A security force fractured by internal doubt is a security force weakened.
En un tiempo en que las guerras se libran tanto con palabras como con armas, España ha documentado una campaña sistemática para corroer desde dentro la confianza de sus fuerzas de seguridad. Actores vinculados al Estado ruso y grupos extremistas alineados con Moscú no buscan derrotar a las instituciones españolas por la fuerza, sino sembrar la duda suficiente para que se fracturen solas. La desinformación, afinada ahora por inteligencia artificial y distribuida en plataformas donde habitan los más jóvenes, se ha convertido en el arma preferida de quienes entienden que una democracia debilitada por dentro es más vulnerable que una atacada desde fuera.
- Desde 2023, la desinformación figura entre las principales amenazas de seguridad nacional en España, y los expertos advierten que la presión se intensificará durante los próximos cinco años.
- Cuando las inundaciones de Valencia dejaron 229 muertos en 2024, actores rusos aprovecharon el duelo colectivo para difundir teorías conspirativas y retratar a España como un Estado en descomposición.
- El nuevo blanco son los propios agentes del orden: policías, militares y guardias civiles son bombardeados con narrativas de declive moral europeo para alinearlos con ideologías desestabilizadoras afines a Moscú.
- La inteligencia artificial ha transformado estas campañas, multiplicando su volumen y dotando a las falsedades de una credibilidad difícil de rebatir, mientras TikTok y Discord se convierten en nuevos vectores de penetración.
- La campaña no necesita convencer a las mayorías: basta con instalar la duda en quienes tienen la misión de proteger, porque una fuerza de seguridad fracturada por dentro ya está, en parte, derrotada.
El Departamento de Seguridad Nacional de España ha documentado una ofensiva deliberada contra sus fuerzas del orden y sus fuerzas armadas. No se trata de un ataque convencional, sino de una campaña de desinformación coordinada, diseñada para erosionar la neutralidad institucional y la confianza pública. Detrás de ella se identifican actores estatales rusos y organizaciones extremistas alineadas con Moscú, que operan con una sofisticación creciente.
Lo que distingue esta oleada de las anteriores no es solo la cantidad de mensajes falsos, sino su precisión. Ya no se trata de inundar el espacio informativo con ruido: se construyen consensos ficticios, realidades sociales inventadas que se presentan como auténticas para legitimar ideologías marginales y romper el entendimiento compartido de los hechos. Cuando Valencia sufrió las devastadoras inundaciones de 2024, Moscú aprovechó la tragedia para sembrar teorías conspirativas y proyectar la imagen de un país en colapso.
A lo largo de 2025, el foco se ha desplazado hacia las propias fuerzas de seguridad. Policías, militares y guardias civiles son el objetivo de narrativas que promueven el declive moral de Europa y cuestionan la capacidad operativa de las instituciones. Cuando tropas españolas actúan en el exterior, campañas paralelas atacan la legitimidad de sus misiones. El mensaje es constante: tu institución falla, tu país falla, el proyecto europeo falla.
La inteligencia artificial ha amplificado este fenómeno de forma cualitativa. Permite producir falsedades más convincentes y distribuirlas a mayor escala en plataformas como TikTok y Discord, donde audiencias jóvenes y personal militar pueden ser más vulnerables. Paralelamente, el discurso ultraconservador y la hostilidad hacia las comunidades LGBTIQ+ se han intensificado, especialmente durante procesos electorales en Europa del Este donde Rusia tiene intereses estratégicos.
La lógica de esta campaña es inquietante en su sencillez: no hace falta que la mayoría crea las mentiras. Basta con que suficientes personas en posiciones clave —un agente, un soldado, un guardia civil— duden lo suficiente de sus propias instituciones para vacilar, para perder fe en la misión. Una fuerza de seguridad corroída por la duda interna es, en la práctica, una fuerza debilitada. Y ese, al parecer, es exactamente el objetivo.
Spain's National Security Department has documented a deliberate campaign to undermine the country's police, military, and civil guard—not through force, but through a coordinated assault on what these institutions are supposed to represent: institutional neutrality and public trust. The architects are Russian state actors and extremist organizations aligned with Moscow, and their method is disinformation deployed with increasing sophistication.
