We are not going to get the deal that was promised to us
Australia's Aukus submarine agreement, once presented as a generational leap in strategic capability, is now straining under the weight of its own ambitions. Labor MP Ed Husic has broken from his party's official position to warn that the United States cannot deliver what was promised — and that accepting secondhand vessels in place of new ones is not a streamlining but a retreat. His intervention surfaces a deeper question that democracies rarely ask aloud: when a nation binds its security to a superpower's goodwill across decades, who truly holds sovereignty over the arrangement?
- American shipyards are producing barely half the submarines per year that the Aukus deal requires, making the original 2032 delivery timeline structurally implausible.
- Australia has quietly agreed to accept three secondhand Virginia-class submarines instead of the promised mix of new and older vessels — a shift framed as practical but received by critics as a concession under pressure.
- Husic's warning that a transactional Trump administration could use submarine transfers as geopolitical leverage has introduced a sovereignty dimension the government has not publicly addressed.
- Internal Labor opposition is hardening fast: a Victorian branch motion demanding a government review passed for the second year running, and grassroots groups are mobilising to excise Aukus from the party platform entirely.
- With former minister Peter Garrett now heading an independent public inquiry and the July national conference approaching, the government faces simultaneous pressure from within its own ranks and from outside the parliamentary system.
Ed Husic, a former Labor cabinet minister, used a closed-door party meeting this week to deliver the most pointed internal challenge to the Aukus submarine deal in three years. His message was direct: Australia needs a contingency plan, because what was agreed is not what the country will receive.
The immediate catalyst was Defence Minister Richard Marles's announcement that Australia would accept three secondhand Virginia-class submarines from the United States, replacing the original plan for a combination of new and older vessels. Marles framed the change as a practical simplification following talks with US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth in Singapore. Husic saw it differently — as a concession forced by an American production crisis that shows no sign of resolution.
The figures are stark. US shipyards are currently delivering between 1.1 and 1.2 Virginia-class submarines per year. The Aukus agreement requires 2.33 annually to function as designed. The first submarine was supposed to reach Australia in 2032; at current rates, that schedule is not credible. But Husic's deeper concern was sovereignty. Because any transfer requires the sitting US president's approval — even as Australia funds American production capacity — a transactional administration could use that leverage to extract concessions on unrelated matters. He said as much, plainly, in the caucus room.
Husic's voice carries particular weight because he is no ordinary backbencher. He served in cabinet until being removed in a factional maneuver led by Marles himself after the 2025 election, and he is closely associated with former Prime Minister Paul Keating, Aukus's most prominent critic. His intervention exposed a fracture Labor had managed to contain since the 2023 national conference. The Victorian branch has now backed a review motion for two consecutive years, and the Labor Against War group is pushing to remove all Aukus references from the party platform before a July conference in Adelaide.
The opposition demanded Marles discipline Husic and reaffirm the government's commitment. Treasurer Jim Chalmers moved to reassure the public, but the internal damage was plain. The same week, former minister Peter Garrett was named to lead an independent public inquiry into the deal, describing it as the most consequential and expensive commitment any modern Australian government has ever made — one that has never received proper parliamentary scrutiny. The question Husic posed — what is plan B? — remained unanswered.
Ed Husic, a former Labor cabinet minister, broke ranks inside a closed-door party meeting this week to deliver the sharpest internal criticism of Australia's Aukus submarine agreement since the Labor national conference three years ago. His warning was blunt: the country needs a backup plan, because what was promised is not what Australia is going to get.
The trigger for Husic's intervention was Defence Minister Richard Marles's decision, announced just days earlier, to accept three secondhand Virginia-class nuclear submarines from the United States instead of the original plan for a mix of new and older vessels. Marles had agreed to this shift after weekend talks with his American counterpart, Pete Hegseth, in Singapore. On the surface, the defence minister framed the change as a practical streamlining—Australian crews would train on one type of American submarine before transitioning to the bespoke Australian-built model expected in 2042. But Husic saw something else: a capitulation to American pressure, driven by a production crisis the US cannot solve.
