You can't rely on proxies. They cause damage.
Across the Middle East, the ancient temptation to wage war through borrowed hands persists — Iran through Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Shia militias; the United States and Israel through Kurdish fighters, Druze forces, and Palestinian factions. Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in the Gulf last week promising that any nuclear deal with Tehran would also curb Iran's proxy networks, but analysts and regional leaders alike regard that promise as aspirational at best. The deeper pattern is one of mutual entrapment: each side justifies its own proxy strategy as a response to the other's, while the populations caught between them absorb the cost.
- Rubio's Gulf tour exposed a fundamental gap between Washington's diplomatic ambitions and the lived fears of Arab leaders who have watched Iran's militia networks outlast every agreement.
- Hezbollah absorbed devastating losses in 2024–2025 yet Iran shows no intention of abandoning it — Tehran reads the setbacks as temporary and is already planning the network's reconstruction.
- A bold US-Israeli plan to send Kurdish fighters into northwestern Iran to destabilize the regime collapsed before it began, undone by Kurdish distrust after Syria, Turkish pressure, and a White House that underestimated the timeline by years.
- Israel found more traction arming a Druze militia in Syria and Palestinian factions in Gaza, but analysts warn these groups lack popular legitimacy and cannot shift the strategic balance.
- Regional governments are pushing to disarm militias and restore state authority, yet the strategic logic of proxy warfare keeps reasserting itself — cheaper, deniable, and endlessly renewable.
Marco Rubio arrived in the Gulf last Friday carrying a reassurance that few in the room fully believed. The nuclear agreement Washington had just struck with Tehran, he insisted, would constrain Iranian power across the region. Gulf leaders were skeptical. They had spent decades watching Iran project influence not through its own soldiers but through the militias it armed, funded, and directed — and they feared a deal focused narrowly on nuclear weapons would leave that network untouched. Rubio acknowledged their concerns and promised any final agreement would require Iran to stop bankrolling Hamas, Hezbollah, Iraqi armed groups, and the Houthis. Analysts, however, quietly assessed that demand as unachievable. Iran, they believed, would likely deepen its proxy relationships once the current conflict subsided.
Hezbollah remained the crown jewel of Iran's regional strategy even after suffering severe casualties in prolonged fighting with Israel through 2024 and 2025. The group had failed its central purpose — deterring an Israeli offensive — yet Tehran showed no inclination to cut it loose. The relationship, forged over four decades with the Revolutionary Guards, ran too deep. Analysts described Iran's posture as patient: the losses were temporary, the rebuilding inevitable, and control over proxy decision-making too valuable to surrender. The Houthis in Yemen told a different story — more independent-minded, useful during the conflict, but not reliably responsive to Iranian direction. In Iraq, Shia militias had demonstrated their reach through drone and rocket attacks on American assets, yet held back their full capacity, restrained by domestic politics and fear of retaliation.
The American and Israeli effort to build a counter-network largely failed. Early attempts to activate armed groups among Iran's Arab and Baloch minorities produced little. A more ambitious plan — deploying Kurdish fighters backed by US special forces into northwestern Iran to spark internal unrest — collapsed under the weight of its own contradictions. Kurdish leaders, still stung by what they saw as an American betrayal in Syria weeks earlier, were reluctant. The White House had imagined the operation could be launched in days; military planners said it needed up to two years. And when Turkish president Erdoğan made his opposition clear, Trump stepped back, even as Israeli warplanes had already begun striking Iranian targets to create an opening.
Israel found more traction elsewhere. Its intelligence services armed a Druze militia in Syria, framed as minority protection but serving the broader goal of resisting Damascus's consolidation of control. In Gaza, Palestinian factions were built up to fight Hamas, though analysts dismissed their strategic value and noted their near-total lack of popular support. Across the region, governments were pressing to disarm irregular forces and restore state authority. Yet the logic of proxy warfare kept reasserting itself — cheaper than conventional force, deniable, and difficult to permanently dismantle. As one former Israeli intelligence officer put it plainly: proxies are not merely unreliable. They cause damage.
Marco Rubio landed in the Gulf states last Friday with a difficult message to deliver and an even harder one to hear. The US secretary of state had come to reassure anxious Arab leaders that a nuclear agreement struck between Washington and Tehran earlier that month would actually constrain Iranian power in the region. But the Gulf states knew better. They had watched Iran wage war through proxies for decades, and they feared that a deal focused narrowly on nuclear weapons would leave Tehran free to keep arming and directing the militias that threaten them.
Rubio acknowledged the worry was real. "They've shared with us some very concrete concerns," he said, and he promised that any final agreement would require Iran not just to limit its nuclear program but to stop bankrolling Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, armed groups in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. It was a clean list of demands. It was also, analysts and Western security officials quietly believed, almost certainly unachievable. Iran, they assessed, would likely deepen its support for these groups once the current conflict wound down. And Israel and the United States, for their part, were expected to expand their own use of armed militias—a mirror image of the same strategy they were asking Iran to abandon.
