China cannot afford a completely failed Russia
As the war in Ukraine enters its fourth year, Donald Trump has placed a significant diplomatic wager: that Xi Jinping holds enough sway over Vladimir Putin to bring Russia to the negotiating table. The theory rests on China's role as Russia's economic lifeline, yet it asks Beijing to sacrifice a partnership it has carefully cultivated as a counterweight to Western power. History reminds us that the architecture of great-power alliances rarely bends to the will of a single phone call, and the human cost of miscalculation falls, as always, on those least responsible for the decisions being made.
- Trump is pressing Xi directly — by phone and from the Davos stage — to use China's economic leverage over Russia to force a ceasefire, a gamble that assumes Beijing will trade its most powerful alliance for improved relations with Washington.
- China's 'no limits' partnership with Russia is not merely diplomatic decoration; it is a strategic architecture built to resist Western pressure, and analysts warn Xi has every reason to protect it, especially with Taiwan's future hanging in the balance.
- Ukraine's position is precarious: Zelensky says he will negotiate only with firm security guarantees and continued Western support, while Russia insists on NATO exclusion and territorial concessions — terms that would leave Ukraine diminished.
- A flurry of high-stakes meetings — Munich, Kyiv, and NATO capitals — is converging this week, with Vance, Bessent, and European allies all moving pieces on a board whose rules are still being written.
- The deepest fear among analysts is not that talks will fail, but that they will succeed on terms that freeze the conflict rather than resolve it, setting a precedent that rewards territorial conquest and destabilizes the international order from Europe to the Pacific.
Donald Trump has built his Ukraine strategy around a single conviction: that Xi Jinping, as Russia's most consequential economic partner, can pressure Vladimir Putin toward peace. He raised the idea directly with Xi by phone and amplified it at Davos, arguing that Beijing holds decisive cards in the conflict. The logic has surface appeal — China has kept Russia's economy breathing through nearly four years of Western sanctions, supplying dual-use goods that sustain Moscow's war machine.
But the strategy runs into a structural problem. China and Russia declared a 'no limits' partnership just before the invasion began, and for Beijing, that alliance is not incidental — it is the cornerstone of a shared project to reshape a world order both powers see as tilted against them. Analysts like Yun Sun of the Stimson Center note that while Trump might tempt Xi with the promise of broader US-China détente, Beijing will not lightly abandon the one powerful ally it has. The Taiwan dimension adds another layer: some observers believe Xi values Russia as a potential partner should Beijing ever move on the island, making the cost of betrayal even higher.
Trump's approach diverges sharply from his predecessor's. Where Biden framed American support for Ukraine as a defense of the rules-based international order, Trump has spoken in transactional terms — suggesting US weapons in exchange for access to Ukrainian mineral wealth, and musing that Ukraine 'may be Russian someday.' His administration has simultaneously dispatched senior officials to consult European and NATO partners, asking them to shoulder more of the burden of supporting Kyiv.
The coming days are dense with diplomacy. JD Vance is set to meet Zelensky in Munich, where China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi will also be present. Treasury Secretary Bessent is heading to Kyiv to discuss mineral deposits. Zelensky has signaled openness to talks but insists on security guarantees; Russia has demanded Ukraine renounce NATO membership and accept its territorial losses.
The risk that haunts analysts is not a failed negotiation but a successful one on the wrong terms. A deal in which Putin keeps occupied territory, Xi and Trump claim the mantle of peacemakers, and Ukraine is left exposed could produce not resolution but a frozen conflict — one that emboldens future aggression, unsettles NATO, and sends a signal to Taiwan that the international community's commitments have a price.
Donald Trump has settled on a theory about how to end the war in Ukraine: convince Xi Jinping to pressure Vladimir Putin toward the negotiating table. The American president has already raised the subject with the Chinese leader by phone and repeated it publicly at Davos, where he told assembled business and political figures that Beijing holds the cards in this conflict. "They have a great deal of power over that situation," Trump said, and he intends to work with them to use it.
The logic seems straightforward enough. China has become Russia's economic lifeline during nearly four years of war, supplying dual-use goods that feed Moscow's defense sector and keeping trade flowing when Western sanctions have tried to choke it off. If anyone can lean on Putin, the thinking goes, it's Xi. But the plan collides immediately with a harder reality: China and Russia have built what they call a "no limits" partnership, a relationship Xi declared weeks before Russian tanks crossed into Ukraine and one he has no obvious reason to abandon. For Beijing, Russia is not just a trading partner or a diplomatic ally. It is the counterweight to American pressure, the partner that shares China's view that the Western-led world order is in decline and that their moment is rising. Lose Russia, and China loses leverage in a world it is trying to reshape.
