We don't need your conferences. We'll handle this ourselves.
On the morning of Eid El Adha, Sudan's two most powerful military figures addressed their nation with visions so incompatible they seemed to describe different countries. General El Burhan offered dialogue on his own terms — sovereign, exclusive, and resistant to outside pressure — while RSF commander Hemedti called not for negotiation but for the wholesale reimagining of a state he accused of decades of tyranny. Between them, political factions fractured along familiar lines, and international mediators prepared to convene talks on June 3 that may find no common ground waiting for them.
- Two rival leaders used a sacred holiday to broadcast irreconcilable blueprints for Sudan's future, deepening the ideological chasm at the heart of a devastating war.
- El Burhan's offer of dialogue came wrapped in conditions — no foreign-imposed solutions, no participation for those with 'blood on their hands' — that critics say amount to exclusion dressed as inclusion.
- Hemedti countered not with a peace proposal but with a founding myth, casting the RSF as liberators fighting corruption and tyranny rather than a party to a ceasefire.
- Political parties split sharply: some embraced intra-Sudanese dialogue as the only legitimate path, while others warned that mixing the language of war with calls for peace renders both meaningless.
- Governor Minawi named El Geneina, Zamzam Camp, and El Fasher as sites of alleged genocide, insisting accountability must precede any political settlement.
- International talks backed by the AU, UN, EU, Arab League, and IGAD open June 3 — but the competing frameworks on dialogue, ceasefire, and justice suggest the parties may not yet be speaking the same language.
On Eid El Adha, Sudan's warring leaders delivered competing visions for their country's future. Lt Gen El Burhan announced plans for a Sudanese-led political dialogue — held on Sudanese soil, excluding those responsible for bloodshed, and explicitly rejecting solutions imposed from abroad. He claimed Khartoum was recovering, praised popular support for his forces, and vowed to continue operations against the RSF. The announcement came days before internationally backed talks were set to begin on June 3.
The political response was immediate and divided. Finance Minister Jibril Ibrahim welcomed the proposal but demanded any settlement include a ceasefire framework that removed RSF forces from cities — not a humanitarian pause that might allow them to regroup. Omar El Digair of the Sudanese Congress Party rejected the framing entirely, arguing that dialogue paired with the rhetoric of war and exclusion was no dialogue at all. Governor Minawi of Darfur set his own conditions: accountability for atrocities in El Geneina, Zamzam Camp, and El Fasher, and guarantees for the safe return of displaced populations. Others, like Hatim El Sir of the Democratic Unionist Party-Original, embraced El Burhan's call and declared themselves ready to participate.
RSF commander Hemedti offered something altogether different. In his own Eid address, he blamed the Islamic Movement and the armed forces for decades of monopolized power and cast the conflict as a struggle between tyranny and a new Sudan built on justice, equal citizenship, and shared wealth. His political wing, the Sudan Founding Alliance, framed its goals not as ending a war but as transforming the state from its roots.
What the speeches revealed was not a narrowing of positions but a widening. El Burhan sought dialogue on his terms; Hemedti sought transformation on his. The parties between them offered competing conditions. And the international community prepared to convene talks that may find no shared framework waiting — only parallel visions passing each other in the dark.
On the morning of Eid El Adha, Sudan's warring factions took to the airwaves with starkly different blueprints for their country's future. Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan, who commands both the Sovereignty Council and the armed forces, announced plans for what he called a comprehensive political dialogue—one that would be Sudanese-led, conducted on Sudanese soil, and explicitly exclude those he deemed responsible for bloodshed. He framed it as a path toward national reconstruction, an end to the cycles of crisis that have defined the country, and eventually a transition to civilian democratic rule. But he was equally emphatic about what he would not accept: solutions imposed from outside, the outcomes of conferences held in foreign capitals, the architecture of international pressure.
The timing was pointed. El Burhan's announcement came just days before talks backed by the African Union, United Nations, European Union, Arab League, and IGAD were scheduled to begin on June 3. In his speech, he also claimed that Khartoum was recovering, praised popular backing for his military, and vowed to press on with operations against the Rapid Support Forces, the paramilitary group that has become his primary antagonist in a war that has fractured the country.
