The court had proven it could act independently. Now it faced a different test.
Com a posse de Lula em janeiro de 2023, o Brasil inicia uma tentativa de reconciliação entre o Executivo e o Supremo Tribunal Federal, após quatro anos de hostilidade aberta sob Bolsonaro. A democracia, como sempre, exige que seus pilares se sustentem mutuamente — e o novo governo parece reconhecer que atacar o Judiciário é corroer o próprio chão em que pisa. As nomeações que virão não serão apenas escolhas jurídicas, mas declarações sobre que tipo de república Lula pretende construir.
- O STF chegou ao fim do governo Bolsonaro com cicatrizes profundas: ministros ameaçados, decisões contestadas e uma relação com o Executivo reduzida a trincheiras.
- A virada foi imediata e simbólica — Alexandre de Moraes, tratado como inimigo pelos bolsonaristas, recebeu ovação dos aliados de Lula na posse, enquanto o ministro Flávio Dino colocou a Polícia Federal à disposição do tribunal para investigar perseguições a magistrados.
- O verdadeiro campo de batalha, porém, será nas nomeações: dois ministros do STF se aposentam em 2023, e as cadeiras vazias são a alavanca mais direta de Lula sobre o equilíbrio ideológico da corte por anos.
- A pergunta que paira sobre Brasília é se o degelo é genuíno ou apenas tático — se Lula buscará juristas com credenciais independentes ou aliados ideológicos dispostos a deferir ao Executivo.
- O equilíbrio entre os três poderes, abalado pela era Bolsonaro, depende agora de escolhas concretas que revelarão se este momento representa uma virada institucional ou apenas uma pausa armada.
Quando Lula assumiu a presidência no início de janeiro de 2023, herdou um Supremo Tribunal Federal ainda marcado por quatro anos de confronto aberto com o Executivo. Sob Bolsonaro, a corte havia investigado aliados do governo, bloqueado ações presidenciais e se tornado alvo constante de ataques — um campo de batalha institucional que deixou marcas em todos os lados.
A mudança de tom foi quase imediata. Alexandre de Moraes, tratado pelos bolsonaristas como símbolo do que chamavam de 'ativismo judicial', recebeu ovação da base aliada de Lula na cerimônia de posse. Dias depois, o ministro da Justiça Flávio Dino foi além das palavras: colocou a Polícia Federal à disposição do STF para investigar casos de assédio e ameaças contra os próprios ministros. Era uma inversão completa de postura — não apenas retórica, mas ação institucional concreta.
O teste mais revelador, porém, viria pelas nomeações. Ricardo Lewandowski e Rosa Weber se aposentariam em poucos meses, abrindo duas das onze cadeiras da corte. Essas vagas representam a influência mais direta e duradoura de qualquer presidente sobre o Judiciário — e as escolhas de Lula seriam lidas como um sinal claro de suas intenções: buscar aliados ideológicos, indicar juristas de perfil independente, ou tentar equilibrar legitimidade institucional com afinidade política.
O podcast Café da Manhã, da Folha de S.Paulo, dedicou um episódio a examinar esse momento com o repórter Matheus Teixeira, de Brasília. A conversa tocou numa questão central: o Brasil conseguiria, sob Lula, reconstruir uma relação funcional entre Executivo e Judiciário — baseada no respeito mútuo aos papéis constitucionais — ou a polarização dos anos Bolsonaro continuaria a corroer a confiança entre as instituições? A resposta, em grande parte, dependeria do que viesse a seguir.
When Lula took office in early January 2023, he inherited a Supreme Court still bearing the scars of four years under Jair Bolsonaro. The relationship between the presidency and Brazil's highest judicial body had been one of open hostility—the court had investigated Bolsonaro allies, blocked government actions, and become a flashpoint for the former president's grievances. Now, with a new administration settling in, the temperature was shifting noticeably.
The change was visible almost immediately. Alexandre de Moraes, a Supreme Court justice whom Bolsonaro supporters had treated as a nemesis, received a standing ovation from Lula's allies during the inauguration ceremony. Days later, Justice Minister Flávio Dino made a symbolic gesture: he placed the Federal Police at the court's disposal to investigate cases of harassment and threats directed at the justices themselves. It was a stark reversal in tone—not just words, but institutional action signaling that the new government saw the court as a partner rather than an adversary.
But the real test of this détente would come through appointments. Two of the court's eleven justices—Ricardo Lewandowski and Rosa Weber—were set to retire within months. These vacancies represented Lula's most direct lever of influence over the court's ideological composition for years to come. The names he chose would shape not only the court's balance but also the broader equilibrium among Brazil's three branches of government. The stakes were high enough that the selection process itself would become a closely watched indicator of whether this apparent warming was genuine or merely performative.
The Folha de S.Paulo's daily news podcast, Café da Manhã, devoted an episode to unpacking what this shift meant. Reporter Matheus Teixeira, based in Brasília, examined the mechanics of institutional balance, the major cases likely to come before the court in 2023, and the profiles of potential nominees being discussed in political circles. The conversation touched on a fundamental question: could Lula and the Supreme Court establish a working relationship based on mutual respect and constitutional roles, or would the deep polarization that had defined the Bolsonaro years continue to corrode institutional trust?
What made this moment significant was not just the change in rhetoric but the underlying recognition that a functioning democracy requires some baseline of cooperation between the executive and judicial branches. The court had proven during the Bolsonaro years that it could act independently and forcefully when it believed the constitution was under threat. Now it faced a different kind of test: whether it could maintain that independence while also working constructively with a president who, unlike his predecessor, seemed willing to accept judicial authority rather than attack it.
The appointments Lula would make in the coming months would be read as a signal of his intentions. Would he choose justices likely to defer to executive power? Would he seek ideological allies? Or would he prioritize institutional legitimacy by selecting candidates with strong legal credentials and independent records? The answer would tell observers much about whether this moment of détente represented a genuine reset or merely a tactical pause in a deeper institutional conflict.
Notable Quotes
Justice Minister Flávio Dino placed the Federal Police at the court's disposal to investigate cases of harassment and threats directed at justices— Lula administration action, January 2023
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
What made the relationship between Bolsonaro and the Supreme Court so toxic in the first place?
The court blocked key government initiatives and investigated allies close to the president. Bolsonaro saw it as an obstacle, not as a co-equal branch. He attacked judges publicly and repeatedly. By the time he left office, the relationship was poisoned.
And Lula's approach is simply to be nicer?
It's more than tone. Dino offering federal police support to investigate threats against judges—that's institutional. It says the government will protect the court's independence rather than undermine it. That's a different operating principle.
But doesn't Lula still have enormous power through these two appointments?
Absolutely. That's why the real test isn't the applause at the inauguration. It's who he nominates. If he picks justices who will reliably side with his government, he's just replacing Bolsonaro's antagonism with something subtler—control instead of conflict.
So the court should be worried?
Not necessarily. Lula has political capital and a functioning Congress. He doesn't need to pack the court the way Bolsonaro tried to delegitimize it. He might actually benefit from a court that's independent but not hostile.
What cases are actually coming up that matter?
The podcast doesn't specify them, but in Brazil's context, you're talking about cases touching on corruption, presidential power, and the boundaries of executive authority. These are the cases where institutional tension shows up most clearly.
So we're watching to see if this is real?
Exactly. The appointments will tell you everything. If Lula picks strong, independent jurists, he's signaling he wants a real détente. If he picks loyalists, he's just playing a longer game.