We didn't have the capacity to convince them to approve it
Em Brasília, o presidente Lula escolheu um momento de inauguração institucional para fazer um acerto de contas com os tropeços recentes de seu governo no Congresso — não apontando o dedo para os parlamentares, mas voltando o olhar para dentro. Ao reconhecer falhas de coordenação política próprias, Lula separou os reveses táticos das conquistas que considera estruturais, como a reforma tributária. Por trás da contenção do discurso, porém, ecoava um aviso mais grave: as consequências das escolhas ambientais do Congresso não serão cobradas em Brasília, mas nos mercados internacionais.
- O governo Lula acumulou derrotas legislativas recentes — no licenciamento ambiental, na indicação ao STF e em pautas de segurança pública — que expuseram fragilidades na articulação política do Palácio do Planalto.
- Em vez de confrontar o Congresso, Lula assumiu a responsabilidade pelas falhas de persuasão, num gesto incomum de autocrítica pública por um chefe de Estado em exercício.
- A derrubada do veto ao licenciamento ambiental foi tratada como uma aposta arriscada pelos próprios parlamentares: se a União Europeia ou a China restringirem compras por razões climáticas, serão o agronegócio e os produtores rurais que pagarão a conta.
- No mesmo evento, o presidente destacou a abertura de quinhentos novos mercados internacionais pela ApexBrasil e anunciou iniciativas comerciais com a Coreia do Sul, sinalizando que a agenda econômica segue avançando a despeito dos atritos legislativos.
- O saldo que Lula quis fixar foi este: a reforma tributária passou, os banqueiros e produtores nunca foram tão bem tratados — os reveses foram reais, mas não definiram o governo.
Na tarde de segunda-feira, durante a inauguração da nova sede da ApexBrasil em Brasília, o presidente Lula escolheu o momento para fazer um balanço honesto das derrotas recentes de seu governo no Congresso. Sem culpar os parlamentares, ele apontou para sua própria equipe de articulação política: faltou capacidade de convencimento. As derrotas no licenciamento ambiental, na indicação do procurador-geral Jorge Messias ao STF e na conduta do deputado Guilherme Derrite foram, em sua leitura, falhas de maquinário — não de princípio.
A linguagem de Lula foi quase apologética. Ele agradeceu ao Congresso pelas aprovações dos últimos três anos e admitiu que seus líderes tropeçaram na gestão política. "O que não foi aprovado", disse, "provavelmente não foi porque não tivemos capacidade de convencer." Mas sob essa contenção havia uma crítica mais afiada: os parlamentares que derrubaram o veto ao licenciamento ambiental estavam apostando contra seus próprios interesses econômicos. Se a União Europeia reclamar das práticas climáticas do Brasil, ou se Xi Jinping decidir parar de comprar produtos agrícolas por causa do desmatamento, serão os produtores rurais — não o governo — a pagar o preço.
Lula também reconheceu fraturas ideológicas no Congresso que nenhuma coordenação conseguiria simplesmente negociar. Mas recusou-se a se demorar nelas. Preferiu sublinhar o que seu governo havia conquistado: a reforma tributária, apresentada como vitória histórica, e o tratamento dado a banqueiros, empresários e produtores rurais, que ele descreveu como sem precedentes.
O evento em si girava em torno do comércio internacional. A ApexBrasil abriu quinhentos novos mercados entre 2023 e 2025, e Lula anunciou planos de levar empresárias brasileiras à Coreia do Sul para explorar o mercado de cosméticos e beleza. O discurso era tanto sobre expansão econômica quanto sobre reparação política.
O que ficou foi a imagem de um presidente tentando separar o simbólico do substantivo: os reveses parlamentares eram reais, mas táticos. A ameaça verdadeira não estava nos votos perdidos em Brasília — estava nos mercados que poderiam se fechar lá fora.
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva stood in Brasília on Monday afternoon, inaugurating a new headquarters for ApexBrasil, and chose the moment to reckon with his government's recent stumbles in Congress. Rather than blame the legislature itself, he turned inward. His political coordination team had failed to persuade lawmakers on several crucial votes, he said. The government had lost important battles in recent weeks—over the environmental licensing bill, over the nomination of attorney general Jorge Messias to the Supreme Court, and over the conduct of deputy Guilherme Derrite in a bill addressing gang violence. These were not, in Lula's telling, defeats born of principled opposition. They were failures of his own machinery to make the case.