The political response was immediate and fractured. Dr Jibril Ibrahim, who leads the Justice and Equality Movement and serves as Minister of Finance, welcomed El Burhan's proposal and called intra-Sudanese dialogue the only legitimate path to a just and durable peace. His movement, however, attached conditions: any settlement must protect Sudan's sovereignty, reject foreign meddling, and include a ceasefire framework that forces the RSF out of cities and residential areas—not merely a humanitarian pause that might allow the militia to rearm. Omar El Digair, leading the Sudanese Congress Party, took the opposite view, arguing that calls for dialogue rang hollow when paired with the language of war and exclusion. He insisted that rebuilding required a peaceful, genuinely inclusive political settlement, not military victory followed by negotiations.
Minni Arko Minawi, the Governor of Darfur, laid out his own terms. Any political process, he said, must preserve Sudan's unity and sovereignty, end foreign interference, guarantee the safe return of displaced people and refugees, and hold accountable those responsible for atrocities. He named specific places—El Geneina, Zamzam Camp, El Fasher—where he said genocide and grave violations had occurred. Hatim El Sir of the Democratic Unionist Party-Original, by contrast, embraced El Burhan's call and declared his party ready to participate, framing broad national dialogue as urgent and necessary to reunite political forces and prepare for free and fair elections.
Meanwhile, RSF Commander Gen Mohamed Dagalo, known as Hemedti, delivered his own Eid address with a fundamentally different narrative. He appealed to neighboring countries and the international community to support what he described as projects for building a new Sudan. He blamed the Islamic Movement and the armed forces for starting the war and monopolizing power for decades. The conflict, in his telling, was a struggle between tyranny, violence, and corruption on one side and a competing vision of freedom, justice, equal citizenship, and sustainable peace on the other. The RSF's political wing, the Sudan Founding Alliance, he said, aimed not merely to end the fighting but to address root causes: governance, justice, wealth-sharing, development. He also pledged to prioritize displaced people and refugees, promising continued provision of food, water, and basic services while working toward their safe return.
What emerged from these speeches was not a narrowing of positions but a widening. El Burhan offered dialogue on his terms, within his borders, excluding his enemies. Hemedti offered an alternative vision of Sudan itself, one that required not negotiation but transformation. The political parties and regional leaders caught between them offered competing conditions and frameworks. And looming over all of it were the international talks set to begin in days, backed by major powers and regional organizations, operating on their own timeline and assumptions. The question was no longer whether Sudan would talk, but whether any of these conversations could actually meet, or whether they would simply pass by each other like ships in the night.
Citas Notables
The dialogue aimed to lay foundations for national reconstruction and pave the way for democratic civilian transition, while rejecting outcomes of conferences held in foreign capitals.— Lt Gen Abdelfattah El Burhan
Calls for political dialogue cannot succeed alongside the rhetoric of war and exclusion; Sudan can only rebuild through a peaceful and inclusive political settlement.— Omar El Digair, Sudanese Congress Party leader
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why did El Burhan feel the need to announce his dialogue plan right before the international talks begin? Doesn't that seem like he's trying to preempt them?
It does look that way. He's essentially saying: we don't need your conferences, we'll handle this ourselves. It's a way of reasserting control over the narrative and the process before outsiders set the terms.
But some of his own political allies welcomed the idea. Doesn't that suggest there's actually appetite for this kind of dialogue?
There is, but on very different terms. JEM wants dialogue, but only if it includes a real ceasefire and RSF withdrawal. The Congress Party wants dialogue, but only if it's truly inclusive and peaceful. They're saying yes to the idea while rejecting the framework.
What about Hemedti's speech? He seems to be offering something completely different—not just a ceasefire but a reimagining of Sudan itself.
Exactly. He's not negotiating within El Burhan's system; he's proposing to replace it. That's a much deeper disagreement than just who sits at the table. It's about what Sudan becomes.
So when these international talks start on June 3, what are they actually walking into?
A situation where the two main combatants have incompatible visions of what dialogue even means. One wants to control the process; the other wants to transform the country. Everyone else is trying to set conditions that might make either scenario acceptable. It's a mess.
Is there any chance these different conversations could actually align?
Only if someone is willing to give ground on what they see as fundamental. Right now, no one is signaling that willingness.