The threat of the missiles is very real, and we weren't able to prevent them all last time.
As the year draws to a close, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu prepares to carry a familiar burden to Mar-a-Lago: the argument that force, not diplomacy, is the only answer to a reconstituting Iran. The meeting, set for December 29, reflects a recurring tension in the human story of deterrence — the question of whether a wound inflicted is ever truly permanent, or whether adversaries simply learn to heal faster. With Iran reportedly rebuilding both its ballistic missile factories and nuclear sites in the months since Operation Midnight Hammer, Netanyahu will ask Trump to choose again from a menu of military options, even as Tehran signals it may be willing to talk.
- Israeli military planners are alarmed that Iran could produce up to 3,000 ballistic missiles annually if its reconstituted facilities are left undisturbed — a scale that would redraw the region's military balance.
- The White House has publicly declared Iran's nuclear capabilities 'totally obliterated,' making any acknowledgment of rapid Iranian reconstitution a politically awkward reversal for the Trump administration.
- Netanyahu will present Trump with a tiered menu of strike options — from Israel acting alone to full U.S. involvement — mirroring the exact framework that produced the June joint operation, pressuring Washington toward action before Iran's defenses recover.
- Iran is simultaneously pursuing diplomatic back-channels to revive nuclear talks, offering Trump an off-ramp that could directly undercut Netanyahu's case for renewed strikes.
- A fragile Gaza ceasefire hangs over the meeting like a shadow — if Israeli-American friction over its implementation deepens, Trump's appetite for another joint military campaign may cool considerably.
Benjamin Netanyahu is preparing to arrive at Mar-a-Lago on December 29 with a proposition that echoes the one he brought to the Oval Office before June's Operation Midnight Hammer: a menu of military options against Iran, and an argument that time is running short.
Israeli officials have grown convinced that Tehran is rapidly rebuilding what was damaged earlier this year — the ballistic missile production facilities and nuclear enrichment sites struck during the joint U.S.-Israeli campaign. Their assessments suggest Iranian factories, if left undisturbed, could eventually produce as many as 3,000 ballistic missiles annually, a figure that would fundamentally shift the military calculus across the region.
The framework Netanyahu plans to present mirrors the one laid out before the June strikes: four scenarios ranging from Israel acting alone to a fully American-led operation. Trump chose the joint path then, committing more than 100 aircraft, a submarine, and seven B-2 bombers to the mission. Israeli officials expect a similar presentation this time, with the added argument that Iran's missile expansion threatens American interests as much as Israeli ones.
The timing is delicate. Trump has been publicly celebrating Operation Midnight Hammer and the Gaza ceasefire as twin foreign policy triumphs, even claiming he had brought peace to the Middle East. The suggestion that Iran is already rebuilding sits uncomfortably against that narrative. Meanwhile, Tehran has signaled interest in resuming nuclear diplomacy — an off-ramp that could complicate Netanyahu's push for renewed strikes.
What worries Israeli planners most in the near term is not the nuclear sites themselves, but the missiles. Iran's air defenses remain degraded after Israeli operations in 2024, but a rebuilt ballistic missile arsenal would give Tehran both a harder punch and a stronger shield for its nuclear ambitions. As one former Israeli official noted, aerial superiority over Iran is no longer in doubt — but the missiles remain a genuine and unresolved threat.
Overhanging everything is the fragile Gaza ceasefire. If tensions between Washington and Jerusalem over its implementation continue to fester, Trump may prove less willing to approve another round of military action. The president has left the door open to both war and diplomacy with Iran, and Netanyahu's task at Mar-a-Lago will be to convince him that the moment for one has already passed.
Benjamin Netanyahu is preparing to walk into Mar-a-Lago later this month with a familiar proposition: options for attacking Iran again. Israeli officials have become convinced that Tehran is rapidly rebuilding what Israeli and American strikes damaged earlier in the year—specifically, the ballistic missile production facilities that were hit, and the nuclear enrichment sites that the U.S. bombed in June during Operation Midnight Hammer. The concern is not abstract. Left alone, Iranian factories could churn out as many as 3,000 ballistic missiles annually, according to Israeli assessments. That scale of production would fundamentally alter the military calculus in the region.
The meeting is set for December 29, though Trump told reporters this week he hadn't formally confirmed it yet. Netanyahu has already announced the date publicly. What Israeli officials plan to present during that conversation is a menu of military options—much like the one they laid out on a coffee table in the Oval Office before June's strikes. Then, Netanyahu's team offered four scenarios: Israel acting alone, limited American support, a joint U.S.-Israeli operation, or the United States conducting the mission independently. Trump chose the joint approach, which became Operation Midnight Hammer, a campaign involving more than 100 aircraft, a submarine, and seven B-2 bombers. The Israeli prime minister is expected to present a similar framework this time, with the argument that Iran's missile expansion and nuclear reconstitution threaten not just Israel but American interests across the broader Middle East.
