If the regime thinks it's facing collapse, it will use whatever it has.
From a research collaboration rooted in open-source intelligence, a portrait has emerged of North Korea as a state that has quietly woven chemical weapons capability into the fabric of its industrial and academic institutions — not as a relic of a bygone era, but as a living instrument of survival. Estimated stockpiles of 2,500 to 5,000 tons, combined with a 2017 assassination carried out with VX nerve agent in a crowded airport, suggest a regime that regards these weapons not as a last resort but as a practical tool of statecraft. Experts now warn that if Pyongyang ever perceived its own extinction approaching, the Korean peninsula could become the site of a chemical catastrophe that international law has long sought to make unthinkable.
- A new report maps an integrated web of North Korean government facilities, universities, and research institutions capable of producing mustard gas, sarin, and VX at industrial scale — not as speculation, but as a documented foundation of feasibility.
- The 2017 VX assassination of Kim Jong-nam in a Malaysian airport serves as the regime's own proof of concept, erasing any doubt that Pyongyang can manufacture and willingly deploy nerve agents in public spaces.
- Analysts warn that chemical weapons would likely precede any nuclear option in a conflict scenario — used to slow advancing South Korean troops before a nuclear strike could trigger the regime's own annihilation.
- Civilians in Seoul and along the peninsula, largely without protective equipment, face the most catastrophic exposure risk, echoing the indiscriminate human toll seen in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine.
- Despite corroboration from defectors and multiple intelligence streams, the actual battlefield effectiveness of North Korea's delivery systems remains uncertain — a dangerous unknown layered atop an already alarming picture.
A research project published in late May 2026 through the 38 North website, conducted by security experts at the Royal United Services Institute in London, has concluded that North Korea possesses the industrial infrastructure to manufacture chemical weapons at significant scale. Drawing on open-source intelligence, researchers identified government-controlled factories, universities, and research institutions with access to the equipment and raw materials needed for large-scale production. The report stops short of claiming active manufacturing, but describes what it calls a "foundation of feasibility" and flags specific indicators for ongoing monitoring.
What gives the findings particular weight is not any single revelation, but the convergence of data points suggesting a sustained, integrated capability. Margaret Kosal of Georgia Tech notes that the 2017 assassination of Kim Jong-nam — carried out with VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport — proves the regime can both produce and deploy chemical weapons. She estimates North Korea can manufacture large quantities of mustard gas and sarin, along with smaller amounts of VX. Stockpile estimates range from 2,500 to 5,000 tons.
Dan Pinkston of Troy University in Seoul argues the program, originally conceived as a substitute for nuclear deterrence before Pyongyang achieved that capability, has never been abandoned. He believes the regime would deploy chemical weapons without hesitation if it perceived imminent collapse — using them to degrade advancing South Korean forces before ever considering a nuclear strike, which would guarantee the regime's own destruction through overwhelming retaliation.
Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi of Tokyo's International University shares that alarm, noting the new findings are corroborated by high-ranking defectors. He argues North Korea views chemical weapons as a psychological leveler against a technologically superior adversary, and that the 2017 public assassination demonstrated the regime's complete indifference to international norms. For civilians caught between combatants without protective equipment, the human cost of such a scenario would be catastrophic — a precedent already written in the histories of Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine.
A research project examining North Korea's military infrastructure has concluded that the regime possesses the industrial capacity to manufacture chemical weapons on a significant scale, raising alarms among security analysts about what could happen if the government faced an existential threat.
The study, released in late May 2026 and published on the 38 North website, drew on work conducted through the Anthracite Project, a collaboration between security experts at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank. The researchers used open-source intelligence to map North Korea's chemical weapons potential. Their findings suggest that government-controlled industrial facilities, universities, and research institutions have access to both the equipment and raw materials necessary for large-scale chemical weapons production. The report stops short of claiming that North Korea is actively manufacturing these weapons, but it does provide what researchers call a "foundation of feasibility" and identifies specific indicators worth monitoring going forward.
What makes this assessment particularly significant is not any single smoking gun, but rather the convergence of multiple data points that together suggest an integrated industrial system capable of sustained production. This conclusion aligns with existing intelligence assessments and deepens concerns among experts, especially given North Korea's demonstrated willingness to actually use chemical weapons. In 2017, regime agents assassinated Kim Jong-nam, the estranged brother of dictator Kim Jong-un, with VX nerve agent at Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Malaysia. Margaret Kosal, who directs graduate studies at Georgia Tech's Institute for Technology, told researchers that the 2017 killing proves beyond doubt that North Korea can manufacture and deploy chemical weapons. She notes that compared to other historical or current chemical weapons programs, very little is publicly known about North Korea's actual capabilities. Based on available evidence, however, she estimates the regime can produce large quantities of mustard gas and sarin, along with smaller amounts of VX.
