The enemy is no longer in the favelas. It is infiltrated in the state.
Ao longo de décadas, as milícias do Rio de Janeiro transformaram-se de grupos de proteção comunitária em organizações criminosas diversificadas que hoje habitam o interior das próprias instituições que deveriam contê-las. Um estudo técnico apresentado por uma rede de sete universidades, organizações da sociedade civil e jornalistas revela que essas estruturas armadas controlam mercados que vão do transporte à moradia, do tráfico de drogas à lavagem de dinheiro, enquanto infiltram câmaras municipais, prefeituras e igrejas evangélicas. O que começou como uma narrativa de proteção tornou-se, segundo os pesquisadores, a maior ameaça ao Estado de Direito, à governança republicana e à democracia no Brasil.
- Milícias deixaram de ser grupos de bairro para se tornar empresas criminosas diversificadas, dominando transporte, gás, internet, habitação e tráfico de drogas simultaneamente.
- A simbiose entre milícias e facções do tráfico — antes inimigos declarados — criou organizações híbridas que combinam controle territorial com redes de distribuição de entorpecentes.
- Mortes violentas de candidatos a vereador na região metropolitana do Rio durante as eleições municipais apontam para interferência direta das milícias no processo eleitoral.
- Igrejas pentecostais são usadas como instrumentos de lavagem de dinheiro e legitimação social, com pastores descrevendo atividades milicianas como 'obra sagrada'.
- Pesquisadores alertam que o inimigo não está mais confinado às favelas: ele já opera dentro das estruturas do Estado, corrompendo cada instituição que toca.
Uma rede de pesquisa formada por sete universidades fluminenses, organizações da sociedade civil e jornalistas apresentou, em 26 de outubro de 2020, um estudo técnico que redesenha o mapa do crime organizado no Rio de Janeiro. O retrato é mais sombrio do que a maioria dos brasileiros imagina: as milícias não são mais grupos armados de bairro — são empresas criminosas sofisticadas enraizadas no tecido institucional do Estado.
A origem dessas organizações remete a uma promessa simples: proteção contra o tráfico de drogas em comunidades abandonadas pelo poder público. Essa narrativa fundadora — homens armados como escudos dos moradores — serviu de cobertura para uma expansão silenciosa. Hoje, as milícias controlam rotas de transporte, distribuição de gás e energia elétrica, internet, programas habitacionais, construção irregular, execuções a contrato, tráfico de drogas e armas, furto de cargas e lavagem de dinheiro. Ao contrário das facções do tráfico, que se especializam em narcóticos, as milícias construíram seu poder na diversificação — e essa flexibilidade é sua maior vantagem econômica.
O estudo documenta algo ainda mais perturbador: a formação de alianças entre milícias e seus antigos inimigos. Facções do tráfico adotaram práticas milicianas, enquanto as milícias incorporaram o varejo de drogas aos seus portfólios. Esse hibridismo representa uma ruptura fundamental na paisagem criminal carioca. Paralelamente, milicianos passaram a ocupar conselhos municipais e prefeituras, e o número elevado de mortes violentas entre candidatos a vereador nas eleições municipais recentes sugere interferência direta no processo democrático.
A pesquisa também revela conexões com igrejas pentecostais evangélicas, que em alguns casos funcionam como instrumentos de lavagem de dinheiro e de construção de legitimidade comunitária — com pastores chegando a abençoar atividades milicianas como missão divina. A conclusão dos pesquisadores é categórica: o problema não está mais circunscrito às favelas. As milícias infiltraram o Estado, corrompem cada estrutura que tocam e representam, hoje, a maior ameaça ao Estado de Direito e à democracia no Brasil.
A research network spanning seven Rio de Janeiro universities, civil society organizations, and journalists released a technical study this week that paints a stark picture of how armed militias have woven themselves into the state's institutional fabric. The findings, presented at a seminar on Monday, October 26, 2020, describe an operation far more sophisticated and dangerous than the street-level criminal enterprises most Brazilians imagine when they hear the word "militia."
These groups began, decades ago, with a straightforward pitch: protection from drug traffickers. In neighborhoods where police and traffickers waged constant war, residents lived in perpetual fear. Militias positioned themselves as shields, antagonists to the narco economy that had seized control of favela life. That origin story—the idea of armed men as protectors—became their founding mythology. But the study documents how that narrative masked a rapid expansion into nearly every market that could generate revenue in poor communities. Militias now control public transportation routes, gas distribution, electricity, internet service, basic food baskets, land grabs, illegal housing construction, contract killing, drug and weapons trafficking, cargo theft, money laundering, and the resale of goods of every description. Unlike drug trafficking organizations, which specialize narrowly in narcotics, militias have built their power on diversification. That flexibility—the ability to shift resources between markets depending on which one is most profitable in any given moment—has become their greatest economic advantage.