Analysts who study Chinese foreign policy are skeptical that Xi will risk that partnership, no matter what Trump offers. Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center, notes that while Beijing might be tempted to cooperate if Trump frames Ukraine as the key to improving US-China relations overall, the Chinese leadership will remain wary of undermining its alignment with Moscow. The calculus is even more complicated by Taiwan. Some observers believe Xi sees Putin as potential support if Beijing ever moves to take control of the self-governing island that China claims. Cutting off Russia now could mean losing that insurance policy later.
Trump's approach to the conflict has shifted dramatically from his predecessor's. Where Joe Biden and NATO allies saw American military aid to Ukraine as essential to defending not just one country's sovereignty but the entire rules-based international order, Trump has suggested a transactional approach. In a recent Fox News interview, he indicated the US should gain access to Ukraine's natural resources in exchange for weapons. He has also said Ukraine "may be Russian someday" and claimed his administration has made "tremendous progress" laying groundwork for peace talks, though he offered no specifics. This week, his Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and special envoy to Ukraine and Russia are meeting with European and NATO counterparts to push them toward taking a larger role in supporting Kyiv.
The coming days will test whether any of this can work. Vice President JD Vance is scheduled to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky at the Munich Security Conference beginning Friday, where China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi will also lead a delegation. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent is expected to travel to Kyiv to discuss the country's mineral deposits, while the special envoy will visit after Munich. Zelensky has said he is willing to negotiate but only if the US and Europe continue supporting Ukraine and provide security guarantees. Russia, meanwhile, has reiterated that it will accept peace only if Ukraine abandons NATO ambitions and cedes the regions Russia has annexed.
The fundamental tension is this: Trump appears to believe Xi can simply threaten to cut off Russia's supply of essential goods and force Putin to compromise. But scholars of Chinese foreign policy say it is not that simple. Liu Dongshu, an assistant professor at City University of Hong Kong, points out that China cannot afford a completely failed Russia. Beijing's relations with the US and Europe have already deteriorated so severely that it has little choice but to continue backing its only powerful diplomatic ally. To abandon Russia now would be to stand alone against the West—a position China is not prepared to accept.
What makes the moment even more uncertain is that Trump himself has echoed Russian and Chinese talking points about the war. He has sympathized with Moscow's view that Ukraine should not join NATO and suggested the conflict continued because America "started pouring equipment" into the country. This alignment with Beijing and Moscow's stated positions raises a question that keeps analysts awake: Is there a deal all three could claim as victory? Putin could save face, Xi and Trump could pose as peacemakers, and the Americans could declare the conflict resolved. But as Robert Ward, director of geo-economics and strategy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, warns, any agreement that leaves Russia in possession of occupied Ukrainian territory risks creating not an end to the war but merely a pause—a frozen conflict that could reignite, with profound consequences for NATO, Taiwan, and the future of the international order Trump's predecessors spent decades building.
Citas Notables
They have a great deal of power over that situation, and we'll work with them— Trump, speaking at Davos about China's role in ending the Ukraine war
China cannot afford a completely failed Russia, because China cannot afford to stand alone against the West— Liu Dongshu, assistant professor at City University of Hong Kong, on why Beijing won't pressure Moscow
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Trump think China can actually move Putin on this? What leverage does Xi really have?
Trump sees the economic relationship—China is keeping Russia's war machine running with dual-use goods and trade. But that's exactly why Xi won't use it as a threat. China can't afford a Russia that collapses. If Beijing cuts Russia off, it stands alone against the West. That's not a position China wants to be in.
So Xi has leverage, but he won't use it?
Exactly. He has leverage, but using it would cost him more than keeping quiet. Russia is his only major ally in a world where the US and Europe are already hostile to Beijing. Losing that partnership would be strategically catastrophic.
What about Taiwan? Does that factor in?
It's huge. Some analysts think Xi sees Putin as potential support if China ever moves on Taiwan. If Xi weakens Russia now by pressuring it toward a peace deal, he loses that insurance. It's another reason he won't risk the relationship.
So Trump's plan is built on a misunderstanding of how Beijing actually thinks?
Not entirely a misunderstanding—more a mismatch between what Trump can offer and what Xi actually needs. Trump thinks he can make cooperation on Ukraine worth China's while. But Xi's calculation is much longer-term and much broader. Ukraine is one piece of a much larger game about reshaping world order.
What happens if Trump, Xi, and Putin actually do broker something?
That's the real danger. You could end up with a deal that lets Putin keep what he's conquered, lets Trump claim victory, and lets Xi position himself as a statesman. But for Ukraine, it's not peace—it's a pause. The conflict freezes, the occupation continues, and the underlying tensions never get resolved.