He was manufacturing conflict from both sides.
A 22-year-old Ukrainian was recruited by Russian handler to attack PM's home; handler identified as 23-year-old diplomat Evgeny Lyukshin trained in information warfare by Putin allies. Russia created fake groups 'Direct Action' and 'Takbir Foundation' to incite vandalism, stir hatred between communities, and spread disinformation about the attacks via social media.
- Roman Lavrynovych, 22, Ukrainian builder, convicted of arson targeting PM's property; handler identified as Evgeny Lyukshin, 23, Russian diplomat
- Russia created fake groups Direct Action UK and Takbir Foundation to incite vandalism and stoke hatred between communities
- Six mosques and an Islamic school vandalized in London after Direct Action offered payment for Islamophobic graffiti
- Lyukshin trained in information warfare at Moscow State Institute of International Relations under tutors including former KGB officer Andrey Bezrukov
- Channels and photos disappeared hours after BBC contacted Lyukshin with evidence of his involvement
BBC investigation reveals Russia orchestrated arson attacks on UK PM's property through a young diplomat, using fake far-right and Muslim groups to sow division and recruit operatives via social media.
A 22-year-old Ukrainian builder named Roman Lavrynovych set fire to property connected to Britain's prime minister last year, and when he was arrested hours later, he seemed to understand almost nothing about his target—only that someone had told him to do it and promised money in return. That someone was a handler who communicated through Telegram under the initials EL, and in one message, after Lavrynovych had already torched a Toyota that once belonged to Sir Keir Starmer, EL wrote simply: "Look, you attacked the home of a very high-ranking person in Britain. I'll send you money, you need to leave the city." It was too late. But the real story—the one that never appeared in court—was who EL actually was and who had sent him.
A BBC investigation has now traced the arson attacks back to the Russian state, identifying the handler as Evgeny Lyukshin, a 23-year-old diplomat trained in information warfare by Putin's closest allies. Lavrynovych was convicted on Monday of conspiring to commit arson, along with another man, Stanislav Carpiuc, 27. A third suspect, Petro Pochynok, 35, was acquitted. But the trial itself was peculiar: it focused narrowly on money and motive, deliberately skirting the identity and connections of the anonymous handler. The court knew him only as "EL Money." The deeper architecture of the operation—who directed it, why, and from where—remained officially unexamined.
The arson attacks were only one piece of a much larger campaign. Russian operatives, working remotely through social media and Telegram, created fake far-right and Muslim organizations designed to stoke division, recruit operatives, and generate real-world violence. The most prominent was a group called Direct Action UK, which appeared online in autumn 2024, after the Southport riots. It presented itself as a homegrown British movement but was entirely Russian-run. Messages in the group bore Moscow timestamps, used Cyrillic characters, and placed pound signs after numbers in the Russian style. Direct Action's social media channels branded the prime minister a traitor, promoted hatred of Muslims, offered money for arson and vandalism, and lionized the far-right activist Tommy Robinson. "This is war," the group declared. And although Direct Action existed only online, it generated tangible attacks: six mosques and an Islamic school in London were vandalized after the group offered payment for Islamophobic graffiti. Slogans like "remigration" and "Stop Islam" were spray-painted across the capital, from Croydon to Leyton. The vandalism was then turned into slick social media videos to amplify the hatred and spread fear.
Parallel to Direct Action, Russian operatives ran a second fake organization called the Takbir Foundation, which posed as an Islamic charity dedicated to funding jihad. Its real purpose was the inverse: to inflame the far right by generating Islamic graffiti that would provoke backlash. The foundation offered up to £150 for graffiti work, calling it "halal money to promote the word of Allah." But when it recruited actual graffiti artists in Bristol, it paid non-Muslims to spray Islamic verses on buildings. The BBC tracked down two artists who were approached through a fake Facebook account named "Michael John" offering "a paid opportunity with a generous budget." Both were sent precise images of buildings with highlighted areas showing exactly where to spray Islamic text. Both refused the work, recognizing it as illegal. But the operation revealed the sophistication of the scheme: EL was simultaneously recruiting Lavrynovych for arson, posting anti-Muslim propaganda designed to look Hindu, and running fake Muslim groups to create the appearance of Islamic vandalism. He was manufacturing conflict from both sides.
The disinformation campaign extended to the arson attacks themselves. After Lavrynovych was arrested, Russian-based accounts spread a lie across social media: that the three Ukrainian suspects were sex workers and that the fires were the result of a personal scandal involving the prime minister. It was entirely false. The suspects did not know Starmer personally and were not sex workers. But the lie was amplified by Tommy Robinson, the far-right activist whom Direct Action had promoted. Robinson posted on X that Starmer had been "banging" Ukrainian male sex workers and shared a fake image of the prime minister with the suspects. Putin's special presidential envoy, Kirill Dimitriev, reposted one of Robinson's messages. The operation had come full circle: a Russian handler recruited a Ukrainian to commit arson, then Russian propaganda blamed the arson on a sex scandal, then a British far-right figure spread the lie, then a Kremlin official amplified it.