The numbers tell the story. American shipyards are currently producing between 1.1 and 1.2 Virginia-class submarines per year. The Aukus deal, struck by the Morrison government in 2021 and endorsed by Labor when it was in opposition, requires a production rate of 2.33 submarines annually for the agreement to work as designed. That gap—nearly doubling what the US can actually deliver—is not a minor shortfall. It is a structural problem. The first American submarine was supposed to arrive in Australia in 2032, with another following every four years. At current production rates, that timeline is a fiction.
Husic's real concern, though, went deeper than logistics. He raised what he called an "active sovereignty question." The deal requires the sitting US president to approve the release of submarines to Australia, even though Australia is paying to boost American production capacity. Under a Trump administration, which Husic characterized as fundamentally "transactional," that approval becomes unpredictable. "You can almost imagine them saying 'we give you these, you will do this with them,'" Husic said during the caucus meeting. He was not speculating idly. He was naming the risk that a superpower, facing its own naval demands, might use submarine transfers as leverage to extract concessions from Australia on other matters entirely.
Husic's intervention landed hard because he is not a backbencher shouting into the void. He was a cabinet minister until after the 2025 election, when he was removed in a factional maneuver orchestrated by Marles himself. He is close to former Prime Minister Paul Keating, one of Aukus's most vocal critics. His words carried weight inside Labor, and they exposed a fracture the party had papered over. The deal had survived heated debate at the 2023 national conference, but Labor's grassroots opposition has only hardened since. A motion calling for a government review of Aukus won support in the Victorian branch for the second consecutive year. The Labor Against War action group is now pushing to strip all references to Aukus from the party's national platform ahead of a July conference in Adelaide.
The opposition response was swift and sharp. Shadow Defence Minister James Paterson called Husic's intervention a "full-on Labor revolt" and demanded that Marles discipline his colleague and reaffirm the government's commitment to the deal. Paterson also questioned Marles's logic on the secondhand submarines—if they were truly cheaper and easier to operate, why hadn't this been the optimal path three years ago? Treasurer Jim Chalmers moved quickly to reassure the public that Labor remained committed to delivering Aukus, but the damage to internal unity was visible.
The same week Husic spoke, former Labor minister Peter Garrett was announced as head of a public inquiry into Aukus, backed by unions and advocacy groups. Garrett called the deal "the most momentous and expensive decision ever made by any Australian government in the modern era," and noted that it had never received proper parliamentary scrutiny. The $368 billion commitment, made across decades, was now being examined from outside government while the government itself was fracturing over its viability. Husic's question—what is the contingency, what is plan B?—hung in the air unanswered.
Notable Quotes
We need to be open as a nation that we are not going to get the deal that was promised to us. What's the contingency? What's the plan B?— Ed Husic, Labor MP
The most momentous and expensive decision ever made by any Australian government in the modern era, and it has never received proper parliamentary scrutiny.— Peter Garrett, former Labor minister, on the Aukus inquiry
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does it matter that the US is only producing 1.1 submarines a year when the deal needs 2.33?
Because Australia paid into a deal that assumes American production will roughly double. If it doesn't, Australia either waits much longer than promised or gets fewer submarines than expected. Either way, the entire strategic calculation changes.
But couldn't Australia just ask the US to speed up production?
That's the thing—Australia is already paying to help boost production. The real constraint isn't money. It's shipyard capacity, skilled workers, supply chains. You can't just will those into existence. And the US has its own navy to supply first.
What does Husic mean by the "transactional nature" of Trump?
He means a president who sees every agreement as a negotiation where he can extract something in return. So when the US hands over a submarine, it might come with an unspoken expectation that Australia does something else Washington wants. That's the sovereignty risk.
Is Labor actually divided on this, or is Husic just one voice?
He's one voice, but he's speaking for something real. The grassroots party has been pushing back for years. Unions oppose it. The fact that Marles had to remove Husic from cabinet after the election suggests there's tension at the top too.
What happens at the July conference?
Labor's national platform comes up for debate. The grassroots groups want Aukus stripped out entirely. If that motion gains traction, it becomes a public fight between the government and its own party base—right when the deal is already looking fragile.
So what's the actual risk here?
That Australia ends up with fewer submarines, later than promised, under conditions it didn't negotiate, while having already committed $368 billion and locked itself into a decades-long dependency on American production decisions.