The timing is complicated. Trump has already been touting his administration's bombing campaign against Iran's nuclear program and the ceasefire between Israel and Hamas as major foreign policy achievements. In a Wednesday address to the nation, he claimed he had "destroyed the Iran nuclear threat and ended the war in Gaza, bringing for the first time in 3,000 years, peace to the Middle East." The White House has echoed this, with spokesperson Anna Kelly stating that Operation Midnight Hammer "totally obliterated Iran's nuclear capabilities." Yet some early assessments suggested the damage may not have been as total as the administration claimed. And now, just months later, Israeli officials are warning that Iran is already rebuilding.
What worries Israeli military planners most is not the nuclear sites alone—those require American bunker-busting bombs to seriously damage, and the U.S. already delivered that blow. The immediate threat, they argue, is the ballistic missiles themselves. In April and October of last year, Israeli forces had already damaged all of Iran's most advanced S-300 air defense systems, which had previously made manned flights into Iranian airspace extremely dangerous. That vulnerability remains. But a large arsenal of ballistic missiles would give Iran the ability to defend its nuclear sites more effectively, and to strike back harder if attacked. One former Israeli official put it plainly: "There is no real question after the last conflict that we can gain aerial superiority and can do far more damage to Iran than Iran can do to Israel. But the threat of the missiles is very real, and we weren't able to prevent them all last time."
Israeli officials are also concerned about Iran's efforts to rebuild its air defenses and to continue funding and arming proxy forces across the region. The logic is interconnected: if Iran can better defend itself militarily, it will move faster to reconstitute its nuclear program, believing it has the protection to do so. Meanwhile, Tehran has signaled interest in resuming diplomatic talks with the United States aimed at reviving some form of nuclear agreement—a development that could complicate Netanyahu's pitch for new strikes.
There is another complication. The ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, which Trump has claimed as a victory, is fragile. Under the second phase of the agreement, Israel is supposed to withdraw from Gaza and hand authority to an interim body. An international stabilization force is also supposed to be deployed. Both sides are reportedly failing to move forward on these commitments. Two former Israeli officials suggested that if friction between American and Israeli officials over Netanyahu's approach to the ceasefire continues, Trump could be less enthusiastic about approving new military action against Iran. The president's openness to strikes depends partly on whether the Gaza situation stabilizes—or whether it becomes another point of tension between Washington and Jerusalem.
Trump himself has left the door open. Last week, he warned Iran against trying to rebuild its ballistic missile or nuclear programs, but also suggested he might be willing to return to talks. "They can try," he said of Iran's missile program, "but it's going to take them a long time to come back. But if they do want to come back without a deal, then we're going to obliterate that one, too." The message was clear enough: diplomacy is possible, but so is war. Netanyahu's job at Mar-a-Lago will be to convince Trump that the moment for diplomacy has passed, and that swift military action is the only language Iran understands.
Citas Notables
There is no real question after the last conflict that we can gain aerial superiority and can do far more damage to Iran than Iran can do to Israel. But the threat of the missiles is very real, and we weren't able to prevent them all last time.— Former Israeli official
If they do want to come back without a deal, then we're going to obliterate that one, too. You know, we can knock out their missiles very quickly, we have great power.— President Trump
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Netanyahu need to brief Trump on this now? Didn't they just strike Iran's nuclear sites six months ago?
They did, but Israeli intelligence suggests Iran is already rebuilding faster than expected. The real concern isn't just the nuclear sites—it's the ballistic missiles. If Iran can produce thousands of them annually, it changes the entire defensive picture.
So this is about preventing Iran from having the capability to protect itself?
Partly. If Iran has enough missiles and air defenses, it can shield its nuclear enrichment sites from future strikes. It's a cycle: more missiles mean Iran feels safer rebuilding its nuclear program, which means Israel feels more threatened.
Why present Trump with options instead of just asking for approval?
Because Trump likes to feel he's choosing. In June, Netanyahu gave him four scenarios on a coffee table in the Oval Office. Trump picked the joint operation. This time, Netanyahu is likely to do the same—let Trump feel like he's making the decision, not just rubber-stamping an Israeli plan.
What if Trump says no?
That's the real risk. Trump is already claiming victory over Iran's nuclear program. If he's focused on the Gaza ceasefire falling apart, or if he's interested in talking to Iran instead of striking it, he might not be interested in another round of bombing.
Is there any chance Iran actually wants to negotiate?
Iran has signaled interest in resuming talks about a nuclear deal. That complicates Netanyahu's argument considerably. Trump might see diplomacy as the cheaper option than more strikes.
So what's Netanyahu's best argument?
That waiting is more dangerous than acting. That every month Iran rebuilds, the window for military action closes. That the missiles are the immediate threat, not the nuclear sites—and that only military action can stop them.