You can't solve a continental drug problem without the biggest country
Em Miami, Donald Trump reuniu doze líderes conservadores da América Latina para discutir uma nova estratégia militar contra o narcotráfico — uma cúpula cujo significado mais profundo reside não em quem compareceu, mas em quem ficou de fora. Brasil, México e Colômbia, as três maiores economias do hemisfério e os países mais decisivos para qualquer resposta eficaz ao tráfico de drogas, estiveram ausentes. A disputa sobre se Lula foi ou não convidado é apenas o sintoma superficial de uma divergência mais fundamental: como o continente deve enfrentar o crime organizado — pela força militar ou pela governança civil.
- Trump afirmou publicamente que Lula foi convidado para a cúpula e não compareceu, enquanto o governo brasileiro nega categoricamente ter recebido qualquer convite — uma contradição pequena com consequências diplomáticas potencialmente grandes.
- A ausência do Brasil, do México e da Colômbia — os três países mais estratégicos na cadeia do narcotráfico — expõe o limite real da coalizão formada em Miami: ela reúne aliados ideológicos, mas não os atores indispensáveis.
- Trump anunciou a criação de uma coalizão militar formal com autorização para uso de força letal contra cartéis em toda a América Latina, escalando o tom bem além de operações de inteligência ou cooperação policial.
- Washington prepara a designação do PCC e do Comando Vermelho como organizações terroristas, uma medida que o governo Lula rejeita por entender que militariza um problema que exige resposta judicial e policial, não intervenção armada.
- O que emerge é uma fratura estrutural: os Estados Unidos constroem uma arquitetura de segurança regional sem os países que tornariam essa arquitetura funcional.
Donald Trump fez uma afirmação aparentemente casual diante de jornalistas na quarta-feira: ele acreditava que Lula havia sido convidado para a cúpula Escudo das Américas, em Miami, e simplesmente optou por não ir. O governo brasileiro já havia dito o contrário — que nenhum convite foi enviado. A contradição era pequena, mas caiu em meio a um desacordo estratégico muito maior.
A cúpula reuniu doze líderes latino-americanos ideologicamente alinhados com Trump para discutir cooperação em segurança numa região onde o narcotráfico se tornou uma crise definidora. Brasil, México e Colômbia — as três maiores economias do hemisfério e as mais críticas para a logística do tráfico — estiveram notavelmente ausentes. Os três países são governados por presidentes de esquerda. Os três criticaram publicamente operações militares americanas na região.
Em Miami, Trump foi explícito sobre suas intenções. Anunciou planos para expandir operações militares além do que os Estados Unidos já realizaram no Caribe, onde forças americanas bombardearam embarcações venezuelanas. Apresentou o que chamou de coalizão militar — uma estrutura formal para empregar força letal contra grupos criminosos armados em toda a América Latina. Não era uma proposta de maior compartilhamento de inteligência. Era uma declaração de intervenção militar ampliada.
Ao mesmo tempo, o governo Trump preparava um movimento que aprofundaria o atrito com Brasília: a designação do PCC e do Comando Vermelho como organizações terroristas sob a lei americana. A medida acionaria sanções financeiras e sinalizaria que esses grupos merecem a mesma resposta legal e militar que grupos terroristas designados. O governo Lula se opõe — para o Brasil, a classificação militariza o que as autoridades enxergam como um problema de justiça criminal doméstica, que exige polícia e tribunais, não ataques militares.
A geometria do momento ficou clara: Trump convocou aliados ideológicos para discutir uma estratégia de segurança que os três países mais poderosos da região — aqueles cuja cooperação determinaria o sucesso ou o fracasso de qualquer iniciativa — já rejeitaram. A disputa sobre o convite era apenas o primeiro lance de uma negociação muito mais longa.
Donald Trump stood before reporters on Wednesday and offered a casual claim that would soon become a point of diplomatic friction: he believed Brazil's president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, had been invited to the Shield of Americas summit in Miami but simply chose not to show up. The Brazilian government had already said otherwise—that no invitation had been extended at all. It was a small contradiction, but it landed in a moment of larger strategic disagreement.
The summit itself had gathered twelve Latin American leaders aligned ideologically with Trump, all of them conservative, all of them gathered to discuss security cooperation in a region where the drug trade has become a defining crisis. Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia—the three largest economies in the hemisphere and the three most critical to narcotics logistics—were notably absent or underrepresented. These three countries sit at the center of the continental drug supply chain, their size and economic power making them unavoidable players in any serious conversation about cartels. All three are led by left-wing governments. All three have publicly criticized American military operations in the region.
At the Miami gathering, Trump made his intentions explicit. He announced plans to expand military operations beyond what the United States had already undertaken in the Caribbean, where American forces had bombed Venezuelan vessels. He spoke of being harder, more aggressive, more willing to use overwhelming force to what he called "eradicate" drug cartels. The language was stark. He unveiled what he termed a military coalition—a formal structure designed to deploy lethal force against armed criminal groups across Latin America. This was not a proposal for increased intelligence sharing or joint law enforcement. This was a declaration of expanded military intervention.
The Trump administration was also preparing a move that would deepen the rift with Brazil's government. Officials were working to designate the two largest criminal organizations operating inside Brazil—the Primeiro Comando da Capital, known as the PCC, and the Comando Vermelho, or Red Command—as terrorist organizations under American law. Such a designation would trigger financial sanctions, restrict their ability to move money internationally, and signal to other nations that these groups warranted the same legal and military response as designated terror groups. The Lula government opposed the move. For Brazil, the classification risked militarizing what officials viewed as a domestic criminal justice problem, one that required police work and courts, not military strikes.
The geometry of the moment was becoming clear. Trump had convened a summit of ideological allies to discuss a security strategy that the three most powerful countries in the region—the ones whose cooperation would actually determine success or failure—had rejected. Whether Lula had been invited or not was almost beside the point. The real question was whether the United States and Brazil could find common ground on how to respond to the drug trade, or whether they would pursue fundamentally different approaches: one military and expansive, the other focused on law enforcement and domestic governance. The disagreement over the invitation was just the opening move in a much larger negotiation.
Citações Notáveis
Trump said he believed Lula had been invited to the Shield of Americas summit but did not attend— Donald Trump, speaking to reporters on March 11
The Brazilian government indicated that Lula had not received an invitation— Brazilian government statement
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why would Trump claim Lula was invited if Brazil says he wasn't? Isn't that easily verifiable?
It's a rhetorical move. By saying Lula was invited and didn't come, Trump frames the absence as a choice—a snub—rather than an exclusion. It shifts the narrative from "we didn't invite you" to "you didn't show up."
But what's the actual disagreement underneath? Is this really about an invitation?
No. The invitation is a symptom. The real issue is that Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia—the countries that actually control the drug trade logistics—won't sign on to Trump's military approach. They want police and courts. Trump wants coalitions and lethal force.
Why would Lula oppose designating the PCC and Comando Vermelho as terrorist organizations? Aren't those groups violent?
They are. But once you classify them as terrorists, you're saying the military should handle them, not the courts. For Lula, that's a dangerous precedent inside Brazil. It also gives the U.S. legal cover to intervene directly.
So this summit—was it actually about getting Brazil on board, or was it about building a coalition without them?
Both. Trump wanted to show he could move forward with allies who agreed with him. But he also wanted to pressure the holdouts by demonstrating what they were refusing to join.
What happens next if Brazil keeps refusing?
That's the real question. The U.S. can designate those groups as terrorists unilaterally. It can expand military operations. But without Brazil's cooperation, the strategy has real limits. You can't solve a continental drug problem without the biggest country in the continent.