Evgeny Lyukshin's background illuminates how deeply embedded he is in Russia's power structure. He is the son of a senior Russian diplomat who previously served as counselor at the embassy in Denmark—meaning his father had been in Europe with potential access to sensitive documents, which aligns with EL's boast on Telegram that he had access to NATO and CIA files "because my father leaks part of it to me." Lyukshin studied at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, a diplomatic academy controlled by the foreign ministry, where he trained in information warfare under a program created two years ago at the Kremlin's direction. His tutors included Andrey Bezrukov, a former KGB officer who spent decades undercover in the West using a stolen Canadian identity before his arrest by the FBI in 2010, and Sergey Nalobin, widely accused of being a spy who once worked at the Russian embassy in London. Lyukshin was also photographed with Mikhail Zvinchuk, the director of Rybar, a state-controlled media organization that has been sanctioned by the UK and US for running disinformation campaigns designed to sow discord and encourage violence. In one Rybar photo, Lyukshin appeared in a group of "future diplomats" trained using Rybar's manuals, though his face had been blurred. The BBC matched his distinctive hoodie to photos from his social media.
When the BBC contacted Lyukshin with evidence that he was EL and a member of the Radio Southport Telegram channel, he did not respond. But hours later, that channel vanished. Four other channels created by Rybar to stoke hatred in the UK disappeared as well, and a photograph of Lyukshin standing behind Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko was taken down from a Russian news site. The BBC presented its evidence to Ben Wallace, the Conservative former defence secretary and security minister. Wallace said the attacks represented a "very deliberate and definite escalation against the British state" and that targeting the prime minister's property would not have come from a low-level operative but "from the very top." Yet the official response has been muted. Counter Terrorism Policing London said police have found no evidence of state backing, despite sources telling the BBC that authorities in both the UK and Ukraine have privately concluded Russia was behind the attacks. The pattern fits a broader wave of Russian sabotage across Europe over the past five years—explosions on railway lines, firebombs on planes, recruitment of proxies through social media. Russia offers payment to young people for escalating crimes, often masked as innocent tasks, then blackmails them if they resist. The operation against Britain's prime minister was simply one more chapter in a campaign that shows no sign of stopping.
Citas Notables
Look, you attacked the home of a very high-ranking person in Britain. I'll send you money, you need to leave the city.— EL (Evgeny Lyukshin), handler, in message to Lavrynovych after arson attack
The evidence showed Russia conducting a very deliberate and definite escalation against the British state. Launching attacks on property linked to the UK prime minister would not have just come from a low-level individual, it would have come from the very top.— Ben Wallace, Conservative former defence secretary and security minister
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would Russia target the prime minister's home specifically? What does that accomplish?
It's not really about the prime minister as a person. It's about creating chaos and demonstrating reach. If Russia can recruit someone to burn down the PM's house, it sends a message: we can touch you anywhere, even in your own country. It also creates the conditions for disinformation—which is where the real damage happens.
But the arson attacks themselves seem almost crude compared to the fake groups and propaganda. Why bother with actual violence?
Because the violence makes the propaganda real. Direct Action could post videos of vandalized mosques and say "look, the far right is rising." Lavrynovych's arson gave them footage, gave them a story to distort. The fake groups needed real incidents to amplify. Without the actual attacks, it's just noise online.
The Takbir Foundation is fascinating—a fake Muslim group run by Russians to provoke the far right. How does that even work? Who falls for it?
Most people don't. The two Bristol artists refused the work immediately. But you only need a few people to act. One person spray-paints a mosque, Direct Action films it, posts it to thousands, and suddenly it looks like a movement. The goal isn't to fool everyone—it's to create the appearance of organic conflict where none existed.
What strikes me is how young Lyukshin is. Twenty-three years old, trained by former spies, running operations that affect real communities. Does he understand the weight of what he's doing?
That's the unsettling part. He's been trained since childhood—military cadet corps, diplomatic academy, tutored by KGB veterans. This isn't a choice for him in any meaningful sense. He's a tool, but a very sophisticated one, embedded in the system from the start.
And when you contacted him, everything vanished. Channels, photos, his presence online. That's not the behavior of someone who has nothing to hide.
No. It's the behavior of someone who knows exactly what he's done and who he answers to. The speed of the deletion—hours—suggests coordination at a high level. Someone gave the order to erase the evidence.