Europeans increasingly open to higher defence spending and show striking confidence that neighbours would help
For eight decades, the promise of American protection formed the quiet bedrock beneath European life. A sweeping survey of fifteen nations, published on the eve of NATO and G7 summits, now reveals that bedrock has cracked: only one in ten Europeans regards the United States as an ally, a figure that has halved in little over a year. What is emerging in place of that old certainty is not panic but pragmatism — a continent turning, with growing resolve, toward the idea that its security must be built from within.
- Faith in the American security guarantee has collapsed to a historic low, with only 11% of Europeans now viewing the US as an ally — a figure that has fallen by half since late 2024.
- In every single country surveyed, majorities doubt the US would come to their military aid, a fundamental rupture with the postwar assumption that underwrote European peace.
- Beneath the pessimism lies an unexpected solidarity: Europeans express strong confidence that their neighbors would defend them, redirecting trust from Washington toward one another.
- Support for higher defense spending, collective EU borrowing, and 'buy European' military procurement is rising sharply, with majorities in multiple countries favoring European hardware over American.
- The shift has clear limits — most Europeans oppose cutting domestic services to fund defense, reject dismantling NATO, and believe relations with Washington will improve after the current presidency ends.
A survey spanning fifteen European countries, published just ahead of NATO and G7 summits in France and Turkey, has documented a historic collapse in confidence in the American security guarantee. Only one in ten Europeans now regard the United States as an ally — down from nearly one in four in November 2024. The European Council on Foreign Relations, which conducted the research, describes the findings as evidence of "deep European distrust" in Washington, hardened by a cascade of recent American actions: military aggression in the Middle East, threats toward Greenland, talk of troop withdrawals from European bases, and public skepticism about NATO's future.
In every country surveyed — from Estonia to Spain, from Denmark to Bulgaria — majorities no longer believe the US would come to their aid in a military crisis. Yet the survey uncovered something unexpected beneath this pessimism: Europeans expressed striking confidence that their neighbors would help them. Rather than breeding despair, the collapse in faith toward Washington appears to be generating pragmatism. The survey's authors described the moment as a window of opportunity for European leaders to move "further and faster" on defense, with public opinion now aligned behind greater self-reliance.
That appetite is already visible in the data. Support for increased national defense budgets has grown, and nearly half of respondents backed collective EU borrowing to finance them. The desire to reduce dependence on American military hardware proved even stronger — in Denmark, 75 percent favored buying European weapons instead, with similar majorities in the Netherlands, Sweden, France, and Spain.
The shift has its limits. Majorities in Italy, Austria, and Germany opposed cutting domestic public spending to pay for higher defense budgets. Only 29 percent supported replacing NATO with a purely European structure. And in France, Spain, and several other countries, 60 percent or more believe relations with the United States will improve once the current president leaves office.
What the survey ultimately captures is a Europe no longer waiting passively on American decisions — a continent in which the postwar assumption of reliable American protection has fractured in the minds of ordinary people, and in which the question is no longer whether to build greater self-reliance, but how quickly leaders can move to meet the public where it already stands.
A survey of 15 European countries has documented a historic collapse in faith in the American security guarantee. Only one in ten people across the continent now regard the United States as an ally—a figure that has fallen sharply from 16 percent six months earlier and 22 percent in November 2024. The European Council on Foreign Relations, a think tank, published these findings on Wednesday, just ahead of critical summits in France and Turkey where NATO and the Group of Seven will convene. The data reveals what the researchers describe as "deep European distrust" in Washington, a sentiment that has hardened considerably in recent months.
The erosion of confidence extends to the core of the transatlantic relationship: military protection. In every single country surveyed—Austria, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—majorities no longer believe the United States would come to their aid if they faced military attack. This represents a fundamental break from the postwar assumption that American security guarantees were reliable. The shift has been prompted by a cascade of recent American actions and statements: the president's military aggression in the Middle East, threats directed at Greenland, promises to withdraw troops from European bases, and public skepticism about NATO's future.