Lula's framing was notably restrained. He expressed gratitude to Congress for approving projects his government had championed over the past three years. He acknowledged that his leaders had stumbled in their political management. "What wasn't approved," he said, "probably wasn't approved because we didn't have the capacity to convince them to approve it." The language was almost apologetic—a sitting president admitting that persuasion, not obstruction, was the missing ingredient.
Yet beneath the measured tone lay sharper criticism. Lula returned repeatedly to the veto overrides on environmental licensing, a decision he cast not as a legislative victory for his opponents but as a self-inflicted wound. The parliamentarians who voted to weaken environmental rules, he suggested, were gambling with their own economic futures. When the European Union filed complaints about Brazil's climate practices, or when China's Xi Jinping decided to stop buying agricultural products because of deforestation, those lawmakers would bear the cost. Farmers and agribusiness leaders would suffer. The government, he implied, would not.
The president also acknowledged ideological fractures within Congress—differences that no amount of coordination could simply negotiate away. Some lawmakers held positions fundamentally at odds with his administration's priorities. That was the nature of a divided legislature. But even as he named these structural obstacles, he refused to dwell on them. Instead, he pivoted to what his government had actually accomplished. Tax reform had passed. It was a signature achievement, one he emphasized repeatedly. Bankers, business owners, and agricultural producers, he said, had never been treated better by any Brazilian government.
The event itself was framed around international commerce. ApexBrasil, the government's trade promotion agency, had opened five hundred new international markets between 2023 and 2025, working in coordination with the Agriculture Ministry. Lula mentioned plans to deepen commercial ties and to bring Brazilian businesswomen to South Korea, where he saw opportunity in the aesthetic market—cosmetics, beauty products, the kinds of goods where Brazil had competitive advantage. The speech was as much about economic expansion as political repair.
What emerged from Lula's remarks was a president attempting to separate the symbolic from the substantive. Yes, Congress had overridden his vetoes. Yes, some of his nominees had faced resistance. But these were tactical setbacks, not strategic defeats. His government had secured the legislation it considered most important. The real risk lay not in parliamentary disagreement but in the international consequences of Brazil's environmental choices. That was the threat worth taking seriously—not the votes lost in Brasília, but the markets that might close elsewhere.
Citas Notables
What wasn't approved, probably wasn't approved because we didn't have the capacity to convince them to approve it— President Lula
When the European Union files a complaint or when Xi Jinping decides not to buy because of deforestation, the parliamentarians will be the ones who lose— President Lula, paraphrased
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When Lula says his team failed to persuade Congress, is he admitting weakness or deflecting blame?
He's doing both at once. By saying the coordination failed, he's acknowledging a real problem—his political apparatus didn't do its job. But he's also saying the substance of his positions is sound. The defeat wasn't ideological; it was tactical. That's a meaningful distinction.
But doesn't that let Congress off the hook? They still voted the way they voted.
True. But Lula's point seems to be that Congress voted that way partly because no one made a compelling case to them. He's not saying they were wrong to override the veto. He's saying his people didn't try hard enough to stop them.
What about the environmental licensing issue? He seemed genuinely concerned about that.
He was. But notice how he framed it—not as a moral failure by Congress, but as an economic miscalculation. If farmers ignore climate standards, Europe and China will punish them. The consequence isn't political; it's commercial. That's how he's trying to make the case stick.
Is he actually worried about the relationship with Congress, or is this just damage control?
Probably both. The losses were real enough that he needed to address them publicly. But by minimizing the crisis and praising what did pass—tax reform, the trade expansion—he's signaling that the relationship is functional, even if imperfect. He's not in crisis mode. He's in management mode.
What does this tell us about where things go from here?
That Lula believes his government can recover from these setbacks by improving its internal coordination. He's not calling for structural change or new alliances. He's saying his team needs to work harder. Whether that's realistic is another question.