A spiky and indigestible entity that would deter China from attempting to seize it by force
En el umbral de 2022, las dos potencias que definen el orden mundial se encuentran, por razones distintas, con menos apetito para el conflicto abierto: Xi Jinping cuida su legado histórico ante los Juegos Olímpicos y el Congreso del Partido, mientras Washington lidia con sus propias fracturas internas. Esta coincidencia de distracciones no es paz, pero sí es una pausa —y las pausas, bien aprovechadas, pueden convertirse en cimientos. La pregunta no es si el momento existe, sino si existe la voluntad de usarlo.
- La rivalidad entre Estados Unidos y China no ha desaparecido: los conflictos sobre derechos humanos, el Mar del Sur de China, la guerra cibernética y el comercio siguen intactos bajo la superficie.
- Xi Jinping enfrenta dos eventos domésticos de enorme peso político —los Juegos Olímpicos de invierno y el vigésimo Congreso del Partido— que lo obligan a proyectar estabilidad antes que confrontación.
- Washington, atrapado entre elecciones de mitad de período, variantes del COVID y una sociedad profundamente dividida, tampoco está en condiciones de escalar la tensión.
- La ventana es estrecha y no se administra sola: Estados Unidos debe publicar su estrategia integral hacia China, avanzar en cooperación climática y sanitaria, y fortalecer las defensas de Taiwán antes de que el momento se cierre.
- La llegada del diplomático de carrera Nicholas Burns como embajador en Beijing ofrece una señal de que Washington podría, esta vez, actuar con intención en lugar de improvisación.
La relación entre Estados Unidos y China ha sido, durante años, un desgaste sostenido de tensión y desconfianza. Pero 2022 llega con una anomalía: ambas potencias tienen razones simultáneas para alejarse del borde. Xi Jinping enfrenta dos eventos domésticos que demandan toda su atención política. En febrero, Beijing acogerá los Juegos Olímpicos de invierno, una vitrina global que China quiere usar para demostrar competencia y control. En otoño, el Partido Comunista celebrará su vigésimo congreso nacional, donde Xi busca asegurar un tercer mandato que lo colocaría en la estatura histórica de Mao y Deng. Ninguno de esos objetivos se beneficia de una confrontación abierta con Washington.
Estados Unidos, por su parte, no está en mejor posición para escalar. Las elecciones de mitad de período, las variantes del COVID y las divisiones internas consumen la energía política del país. El resultado es una coincidencia de distracciones que, sin ser paz, crea una pausa real.
Esa pausa merece ser aprovechada con seriedad. La primera tarea es que Washington publique la estrategia integral hacia China que el Consejo de Seguridad Nacional lleva tiempo elaborando —una que integre disuasión militar, agenda tecnológica en semiconductores e inteligencia artificial, iniciativas diplomáticas como el fortalecimiento del Quad, y un componente centrado en derechos humanos. Sin ese marco, Estados Unidos seguirá respondiendo de forma reactiva.
El cambio climático ofrece un segundo terreno. Ambos países han coordinado antes para arrastrar al resto del mundo hacia compromisos ambientales, y con John Kerry empujando por pasos concretos, 2022 podría ser el año en que se trace un camino compartido. La preparación ante pandemias es una tercera área de interés mutuo: el mundo vivirá con nuevas variantes por años, y otra pandemia no es una posibilidad sino una certeza. Prepararse juntos ahora es interés propio disfrazado de diplomacia.
En el plano comercial, los aranceles de la era Trump siguen vigentes y las negociaciones nunca ganaron impulso. Ambos países deberían consolidar lo que tiene sentido de esas conversaciones y avanzar hacia acuerdos más sustantivos. Y en lo militar, este es un momento razonable para ayudar a Taiwán a convertirse en un objetivo indigerible para cualquier intento de toma por la fuerza —mediante ventas de armas antibuque, minas inteligentes y herramientas cibernéticas.
La llegada de Nicholas Burns como nuevo embajador estadounidense en Beijing es oportuna. Un diplomático de carrera con experiencia y claridad puede ayudar a que este año se convierta en algo más que una tregua accidental.
The relationship between the United States and China has been a grinding affair of tension and mistrust. But 2022 may offer something different: a moment when both powers have reasons to step back from the brink. For the next ten months, Chinese President Xi Jinping's attention will be divided by two massive domestic events that demand his focus and political capital in ways that conflict with aggressive foreign policy.