Hezbollah remained the centerpiece of Iran's regional network, even after taking a severe beating in prolonged fighting with Israel across 2024 and 2025. The organization had failed in its core mission: to deter an Israeli attack. Yet Tehran showed no sign of abandoning it. The group had been founded in Lebanon with help from Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps more than four decades earlier, and the relationship ran too deep to sever. "The Iranians see this as a temporary bad phase," explained Hanin Ghaddar, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. "They believe Hezbollah will regenerate. It is absolutely vital for the Revolutionary Guards to rebuild their proxies around the region and to control their decisions." By tying any ceasefire to an end to fighting in Lebanon as well, Iran had created friction between Israel, which wanted to keep pressing its offensive, and Washington, which wanted a deal.
The Houthis in Yemen presented a different picture. They had entered the conflict only in its final days, yet they had shown they could strike at Israel and disrupt shipping in the Red Sea. But they operated with more independence from Tehran than other proxy groups. "They are very hardcore and were useful during the war," Ghaddar said, "but they have their own decision-making processes that don't involve the Iranians." In Iraq, Shia militias that Iran had nurtured for more than two decades had flexed their muscles—launching dozens of drone and rocket attacks against American assets and targeting Kuwait—but they had held back their full strength. Domestic Iraqi politics and fear of American retaliation made their leaders cautious. "They are more risk-averse than perhaps the Iranians would like," said Michael Knights, an expert on Iraqi militias.
The American and Israeli strategy to mobilize proxies of their own had largely misfired. At the start of the conflict in January, the US and Israel had tried to activate armed groups among Iran's ethnic minorities—Arabs in the southwest and Baloch in the southeast. The effort went nowhere. "There were general contacts with these communities," said Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli intelligence officer now at Tel Aviv University, "but they did not develop." The same held true for Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, despite long historical ties to both Washington and Tel Aviv.
The most ambitious plan had been shelved for more than two decades: a scheme to send several thousand lightly armed Kurdish fighters, backed by US special forces and protected by American and Israeli air power, across the border into northwestern Iran. The idea was to destabilize the regime and spark uprisings. But when the moment came, only a few hundred fighters were ready to deploy. Kurdish leaders remained wary after what they saw as an American betrayal in Syria just weeks earlier, when Washington had backed a deal that placed Kurdish forces under central government control. The White House had also apparently believed the operation could be mounted in days, when military planners said it would need twelve to twenty-four months of preparation. And Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had made his opposition clear enough that Donald Trump backed away from the plan after Israeli warplanes had already begun striking Iranian targets to create an opening.
Israel had pursued other proxy strategies with more success. Its intelligence services had armed and funded a new Druze militia in Syria, ostensibly to protect the religious minority but also, analysts noted, to resist the Syrian government's consolidation of control in their regions—a outcome that served Israeli interests. In Gaza, Israel had built up Palestinian militias to fight Hamas, though with limited effect. "They will in no way change the strategic situation in Gaza," Milshtein said. "They have zero popular support and absolutely cannot be an alternative to Hamas." Across the region, governments were pushing to disarm militias and strengthen state authority, hoping to reduce the instability that proxy warfare had created. But the temptation to use proxies remained powerful, despite the obvious costs. "You can't rely on proxies," Milshtein said bluntly. "They are not just useless. They cause damage."
Citas Notables
The Iranians see this as a temporary bad phase and believe Hezbollah will regenerate. It is absolutely vital for the Revolutionary Guards to rebuild their proxies around the region and to control their decisions.— Hanin Ghaddar, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
You can't rely on proxies. They are not just useless. They cause damage.— Michael Milshtein, former Israeli intelligence officer and analyst at Tel Aviv University
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why do all three powers—Iran, Israel, and the US—keep reaching for the same tool if it keeps failing them?
Because it works just enough to be tempting, and it costs them less than direct war. A proxy absorbs the casualties and the political risk. When it fails, you can deny involvement.
But the source suggests these proxies are becoming less reliable. The Houthis ignore Tehran. The Iraqi militias hold back. Doesn't that undermine the whole strategy?
It does, but not fast enough to change behavior. Iran still sees Hezbollah as vital to its future, even after it failed to stop an Israeli strike. The Guards have invested forty years in that relationship. You don't walk away from that because of one bad war.
What about the Kurdish plan? It sounds like it could have worked if the timing had been different.
Maybe. But "could have" is doing a lot of work there. Even the people who designed it disagree on whether Kurdish fighters could have actually penetrated Iran beyond the border regions. And Erdoğan's veto was decisive. Trump listened to him.
So the real constraint isn't military capability. It's politics.
Exactly. The Kurds didn't trust America after Syria. Turkey wouldn't allow it. The White House wanted instant results instead of patient preparation. Military plans don't survive contact with political reality.
And yet the article ends with governments trying to disarm militias while everyone keeps arming them. How does that resolve?
It doesn't. Not yet. That's the instability the piece is describing. The push to strengthen states is real, but the incentive to use proxies is stronger. Until one side genuinely believes it can win without them, the cycle continues.