Maybe we can forgive him if he unblocks the aid
Along the fault lines of European solidarity, Poland's foreign minister extended a conditional hand toward Slovakia, suggesting that diplomatic reconciliation is possible if Bratislava stops obstructing aid to Ukraine. The gesture acknowledges a quiet but meaningful shift in Slovak Prime Minister Fico's posture — one that has moved, however tentatively, away from the Russia-aligned bloc he once shared with Hungary's Orban. In the longer arc of this war, the question is whether individual leaders can navigate between old allegiances and new realities without losing either.
- Poland's foreign minister publicly offered Slovakia a diplomatic thaw, but attached a clear condition: Fico must stop blocking EU aid to Ukraine.
- Fico's planned trip to Moscow for Victory Day celebrations — despite EU neighbors refusing him overflight rights — keeps the contradiction alive and the tension unresolved.
- A phone call with Zelensky and an in-person meeting in Yerevan suggest Fico is quietly repositioning, signaling support for Ukraine's EU membership and insisting Kyiv must have a seat at any peace table.
- Hungary's incoming leadership is expected to approve Ukraine aid, which would dissolve the Moscow-friendly bloc inside the EU and leave Slovakia increasingly isolated if Fico does not follow.
- Sikorski's offer is less a demand for ideological purity than a pragmatic signal: unblock the aid, and Poland can forgive the Moscow visit — flexibility offered in the name of European unity.
On May 6, Poland's Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski addressed a defense conference in Warsaw and offered Slovakia a way back into European good standing — contingent on Prime Minister Robert Fico ending his obstruction of EU aid to Ukraine. The offer was careful and conditional: "If he unblocks aid to Ukraine but also goes to Russia, maybe we can forgive him." It was a diplomatic olive branch extended across a relationship that had grown visibly strained.
The roots of that strain ran through energy politics and wartime solidarity alike. When the Druzhba pipeline went offline in January after a Russian strike, it sharpened regional tensions and exposed how differently EU members were responding to the war. Fico had stood alongside Hungary's Viktor Orban in opposing both aid packages for Kyiv and sanctions against Moscow — a pairing that made the two countries outliers within the bloc.
But something had begun to shift. Days before Sikorski's remarks, Fico spoke with President Zelensky by phone, reaffirmed Slovak support for Ukraine's EU membership, and insisted that any peace deal without Ukraine at the table would be meaningless. The two leaders then met in person in Yerevan on May 4, with both sides describing the exchange as constructive. The movement was subtle, but it was real.
Fico's planned trip to Moscow for Russia's Victory Day on May 9 — which several EU neighbors refused to facilitate by denying overflight rights — complicated any clean narrative of realignment. Sikorski appeared to be acknowledging that contradiction directly, offering forgiveness not as an ultimatum but as a pragmatic calculation: unblock the aid, and Poland could accept the Moscow visit.
The stakes extended well beyond bilateral relations. With Hungary's incoming leadership expected to approve Ukraine aid, the Russia-aligned bloc within the EU was already fracturing. If Slovakia moved in the same direction, the internal resistance that had slowed European support for Ukraine could collapse entirely. Sikorski's words were, in that sense, an invitation to Fico to step through a door that was already opening.
On May 6, Poland's foreign minister stood before a defense conference in Warsaw and offered Slovakia a path back into the fold—if its leader would stop blocking aid to Ukraine. The condition was simple enough on its surface, though the politics underneath were far more tangled. Radoslaw Sikorski had been reading recent interviews with Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico and detected something that looked like a shift. "If he unblocks aid to Ukraine but also goes to Russia, maybe we can forgive him," Sikorski said, his words carrying the weight of a diplomatic olive branch extended across a relationship that had grown strained.
The tension between Slovakia and its neighbors had been building for months, rooted in something as concrete as oil. In January, the Druzhba pipeline that carried Russian crude to Slovakia and Hungary went offline after Ukraine reported it had been damaged in a Russian strike. The disruption rippled through the region's energy security and became a flashpoint in the broader question of how EU members should respond to Russia's war in Ukraine. Fico had aligned himself closely with Hungary's Viktor Orban in opposing both EU aid packages for Kyiv and sanctions against Moscow, making the two countries outliers in a union otherwise moving toward stronger support for Ukraine.
But something appeared to be moving. Three days before Sikorski's remarks, Fico had spoken with President Volodymyr Zelensky by phone and reaffirmed Slovakia's backing for Ukraine's bid to join the European Union. More than that, he stressed that any peace settlement with Russia would be meaningless without Ukraine at the negotiating table—a position that contradicted the logic of his previous alignment with Orban. The two leaders then met in person on May 4 in Yerevan, continuing what both sides described as constructive dialogue. The shift was subtle but real.
Yet Fico was still planning to fly to Moscow on May 9 for Russia's Victory Day celebrations, a move that drew sharp criticism from other EU members who had refused to grant him permission to cross their airspace. The trip seemed to undercut any narrative of a clean break from Russia. It was this contradiction—the simultaneous moves toward Ukraine and toward Moscow—that Sikorski appeared to be acknowledging. He was not demanding Fico choose one or the other. He was saying that if Fico unblocked the aid, Poland could live with the Moscow visit. The forgiveness, in other words, came with conditions but also with flexibility.
The broader context made Sikorski's offer significant. Hungary's government was in transition, and the incoming leadership was expected to approve EU aid for Ukraine—a reversal that would break the Moscow-friendly bloc that Orban and Fico had formed. If Slovakia moved in the same direction, the EU's internal resistance to supporting Ukraine would collapse. Sikorski's words were not just about bilateral relations between Warsaw and Bratislava. They were about whether the EU could move as one on the question that had come to define its relationship with Russia. The question now was whether Fico's recent signals of support for Ukraine would translate into concrete action when the next aid vote came to the table.
Citas Notables
If he unblocks aid to Ukraine but also goes to Russia, maybe we can forgive him— Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski
No peace deal with Russia can be reached without Kyiv at the table— Slovak PM Robert Fico, in a call with President Zelensky
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would Sikorski offer forgiveness for a Moscow trip? Doesn't that undermine the whole point of EU unity against Russia?
Because the alternative is worse. If Fico blocks aid, Slovakia becomes an obstacle. If he unblocks it, the EU wins on the thing that actually matters—supporting Ukraine. The Moscow visit is theater. The aid vote is real.
But doesn't Fico going to Moscow send a signal that EU members can still court Russia without consequences?
It does. But Sikorski is making a calculation: a Slovak leader who votes yes on Ukraine aid but shakes hands with Putin is more useful than one who votes no and stays home. It's pragmatism over purity.
The article mentions Fico recently said peace talks need Ukraine at the table. Is that a genuine shift or just words?
The phone call with Zelensky and the meeting in Yerevan suggest something real is moving. But words are cheap. What matters is the vote. Sikorski is essentially saying: prove it by unblocking aid, and we'll treat the Moscow trip as a quirk, not a betrayal.
What happens if Fico doesn't unblock the aid?
Then Poland and others will likely isolate Slovakia further. But more importantly, Hungary's new government is expected to approve aid anyway. Fico would be left standing alone, which is probably why Sikorski thinks he might actually move.