What makes this diversification so effective is the tacit consent of public authorities. The study notes that security itself, a fundamental public good, should never be privatized. Yet across Rio, militia members have effectively replaced police presence in their territories, with the knowledge and sometimes the cooperation of the officials who should be preventing it. The same applies to utilities, housing programs, and social services. Public infrastructure has been occupied by armed groups, either through direct coercion or through the deliberate inaction of the authorities responsible for oversight.
The research reveals that militias have begun forming unexpected alliances with their former enemies. Drug trafficking factions and militias, once locked in territorial warfare, have discovered mutual advantage. Traffickers have adopted militia-style practices in their domains, while militias have incorporated retail drug sales into their business portfolios. This symbiosis represents a fundamental shift in Rio's criminal landscape—the emergence of hybrid organizations that combine the territorial control and diversified revenue streams of militias with the drug distribution networks of traditional trafficking organizations.
Perhaps most alarming to the researchers is the documented infiltration of state institutions. Connections between militias and police have long existed in Rio—the study notes that organized crime and law enforcement have maintained relationships for decades, whether through the numbers game or drug trafficking. But the new threat runs deeper. Militia members are now positioning themselves within municipal governments and city councils. The researchers point to an unusually high number of violent deaths among candidates for city council positions across the Rio metropolitan region during the most recent municipal elections, suggesting militia involvement in electoral politics. One documented case describes militia members founding a residents' association, then mobilizing the federal public defender's office to secure access to housing units in a federal "My House, My Life" program—a demonstration of their ability to navigate between legal and illegal channels while positioning themselves as advocates for the poor.
The study also documents connections between militias and pentecostal evangelical churches. Some churches, according to the researchers' interviews, serve as money-laundering operations for militia proceeds while simultaneously facilitating political connections. Through these same churches, militias conduct social work—distributing communal soup, for instance—that builds community legitimacy. The researchers report that some pastors have blessed militia activities, describing them as sacred work and claiming that God periodically sends groups to cleanse the world of evil.
The conclusion reached by the research network reframes the entire security challenge facing Rio and Brazil. For decades, policymakers have treated crime as a favela problem—something contained in specific neighborhoods, something that could be managed through police operations in poor areas. The study argues this framing is not just incomplete but dangerously false. The enemy, the researchers write, is no longer confined to the hills. It has infiltrated state structures, embedded itself in the machinery of power, and begun to operate as a new class of entrepreneur whose market is everything that can be consumed in poor and working-class communities. Without regulation and without limits, the study warns, these groups tend to corrupt every structure they touch. The researchers conclude that militias represent the greatest threat to rule of law, republican governance, and democracy in Brazil.
Citas Notables
The militias would no longer act as groups needing to establish alliances with established powers, but as internal and organic parts of the state apparatus, subjecting public powers to their private and extralegal interests.— Rede Fluminense de Pesquisas sobre Violência, Segurança Pública e Direitos Humanos (technical study)
The greatest challenge to rule of law, the republic, and democracy in the country.— Research network conclusion on militia threat
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
How did militias go from being seen as protectors to becoming this kind of institutional threat?
The protection story was real at first—people in favelas genuinely preferred militia presence to the chaos of police-trafficker warfare. But once they had territorial control and community acceptance, the logic of expansion took over. Why stop at security when you can control the gas line, the minibus route, the construction project? Each new market reinforced their power.
So the diversification is what makes them different from traditional drug cartels?
Exactly. A trafficking organization is built around one product. A militia is built around control of a territory and everything that flows through it. That's much harder to disrupt because you can't just cut off one supply chain.
The study mentions police cooperation. Is that widespread or isolated?
The researchers are careful to say it's not unique to militias—organized crime and police have always had relationships in Rio. But what's new is the scale and the institutional depth. It's not just individual officers taking bribes. It's becoming structural.
What about the church connection? That seems almost surreal.
It's actually quite functional. Churches provide legitimacy, they move money, they connect militias to politicians, and they do real social work that builds loyalty. A pastor blessing militia violence as God's work—that's not incidental. That's how you make people accept what would otherwise be unacceptable.
The study mentions deaths of city council candidates. Are militias actually running for office now?
Not directly, not yet. But they're clearly trying to control who gets elected and who doesn't. The high number of candidate deaths suggests they're willing to use violence to shape electoral outcomes. That's the infiltration happening in real time.
What does the study say should happen next?
The researchers are essentially saying the old security playbook is useless. You can't police your way out of this if the police are compromised and the criminals are inside the government. It requires something much more systemic—institutional reform, regulation, limits on what can be privatized. But they don't offer a roadmap. They're mostly sounding an alarm.