Yet the survey uncovered something unexpected beneath the pessimism about American reliability. Across nearly every country polled, Europeans expressed striking confidence that their neighbors would help them in a crisis. This finding suggests that the collapse in faith toward Washington is not breeding despair but rather pragmatism—a recognition that Europe may need to depend on itself. Jana Kobzová, a senior policy fellow at the think tank and one of the survey's authors, noted that "across the continent, there's clear support for reducing dependence on Washington." Her co-author, Paweł Zerka, described the moment as a window of opportunity for European leaders to move "further and faster" on security matters, with public opinion now aligned behind greater self-reliance.
That shift is already visible in Europeans' appetite for higher defense spending. Support for increased national military budgets has grown by four percentage points over the past year. On average, 47 percent of respondents backed the idea of collective EU borrowing to finance larger defense budgets, with support strongest in Portugal, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Spain. The desire to reduce dependence on American military hardware proved even more robust. In Denmark, 75 percent of respondents favored buying European weapons and equipment instead of American ones. Similar majorities emerged in the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Spain—all above 60 percent.
The appetite for change has limits, however. When asked whether countries should cut domestic public spending to pay for higher defense budgets, opposition dominated. In Italy, 63 percent rejected the trade-off; in Austria, 59 percent; in Germany, 56 percent. There was also little appetite for dismantling NATO entirely in favor of a purely European defense structure—only 29 percent supported that idea. The prevailing European view, held by 60 percent or more in France, Spain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden, is that relations with the United States will "probably get better" once the current president leaves office.
The survey also captured European ambivalence on other security questions. Despite rising energy costs, 44 percent of Europeans said resuming imports of Russian oil and gas would be a "rather bad" or "very bad" idea. On Ukraine, opinion remains divided. While some countries have been stalwart supporters of Kyiv, respondents in Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, Germany, and even Estonia—one of Ukraine's closest allies—were more likely to oppose admitting the country to the European Union "in the current context" than to favor it.
The portrait that emerges is of a Europe no longer waiting passively for American decisions. The historic low in confidence has catalyzed a shift toward collective self-defense, higher military spending, and European weapons procurement. Whether European leaders can move quickly enough to satisfy public demand, and whether this moment of pragmatism will persist once American politics shift, remains an open question. What is clear is that the postwar assumption of American reliability—the foundation on which European security has rested for eight decades—has fractured in the minds of ordinary Europeans.
Citações Notáveis
Across the continent, there's clear support for reducing dependence on Washington. Europeans are increasingly open to higher defence spending and show a striking degree of confidence that neighbouring countries would come to their aid in a crisis.— Jana Kobzová, ECFR senior policy fellow
Clear public demand for greater self-reliance and the need to hedge against US defence guarantees has created a window for Europe's leaders to go further and faster on security.— Paweł Zerka, ECFR senior policy fellow
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
What does it mean that only one in ten Europeans now see the US as an ally? Is that just political sentiment, or does it translate into actual policy?
It's both. The numbers reflect real anger and disappointment, but they're also creating political permission for European leaders to do things they couldn't do before—spend more on defense, buy European weapons, coordinate military planning without waiting for Washington. The survey shows that public opinion has moved faster than policy.
The survey found that Europeans trust their neighbors to help them militarily, even as they doubt America would. That's a remarkable inversion.
It is. For seventy years, the assumption was that only America had the military capacity and will to defend Europe. Now Europeans are saying: we'll defend each other. It's not that they suddenly think France or Poland are military superpowers. It's that they've lost faith in the guarantee, so they're looking at what they actually have—each other.
But the survey also shows Europeans don't want to cut social spending to pay for defense. How do you square that circle?
You don't, easily. There's a gap between what people say they want—more defense, less dependence on America—and what they're willing to sacrifice for it. That's where the EU borrowing idea comes in. It's a way to fund defense without asking voters to choose between guns and butter.
Do Europeans actually believe things will improve once Trump leaves office?
Most say they think relations will get better. But the survey also shows they're not waiting around. They're hedging. They're building alternatives now, not betting everything on the next American election. That's the real story—the pragmatism underneath the hope.
What about the divisions—Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria skeptical of Ukraine joining the EU? Does that complicate the picture of European unity?
Absolutely. Europe isn't monolithic. Some countries are closer to Russia, some have different security concerns. The survey shows that while there's broad agreement on reducing US dependence, there's real disagreement on what Europe should do next. That's a problem for any unified European defense strategy.