Dialogue only works when it is taken seriously
Em maio de 2022, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, ex-presidente e candidato favorito às eleições brasileiras de outubro, distribuiu a responsabilidade pela guerra na Ucrânia entre quatro atores — Rússia, Ucrânia, Estados Unidos e União Europeia — argumentando que a diplomacia havia sido abandonada antes mesmo dos primeiros tiros. A sua posição, ao equiparar a culpa de Zelensky à de Putin e ao sugerir que a exclusão da Ucrânia da NATO teria evitado o conflito, não é apenas uma leitura geopolítica: é também um sinal de que o Sul Global começa a recusar o papel de audiência silenciosa numa guerra narrada exclusivamente pelo Ocidente. Na voz de Lula, ressoa uma tradição brasileira mais antiga — a da não-alinhamento como forma de soberania.
- Lula igualou a responsabilidade de Zelensky à de Putin, afirmando que o presidente ucraniano 'quis a guerra' e não negociou com seriedade suficiente — uma declaração que provocou reações imediatas no contexto de um conflito ainda em curso.
- A sua tese central é que o Ocidente falhou ao não oferecer a concessão mais simples: garantir que a Ucrânia não entraria na NATO nem na União Europeia, o que, segundo ele, teria desarmado as ansiedades russas antes da invasão.
- Ao sugerir que líderes ocidentais 'estimularam' Zelensky para a confrontação em vez de o orientarem para o compromisso, Lula desafia a narrativa dominante de que a resistência ucraniana é uma escolha soberana e não uma proxy de interesses alheios.
- Com estas declarações, o candidato brasileiro sinaliza uma política externa de autonomia estratégica — nem pró-Moscovo, nem pró-Washington — que ressoa com uma fatia significativa do eleitorado e com outros países do Sul Global céticos do apoio ocidental à Ucrânia.
Em entrevista à revista Time publicada no início de maio de 2022, Lula da Silva não poupou nenhum dos protagonistas da guerra na Ucrânia. Reconheceu que Putin não deveria ter invadido — usando uma metáfora agrícola sobre colher o que se semeia — mas rapidamente deslocou o peso da responsabilidade para Washington e Bruxelas. A solução, disse, era simples e estava ao alcance: bastava garantir que a Ucrânia não entraria na NATO. O problema, na sua leitura, foi que essa conversa nunca aconteceu com seriedade.
Mais controversa foi a equiparação entre Putin e Zelensky. Para Lula, o presidente ucraniano partilha a culpa porque terá querido a guerra e cedido à pressão ocidental em vez de negociar. Usando uma expressão coloquial brasileira, sugeriu que o Ocidente 'foi estimulando o rapaz' até ele acreditar ser maior do que a situação. Imaginou uma conversa alternativa: dizer a Zelensky que era talentoso, mas que não valia uma guerra; e dizer a Putin que a força militar era desnecessária.
O artigo da Time enquadrou estas declarações na trajetória pessoal de Lula: o homem que saiu do poder em 2010 como o presidente mais popular da história do Brasil, foi preso no âmbito da operação Lava Jato, e viu a sua condenação anulada pelo Supremo Tribunal Federal em 2019, após se concluir que o juiz — o então futuro ministro Sergio Moro — havia agido com parcialidade. Agora, a preparar o regresso à presidência contra Jair Bolsonaro, Lula escolhe o não-alinhamento como bandeira — uma afirmação de soberania brasileira num mundo que ele recusa ver em preto e branco.
In an interview with Time magazine published in early May 2022, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the former Brazilian president and leading candidate in his country's October elections, distributed blame for the Ukraine war across four parties: Russia, Ukraine, the United States, and the European Union. His argument rested on a single premise—that diplomacy had been abandoned before the fighting began.
Lula did not spare Vladimir Putin. "Putin should not have invaded Ukraine," he said, invoking a metaphor about harvesting what one plants: sow discord, reap conflict. But he moved quickly past this acknowledgment. The real failure, in his view, belonged to the Americans and Europeans, who could have prevented the war through a simple concession. "The United States and Europe could have said: Ukraine will not enter NATO. The problem would be solved," he explained. He extended the same logic to European Union membership, suggesting that Brussels could have postponed Ukraine's accession and thereby defused Russian anxieties.
Most strikingly, Lula assigned equal culpability to Volodymyr Zelensky. The Ukrainian president, he argued, bore the same responsibility as Putin because he had wanted war and failed to negotiate seriously enough. "In a war there is never just one guilty party," Lula said. He suggested that Zelensky, a former comedian and actor, had been encouraged by Western powers to embrace confrontation rather than compromise. "You keep stimulating the guy and he starts thinking he's the greatest," Lula remarked, using a colloquial Brazilian expression. He imagined a different conversation: telling Zelensky he was a talented performer but not worth a war, and telling Putin that military force was unnecessary.
The core of Lula's critique was that serious negotiation had never occurred. The parties involved, he said, could have sat down for ten days, two weeks, three weeks, or a month to search for a solution. Instead, he observed, the international response had focused on stoking hatred toward Putin rather than pursuing agreement. "Dialogue only works when it is taken seriously," he insisted. The Americans and Europeans, in his telling, had failed that test by refusing to address what he saw as Russia's legitimate security concerns about NATO expansion.
The Time article contextualized Lula within his own political trajectory. He had left office in 2010 as Brazil's most popular president in history. He had then faced conviction in the Lava Jato operation, spending 580 days in prison before the Supreme Federal Court annulled his conviction in 2019, finding that the judge—former justice minister Sergio Moro—had been biased and partial. The UN Human Rights Committee had reaffirmed this position just days before the interview. Now, as he prepared to challenge incumbent Jair Bolsonaro for the presidency, Lula was staking out a position of non-alignment on the Ukraine question, one that reflected skepticism toward Western narratives and a preference for Brazilian autonomy in foreign policy.
Citas Notables
Putin should not have invaded Ukraine, but the United States and Europe could have said Ukraine will not enter NATO and the problem would be solved— Lula da Silva, in Time magazine interview
Zelensky is as responsible as Putin because in a war there is never just one guilty party— Lula da Silva
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When Lula says both Zelensky and Putin bear equal blame, what does he actually mean by that?
He's arguing that Zelensky had agency in the situation—that he could have negotiated harder, made concessions on NATO membership, bought time. In Lula's view, choosing not to do those things is a form of choosing war.
But isn't there a difference between invading and refusing to surrender territory to avoid invasion?
Of course there is. But Lula isn't making a legal or moral argument about who committed the act of aggression. He's making a political argument about who could have prevented the war through compromise. He's saying the Ukrainian president had leverage he didn't use.
Why would a Brazilian leader care so much about this? What's Brazil's stake?
Brazil sees itself as a bridge between the Global South and the West. It wants room to maneuver, to trade with everyone, to not be forced to choose sides. If the war is everyone's fault equally, then Brazil doesn't have to pick a side either.
Is he defending Putin?
Not exactly. He says Putin shouldn't have invaded. But he's saying that doesn't make Putin uniquely responsible. He's spreading the blame thin so that no single actor looks like the villain.
What about the timing—why say this in May 2022, when the war is still young?
Because Lula is running for president in October. He's signaling to Brazilian voters that he won't be a puppet of Washington or Brussels. He's independent. He'll talk to everyone, blame everyone equally, and chart his own course.
Does this position actually make sense, or is it just political theater?
It's both. The argument has internal logic—diplomacy could have happened, the West could have made concessions. But it also conveniently absolves Brazil of having to take a clear stance on an invasion, which is politically useful.