We are totally apolitical. The minerals go where the buyers are.
Along the Atlantic coast of Angola, a railway executive quietly insists that the tracks beneath his trains carry no ideology — only copper, cobalt, and the practical logic of commerce. Nicholas Fournier, chief executive of the Lobito Atlantic Railway, stewards a 30-year concession on the Benguela line that Western governments have cast as a strategic answer to Chinese influence in African mining, yet the corridor already serves Chinese-owned mines and buyers on every continent. In the long human story of infrastructure and empire, this corridor may be most remarkable not for the rivalries it was meant to resolve, but for the way it renders those rivalries beside the point.
- Western governments have framed the Lobito Corridor as a geopolitical counterweight to China, but the man running the railway refuses to accept that framing — his priority is moving copper, not making foreign policy.
- The tension between strategic narrative and operational reality is already visible on the ground: roughly 70 percent of DRC mines are Chinese-owned, and they are already shipping through this so-called Western-backed route.
- Infrastructure is the corridor's most stubborn constraint — single-track lines, limited passing points, and severe flooding in Benguela province have forced the company to reroute 350 kilometres of cargo by truck while repair crews work for weeks.
- LAR is pushing to extend continuous rail service from Lobito to Kolwezi within two years, working alongside DRC state railways to rehabilitate track and gradually lengthen freight trains from 15 wagons toward 50.
- The Zambian extension — the corridor's much-discussed missing link — remains off Fournier's near-term radar, a candid acknowledgment that ambition and capital have their limits.
Nicholas Fournier, chief executive of the Lobito Atlantic Railway, offers a deliberately unromantic account of the project he leads. The corridor has been celebrated in Washington and European capitals as a strategic alternative to China's grip on African mineral supply chains, but Fournier speaks in the language of train schedules, track conditions, and copper cathode plates — not geopolitics.
LAR holds a 30-year concession on Angola's Benguela railway, linking the Democratic Republic of Congo's mining belt to the port of Lobito. The ownership consortium — commodities trader Trafigura and Portuguese firm Mota-Engil each holding 49.5 percent, with Belgian operator Vecturis holding the remainder — reflects the project's hybrid commercial character. US Development Finance Corporation loans exceeding $500 million have fed perceptions of Western strategic intent, but Fournier is matter-of-fact about the money: it is a loan, and LAR pays interest on it.
The operation is already moving real volume. In 2025, LAR ran 5,000 trains along the Angolan section, with freight including one daily copper train from the DRC to Lobito and one sulphur train returning. Copper dominates — about 95 percent of DRC cargo — with cobalt also moving and proposals for manganese and lithium under consideration. The geopolitical irony is plain: roughly 70 percent of DRC mines are Chinese-owned, and some already use this Western-backed corridor to export their copper to buyers across the Americas, Europe, and Asia. "So we are totally apolitical," Fournier said.
The corridor's central challenge is infrastructure. Single-track lines with passing points only at stations constrain capacity and demand precise scheduling. Scaling freight trains from 15 wagons to 25 or eventually 50 depends on track rehabilitation that LAR is co-financing with DRC state railway SNCC. Fournier expects continuous rail service from Lobito to Kolwezi within two years. The Zambian extension, by contrast, is not on his near-term agenda — the rehabilitation costs are too large and the timeline too uncertain.
When flooding struck Angola's Benguela province shortly before the interview, LAR activated a 350-kilometre road haul to keep cargo moving while repair crews worked. The response was pragmatic and unsentimental: when the track fails, you use trucks. The business of minerals does not wait.
Nicholas Fournier sits in the port city of Lobito with a straightforward message: the railway he runs is not a geopolitical weapon. It is a business.
Fournier is the chief executive of the Lobito Atlantic Railway, which holds a 30-year concession to operate Angola's Benguela railway—a crucial link in what Western governments have been promoting as the Lobito Corridor, a trade route designed to move critical minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo's mining belt to the Atlantic. The corridor has been framed in Washington and European capitals as a counterweight to China's dominance of African mining and mineral processing. But when Fournier speaks about his operation, he does not reach for geopolitical language. He talks about trains, copper, track conditions, and the practical work of moving cargo across borders.