The scale of this threat has become impossible to ignore. Since 2023, disinformation has ranked among Spain's principal security concerns, and experts expect the problem to intensify over the next five years. What makes this moment different from earlier waves of false information is not just volume but precision. These campaigns are no longer simply flooding the information space with noise. Instead, they construct false consensuses—invented social realities presented as authentic—designed to legitimize fringe ideologies and fracture the shared understanding of what is actually happening.
Russia has proven willing to exploit any opening. When Valencia was devastated by flooding in 2024, killing 229 people, the Kremlin seized the moment to seed conspiracy theories and portray Spain as a nation in collapse. This pattern repeated throughout 2025, but with what security officials describe as qualitative shifts in targeting. The new focus is on the security forces themselves. Russian-linked actors and extremist groups are working to erode the institutional neutrality of police, military personnel, and civil guards by promoting narratives of European moral decline and rising insecurity. The goal is explicit: align these public servants with destabilizing ideologies that serve Moscow's interests.
The military has become a particular target. Campaigns have emerged designed to damage the armed forces' social credibility by questioning their operational capacity. When Spanish troops operate abroad, these disinformation efforts attack the legitimacy of their mandates and the effectiveness of their missions. The message is consistent: your institution is failing, your country is failing, the European project is failing.
What distinguishes this campaign from earlier disinformation efforts is its technological sophistication. Russia has begun deploying artificial intelligence to amplify the volume and improve the apparent credibility of false narratives. The Kremlin has tested distribution across newer platforms—TikTok and Discord among them—where younger audiences and military personnel may be more vulnerable. The AI component is not incidental; it has allowed Russian actors to achieve greater penetration and make their fabrications more convincing.
Throughout 2025, the disinformation has deepened along predictable ideological lines. Anti-European narratives have intensified. Hostility toward LGBTQ+ communities has grown more explicit. Ultraconservative discourse has been amplified, particularly during elections in Eastern Europe where Russia has strategic interests. Emergencies and natural disasters continue to be weaponized—not just to spread panic, but specifically to discredit Spain's security forces and undermine confidence in state institutions.
What makes this campaign particularly dangerous is that it does not require most people to believe the lies. It only requires enough people in key positions—police officers, soldiers, civil guards—to doubt their own institutions enough to hesitate, to question orders, to lose faith in the mission. A security force fractured by internal doubt is a security force weakened. That appears to be precisely the point.
Citações Notáveis
Actors linked to extremism, anti-Europeanism, and aligned with Russia seek to erode institutional neutrality of security forces— Spain's National Security Department annual report
The goal is to align public servants with destabilizing theses that serve Moscow's interests— National Security analysis of campaign objectives
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why target the security forces specifically? Why not just attack the government or the public?
Because security forces are the state's backbone. If you can make them doubt their own legitimacy, you don't need to convince everyone else. You just need to create enough internal fracture that the institution stops functioning as a unified force.
How does a false narrative about European moral decline actually reach a police officer or soldier?
Through the same channels they use every day—social media, messaging apps, Discord servers where they gather. The disinformation doesn't announce itself as propaganda. It arrives as a shared post, a conversation, something a colleague sends. It feels organic.
The report mentions artificial intelligence. What does that actually change?
Speed and scale. An AI can generate dozens of variations of the same false narrative, each tailored to different audiences, all deployed simultaneously across platforms. It's no longer one person writing one lie. It's thousands of versions of the same lie, each appearing authentic.
Why did they use the Valencia flooding specifically?
Because tragedy creates openness. People are grieving, confused, looking for explanations. That's when conspiracy theories take root most easily. Russia didn't create the disaster—they just weaponized the moment when people's defenses were lowest.
What does it mean that they're targeting LGBTQ+ communities alongside the security forces?
It's part of the same strategy: fracture society along every possible line. Make the security forces see themselves as defenders of a traditional order under threat. Make them see certain groups as enemies. Turn institutional neutrality into ideological alignment.
Is there any indication this is actually working?
The fact that Spain's National Security Department felt compelled to issue this warning suggests they believe the threat is real and growing. They wouldn't sound the alarm if the campaigns were failing.