was essentially admitting that five months of military force had failed. He told CNBC he didn't want to be "a president with a depression on my resume"—an acknowledgment that if the strait remained closed much longer, the global economy faced serious risk. Oil prices were already climbing toward $90 a barrel, a trajectory that threatened his political standing ahead of midterm elections. The MoU promised negotiations on Iran's nuclear program by August 17, but that deadline now looks entirely unrealistic. The document itself was vague enough to be interpreted differently by both sides, and the fighting has resumed as both Washington and Tehran have moved further from its terms.
The human and financial toll keeps mounting. The U.S. military campaign has cost an estimated $100 billion, including damage to American bases in Kuwait, Jordan, and Bahrain that Iran continues to strike. The 6,000 sailors trapped in the strait remain there because the waterway is still controlled by Tehran, which has only grown stronger politically following the death of its supreme leader. Inside Iran's government, chief negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf has purged his critics in parliament, but he faces daily pressure to justify negotiations with a counterparty that appears willing to discard agreements at will.
Trump's fundamental vulnerability is that he created this crisis himself. The strait was open and functioning until he took Benjamin Netanyahu's advice, abandoned the negotiating table, and launched the bombing campaign. Now, after nearly five months of war, he is in a worse position than when he started. The advocates for continued military pressure—those who believe Iran will eventually crumble under a reinstated oil embargo—are back in the room. But their confidence looks increasingly detached from reality. The administration cannot articulate what it actually wants from the strait or how it plans to achieve it. As Philip Gordon, Joe Biden's former national security adviser, pointed out, the MoU itself was poorly drafted, with the U.S. failing to clarify what it expected in exchange for the massive financial relief it promised.
Meanwhile, the debate has widened beyond the strait itself. Sayyid Badr Albusaidi, Oman's foreign minister, wrote in Le Monde that the entire premise of American Iran policy was flawed. Forty-five years of costly containment had been revealed as a myth. The real threats to Gulf security, he argued, came not from within the region but from decisions made outside it—particularly in Tel Aviv. That observation cuts to the heart of Trump's predicament. He inherited a region where American military presence and regional partnerships had created a fragile equilibrium. He chose to shatter it, and now he is discovering that the pieces do not reassemble on command.
Citações Notáveis
Trump told CNBC he did not want to be a president with a depression on his resume, effectively admitting that five months of military force had failed to achieve its purpose.— Trump, via CNBC reporting
The U.S. failure to clarify what it expected in exchange for massive financial relief in the MoU was as problematic as Iran's attacks on shipping.— Philip Gordon, former U.S. national security adviser
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why did Trump propose the toll in the first place if it contradicted everything the U.S. had just said about freedom of navigation?
Because he was looking for a way to claim victory without actually achieving his military objective. The toll would have generated revenue and allowed him to say he'd "monetized" the strait. It was a face-saving measure that collapsed the moment anyone looked at it closely.
But his own secretary of state had already said tolls violated international law. Didn't anyone in the room point that out?
They did, but apparently not before the announcement. The White House briefings on Tuesday insisted it was a serious, long-considered plan. By Wednesday, after the revolt from shipping companies and his own officials, it was abandoned. The machinery of government wasn't functioning coherently.
What does Trump actually want from the strait now?
That's the question no one can answer. He wants it open and under American influence, but he's unwilling to negotiate seriously and he's run out of military options that work. The MoU he signed in June was an admission that bombing hadn't achieved the goal. Now he's back to bombing, but with no clearer strategy.
Is there a way out of this for him politically?
Not a good one. Oil prices climbing toward $90 a barrel hurt him before the midterms. The 6,000 sailors are still trapped. Iran is stronger, not weaker. He's spent $100 billion and has less to show for it than when he started. The only question is whether the war escalates further or whether he finds another way to declare victory and leave.
What about the regional players—Iran, Oman, the Gulf states?
They're watching an American president who can't stick to his own stated principles or his own agreements. Iran sees weakness masked by force. Oman is arguing that the whole containment strategy was a myth. The Gulf states are hedging their bets because they can't trust American commitment to anything.