Don't sell. The president warmed to his stated mission.
Em dezembro de 2024, o presidente Lula recebeu no Palácio do Planalto o banqueiro Daniel Vorcaro e, diante de ministros e do então diretor do Banco Central, aconselhou-o a não vender o Banco Master ao BTG Pactual por um real simbólico — um gesto que tocava na questão perene da concentração bancária no Brasil. Meses depois, documentos da Polícia Federal revelaram que a negociação continuava em segredo, enquanto o Banco Central vetava alternativas e, por fim, liquidava a instituição em novembro de 2025. O que começou como uma audiência de alto nível sobre soberania competitiva terminou na dissolução silenciosa do próprio banco que se queria salvar.
- O Banco Master chegou ao Palácio do Planalto como uma instituição em apuros, buscando legitimidade política para resistir a uma oferta de compra por apenas R$1.
- Lula abraçou o discurso de Vorcaro contra o oligopólio bancário e, com ministros e o futuro presidente do Banco Central presentes, sinalizou apoio para que a venda ao BTG fosse recusada.
- Quatro meses depois, Vorcaro pedia sigilo absoluto ao sócio sobre as mesmas negociações — 'pelo amor de Deus, não conta pra ninguém' —, revelando a tensão entre a narrativa pública e as tratativas privadas.
- A reunião de abril de 2025 com Galípolo, já presidente do Banco Central, encerrou na prática qualquer possibilidade de venda ao BTG, sem que uma alternativa viável tivesse se consolidado.
- Com o negócio com o BRB vetado pelo Banco Central em setembro e sem outros compradores, o Master foi liquidado em novembro — a bênção presidencial não havia sido suficiente para mudar o destino da instituição.
Numa tarde de dezembro de 2024, Daniel Vorcaro entrou no Palácio do Planalto com um dilema concreto: o BTG Pactual queria comprar o Banco Master por um real. Ele apresentou a recusa como uma questão de princípio — vender seria render-se ao mesmo oligopólio formado por Itaú, Bradesco, Santander, Caixa e Banco do Brasil que ele dizia querer combater. Lula ouviu e concordou. A reunião reunia peso institucional raro: Gabriel Galípolo, então diretor de política monetária do Banco Central, os ministros Rui Costa e Alexandre Silveira, além de Guido Mantega, ex-ministro da Fazenda e consultor do Master. Ao sair, Vorcaro escreveu à namorada: 'Foi ótimo. Ele chamou o presidente do Banco Central que está entrando e três ministros.'
Mas os documentos da Polícia Federal, revelados pelo UOL e pela Gazeta do Povo, mostram que a história não terminou ali. Em abril de 2025, Vorcaro voltou a discutir a proposta do BTG com seu sócio Augusto Lima — desta vez pedindo silêncio absoluto. 'Irmão, pelo amor de Deus, não conta pra ninguém', escreveu às 20h46 do dia 10 de abril. No dia seguinte, os dois se reuniram com Galípolo, agora presidente do Banco Central, em Brasília. Após esse encontro, a venda ao BTG foi definitivamente descartada.
A trajetória do Master já havia passado por outra tentativa frustrada: uma negociação com o BRB, banco público do Distrito Federal, que naufragou por problemas na carteira de crédito e foi vetada pelo Banco Central em setembro. Sem alternativas, a instituição foi liquidada em novembro de 2025. O que havia começado como uma conversa presidencial sobre concorrência bancária terminou na dissolução do próprio banco — deixando em aberto se o apoio de Lula havia sido um alento real ou apenas um adiamento do inevitável.
In the wood-paneled offices of the Palácio do Planalto on a December afternoon in 2024, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva listened as Daniel Vorcaro, owner of Banco Master, laid out his dilemma. BTG Pactual wanted to buy his bank. The price was symbolic: one real. Vorcaro framed the choice as a matter of principle. He wanted to break the stranglehold that five institutions—Itaú, Bradesco, Santander, Caixa, and Banco do Brasil—held over Brazilian banking. Should he sell to BTG, or stay in the market and fight for competition?
Lula's answer, according to documents later uncovered by federal police, was clear. Don't sell. The president warmed to Vorcaro's stated mission to reduce banking concentration in the country. He had brought Gabriel Galípolo, then the Central Bank's director of monetary policy, along with ministers Rui Costa and Alexandre Silveira. Vorcaro came with his partner Augusto Lima and Guido Mantega, the former finance minister now working as a consultant to Master. It was, by any measure, a high-level audience for a bank in trouble.
But the story that emerged from Federal Police documents—revealed in reporting by UOL and later by Gazeta do Povo—suggests the conversation's real significance lay in what happened after. In April 2025, four months later, Vorcaro and Lima discussed the BTG proposal again. This time, Vorcaro was adamant about secrecy. "Brother, for God's sake, don't tell anyone about this," he wrote to Lima at 8:46 p.m. on April 10. Lima's response was casual: "Of course, brother. You're crazy." The next day, Vorcaro and Lima met with Galípolo—who by then had assumed the presidency of the Central Bank—in Brasília. The BTG sale plan went nowhere after that meeting.
The timeline reveals the fragility of Master's position. Earlier, the bank had been offered to BRB, the state-owned bank of the Federal District, but credit portfolio problems derailed that transaction. The Central Bank vetoed the BRB deal in September. By November, the Central Bank had liquidated Master entirely. What had begun as a conversation about breaking oligopoly had ended in the bank's dissolution.
Vorcaro's private message to his girlfriend after the December meeting with Lula captured the moment's significance. "It went great," he wrote. "He called in the Central Bank president who's coming in and three ministers." Her response—"Wowwwww, I'm dying to know everything"—reflected the weight of what had transpired. A banker with a struggling institution had walked into the presidential palace and walked out with the president's blessing to reject a buyer, even one offering a nominal price. What remained unclear was whether that blessing had actually helped Master survive, or whether it had merely delayed the inevitable.
Citas Notables
Brother, for God's sake, don't tell anyone about this.— Daniel Vorcaro, in message to Augusto Lima about BTG negotiations
We want to reduce banking concentration in Brazil, president. Should I sell or stay in the market?— Daniel Vorcaro, paraphrased from December meeting with Lula
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would Lula care whether Master sold to BTG or not? Isn't that a private transaction?
Because Lula saw it as a question about power. If BTG bought Master for a real, it would consolidate more of the market. Vorcaro was offering him a different story—that Master could stay independent and compete, break the oligopoly. That appealed to him.
But Master was already failing, wasn't it? The credit problems, the Central Bank veto of the BRB deal—those happened before the BTG conversation.
Yes. So the question becomes: did Lula's advice actually change anything, or did it just give Vorcaro political cover to reject a deal that was already falling apart? The documents suggest the latter.
What about the secrecy? Why was Vorcaro so careful about keeping the BTG plan quiet?
If word got out that he was shopping the bank for a real, it would look desperate. It would undermine the narrative he'd built with Lula—that Master was a viable competitor, not a sinking ship.
And Galípolo's role? He was at the December meeting, then met with Vorcaro again in April?
That's the pattern that matters. Galípolo went from being a monetary policy director to the Central Bank president. And each time he met with Vorcaro, the BTG deal died a little more. Whether that was coordination or coincidence, the documents don't say.
So what actually happened to Master?
It got liquidated in November. The bank that Vorcaro said he wanted to keep independent to fight oligopoly ended up dissolved by the very institution Lula had brought into the room.