The ownership structure reflects the project's hybrid nature. A consortium led by commodities trader Trafigura and Portuguese construction firm Mota-Engil each hold 49.5 percent of LAR, with Belgian rail operator Vecturis owning the remaining stake. The US International Development Finance Corporation provided financing exceeding $500 million—a fact that has fueled perceptions of Western backing. Fournier does not shy from this. "It is indeed a loan and we pay interest on it," he said. The money is a tool, not an ideology.
The operation itself is already moving significant volume. LAR began running trains in 2023 and in 2025 moved 5,000 trains along the Angolan section of the line, with 90 percent carrying passengers and the remainder hauling freight for domestic markets and the DRC. On the Congolese side, the company now runs one copper train daily to Lobito and one sulphur train daily back toward the mines. Copper dominates the freight picture—about 95 percent of the DRC cargo arrives as cathode plates in sealed containers. The company has also moved cobalt and is fielding proposals for manganese and lithium, though Fournier's focus remains on what generates the most immediate demand.
Here is where the geopolitical reality and the business reality intersect without contradiction: roughly 70 percent of the mines in the DRC are Chinese-owned, and some are already using this Western-backed corridor to ship their copper. The end buyers are scattered across the Americas, Europe, and Asia. "So we are totally apolitical," Fournier said. The corridor serves whoever needs to move minerals, regardless of flag.
The immediate challenge is infrastructure. Much of the route is single track, doubling only at stations where trains can pass. This constraint makes timetable discipline critical and limits how much cargo can move. Scaling up requires lengthening trains from around 15 wagons to 25 or potentially 50, but that depends on track quality and infrastructure investment on the Congolese side. LAR is working with the DRC's state railway operator, SNCC, providing expertise and pre-financing for track rehabilitation from the Angolan border to Kolwezi and on to Lubumbashi, the heart of the copper belt. "Within two years, we will have a continuous line from Lobito to Kolwezi," Fournier said, though he acknowledged the work will take time.
The Zambian extension—often called the missing link in the corridor—is not on his immediate agenda. The cost and scale of rehabilitating Zambian rail infrastructure make it a longer-term proposition. When approached about extending to Ndola in Zambia, Fournier was candid: "At present, it is not really on my radar."
As Fournier was managing these expansion plans, severe flooding in Angola's Benguela province ten days before the interview forced the company to activate contingency measures. Weeks of repair work lay ahead. The solution was pragmatic: a 350-kilometre road haul to move cargo before transferring it back to rail. "Unfortunately, there's no other way than using trucks in this type of situation," he said. The business of moving minerals does not pause for ideology or infrastructure failure. It adapts.
Citas Notables
It is indeed a loan and we pay interest on it.— Nicholas Fournier, LAR CEO, on US DFC financing
Within two years, we will have a continuous line from Lobito to Kolwezi.— Nicholas Fournier, on infrastructure expansion timeline
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When you say the corridor is apolitical, do you mean that genuinely, or are you managing perception?
I mean it operationally. We move cargo for whoever owns the mines and whoever wants to buy the minerals. Seventy percent of those mines are Chinese-owned. They use our line. That's the reality.
But the US gave you over $500 million. That's not neutral.
It's a loan with interest. We're paying it back. The money is a tool to build infrastructure. The infrastructure serves the market.
So if China offered to finance a competing route, you'd be equally interested?
If it made business sense, yes. But right now, we're focused on what we have—moving copper, moving it efficiently, and expanding capacity where the demand is highest.
What's the real constraint on growth?
Track condition and infrastructure on the Congolese side. We can run one copper train a day now. With proper investment, we could run more. That's not politics. That's engineering.
And Zambia?
Zambia is expensive and complex. We're not ignoring it, but it's not where the immediate opportunity is. Kolwezi is where the copper is. That's where we're focused.
When the flooding hit, what did you learn?
That you need a Plan B. We moved cargo by truck for 350 kilometres until the rail was passable again. Business doesn't stop for weather or politics.