In February, Beijing will host the Winter Olympics, a global spectacle that China intends to use as a demonstration of its competence and control—including, pointedly, its management of COVID-19. More consequentially, in the autumn, the Communist Party will hold its twentieth national congress, where Xi expects to secure another five-year term as leader. That achievement would place him in the historical company of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, a consolidation of power that requires a stable domestic environment and the appearance of steady governance. A major confrontation with Washington would complicate both objectives.
Meanwhile, the United States faces its own calendar of distractions. Midterm elections loom in 2022. COVID variants continue to mutate and spread. The country is fractured by internal disagreements that consume political energy. Neither superpower, in other words, is positioned to escalate. The disputes between them remain real and numerous—human rights, territorial claims in the South China Sea, cyber warfare, naval arms racing, trade imbalances—but the structural incentives for 2022 point toward a pause rather than a clash.
This window should not be wasted. The first priority is for Washington to finally publish the comprehensive China strategy that the National Security Council staff has been drafting. Such a strategy should integrate four elements: a military component focused on deterrence; a technology agenda addressing semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and quantum computing; diplomatic initiatives, including strengthening the Quad alliance of the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, and drawing Europe into Pacific affairs; and a values-based component centered on human rights. A coherent framework would allow the United States to engage China from a position of clarity rather than reactive improvisation.
Climate change represents a second avenue worth pursuing. The two countries have not always aligned on timelines or methods for reducing emissions, managing ocean acidification, preventing overfishing, or addressing polar ice loss. Yet they have occasionally coordinated to pull the rest of the world along. With John Kerry pushing hard for concrete next steps, 2022 could be the year both nations commit to a shared path forward on the defining environmental challenge.
Pandemic preparedness is a third area where cooperation serves mutual interest. The world will live with new COVID variants for years to come. Given dense urban populations and the velocity of international travel, another pandemic is not a possibility but a certainty. Preparing together now, rather than competing when the next crisis arrives, is rational self-interest dressed as diplomacy.
Trade and commerce offer a fourth opportunity. The negotiations begun under the Trump administration never gained momentum. Trump-era tariffs remain in place. Chinese purchases of American goods never materialized. The entire process has drifted. Both countries should consolidate what makes sense from the conversations so far, then push toward more substantive commercial agreements. Intertwined markets and businesses can serve as a foundation for better communication.
On the military side, 2022 is a reasonable moment for the United States to help Taiwan strengthen its defenses—making the island into what one might call a porcupine, a spiky and indigestible entity that would deter China from attempting to seize it by force. This could include sales of anti-ship weapons, intelligent mines, and cyber tools, along with small-scale exercises and training. The underlying conditions in the US-China relationship remain challenging, but the convergence of the Olympics and the Party Congress creates a narrow opening. The arrival of career diplomat Nicholas Burns as the new American ambassador to China is well-timed. He can help ensure that this year becomes a foundation for something better.
Citações Notáveis
Xi Jinping needs a stable domestic environment and the appearance of steady governance to secure his third term— Analysis of Xi's political priorities
The two countries should consolidate what makes sense from trade conversations so far, then push toward more substantive commercial agreements— Strategic recommendation for US-China relations
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why should we believe that Xi Jinping will actually moderate his approach just because he has domestic events to manage?
Because the Party Congress is not a ceremonial affair—it's where his legitimacy is formally renewed. Any major international crisis or perception of weakness at home could complicate that process. The Olympics are even more fragile; they're a statement about China's place in the world, and a military confrontation would undermine that narrative.
But doesn't China have a history of using foreign tensions to rally domestic support?
It does, but that's a tool for managing internal discontent, not for advancing Xi's specific goal right now, which is a smooth transition to his third term. He needs the Party to see him as a stabilizing force, not as someone who creates unnecessary risks.
The article mentions Taiwan. Isn't arming Taiwan exactly the kind of thing that would provoke China?
It could, but the timing matters. If done carefully and quietly, it's less likely to trigger a response during this window. The goal is to make Taiwan defensible enough that China calculates the cost of invasion as too high—deterrence, not provocation.
What about the climate cooperation angle? That seems almost naive given how much they compete on energy.
It's not naive because both countries benefit from being seen as responsible actors on the defining issue of our time. Climate isn't zero-sum the way military power is. They can cooperate on emissions without surrendering anything strategic.
If this pause is real, what happens after the Party Congress in the fall?
That's the question. If Xi secures his third term, the constraints that created this window disappear. The relationship could harden again. That's why the next ten months are precious—they're a genuine opportunity, not a permanent shift.