Estimates suggest North Korea holds between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons stockpiles. Experts believe the program was originally conceived as a poor substitute for nuclear deterrence, developed before North Korea achieved its own nuclear capability. But nothing indicates that Pyongyang has abandoned the chemical arsenal. Dan Pinkston, an international relations professor at Troy University in Seoul and author of a report on North Korea's chemical and biological weapons programs for the International Crisis Group, argues that the regime would have no hesitation using these weapons if it perceived itself facing imminent collapse. He describes the North Korean government as paranoid, viewing any lethal weapon system as justified by the need for self-preservation.
If conflict erupted on the Korean peninsula, Pinkston believes chemical weapons would likely be deployed before nuclear options were considered. A nuclear strike by North Korea would trigger overwhelming retaliation that would end the regime, he explains, but chemical weapons could be used to degrade or delay South Korean military operations if troops advanced toward Pyongyang. The consequences for civilians caught in such a scenario would be catastrophic, particularly for those without protective equipment. Pinkston points to historical precedent: Iraq used chemical weapons against Iranian forces in the 1980s, Syria deployed them against rebels and civilians, and Russia has reportedly used them in Ukraine. Despite the international taboo surrounding chemical weapons because of their indiscriminate effects on the human body, North Korea has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, has already demonstrated willingness to use them, and shows no signs of abandoning the arsenal.
Ryo Hinata-Yamaguchi, a military affairs expert at Tokyo's International University, expressed alarm at the new findings, particularly because they corroborate information from other sources, including high-ranking defectors. While acknowledging uncertainty about the actual effectiveness of North Korea's chemical weapons and the systems needed to deploy them in combat, he agrees that Pyongyang would not hesitate to use them to prevent total collapse. The 2017 VX assassination in a public space demonstrated that the regime has no qualms about such use, and North Korea's pattern of defying international law suggests the government sees chemical weapons as having useful psychological impact. Hinata-Yamaguchi suspects North Korea would deploy whatever tools might level the playing field against a technologically superior opponent, making the probability of chemical weapons use in a Korean peninsula conflict quite high.
Citações Notáveis
It is absolutely clear that North Korea can and has manufactured chemical weapons, and the 2017 VX use confirms it.— Margaret Kosal, Georgia Tech Institute for Technology
The regime would not hesitate to use these weapons if it perceived itself facing imminent collapse.— Dan Pinkston, Troy University
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does this report matter now, in 2026? Haven't we known North Korea had chemical weapons for years?
We've known they had them, yes, but this is different. It's not just saying they have stockpiles—it's mapping the actual industrial infrastructure that could keep producing them indefinitely. That's a capability question, not just an inventory question.
So the concern is that they could manufacture more, not just use what they have?
Exactly. And it changes how you think about deterrence. If they're running out, maybe they're more cautious. If they can make unlimited quantities, the calculus shifts entirely.
The report mentions they haven't signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. Why would that matter if they're willing to use them anyway?
It matters because it means there's no legal framework constraining them, no inspections, no international pressure with teeth. They can operate completely in the open within their own borders without violating any treaty they're bound by.
The experts seem to think chemical weapons are more likely than nuclear weapons in a conflict. That's counterintuitive—isn't nuclear worse?
Nuclear is worse, but it's also a regime-ender. A nuclear strike on Seoul brings overwhelming retaliation that destroys the government. Chemical weapons can achieve military objectives without crossing that threshold. They're the weapon you use when you want to survive the war.
What about the civilians? The report mentions people without protective equipment.
That's the horror of it. In a real conflict, chemical weapons don't distinguish between soldiers and civilians. You'd have people in Seoul or along the border with no warning, no protection, exposed to nerve agents. The casualties would be in the tens of thousands, maybe more.
Is there any reason to think North Korea won't actually use them if war starts?
Not really. They've already used VX. They've shown no remorse. And the experts all agree—if the regime thinks it's facing collapse, it will use whatever it has. That's the terrifying part of this report. It's not speculative. It's based on what we can actually see.