Brexit is not done with him or indeed with the United Kingdom
Five years after Britain chose to leave the European Union, the country finds itself neither broken nor whole — the predicted economic collapse did not come, yet the union itself strains under pressures the referendum unleashed rather than resolved. What began as a vote about membership in a trading bloc has become a reckoning with regional inequality, national identity, and the fragility of political settlements long taken for granted. In Northern Ireland, a peace built over decades now bears the weight of new borders and old grievances; in Scotland, a democratic majority that voted to remain finds itself bound by a decision it rejected. History, as it tends to do, has refused to conclude on anyone's schedule.
- The catastrophe that Remain campaigners forecast never arrived — no recession, a successful vaccine rollout, and a Conservative Party that consolidated rather than collapsed — giving Brexit's architects a surface-level vindication that obscures deeper fractures.
- Northern Ireland's sectarian wounds, carefully sutured by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, have been torn open again by the trade border arrangements Brexit required, reawakening tensions that a generation had worked to put to rest.
- Scotland, where 62 per cent voted Remain, now finds itself governed by a decision it rejected, handing the SNP a powerful argument for independence and turning the Leavers' old charge against Brussels back upon Westminster.
- The Leave vote was never purely about Europe — it was a revolt from towns and small cities hollowed out by austerity, and both major parties are now scrambling to absorb or redirect that disaffection without fully understanding it.
- The Conservatives are winning former Labour strongholds under a banner of 'levelling up,' but losing affluent Remain-leaning seats like Chesham and Amersham, revealing a political map still shifting beneath everyone's feet.
- Despite declarations that Brexit is 'done,' the European question has a long history of returning in new forms — and the unresolved tensions in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and the old party coalitions suggest this chapter is far from its final page.
Five years after the referendum, Britain has done more than leave the European Union — it has exited the single market, severed customs ties, and negotiated a new trade relationship with Europe. The immediate economic disaster that David Cameron's government warned of never came. The Conservative Party, widely expected to fracture, instead consolidated power. Labour's coalition of working- and middle-class voters broke apart instead.
Boris Johnson seized the 'get Brexit done' mandate, won a landslide, and presided over a vaccine rollout that succeeded where the EU's early procurement stumbled. More than 80 per cent of British adults received a first dose. What had looked like a historic miscalculation began, at least on the surface, to look like vindication.
But the costs are real and cannot be dismissed. In Northern Ireland, the border question — which the New Statesman had warned about before the vote — has proved as intractable as feared. The machinery of the Good Friday Agreement, built painstakingly over decades, now groans under new trade barriers and reawakened sectarian grievances. In Scotland, where 62 per cent voted Remain, the SNP has turned the result into a powerful argument for independence, levelling at Westminster the very charge Leavers once made against Brussels.
These fractures trace back to the carelessness of Cameron's original gamble. He made no provision for the four nations to separately ratify the outcome, arranged no confirmatory vote, and simply assumed he would win. When he lost, the country was left to manage the consequences alone.
The Leave vote was never only about Europe. It was a cry of disaffection from towns and small cities that had endured the deepest public spending cuts in postwar history and had lost faith in the institutions meant to serve them. The Conservatives have since captured seats in old Labour heartlands like Hartlepool, but their 'levelling up' agenda has triggered a backlash in affluent, pro-Remain areas — the Liberal Democrats won Chesham and Amersham in June 2021 — leaving the political map volatile and unsettled.
Harold Wilson declared in 1975 that fourteen years of national argument over Europe were finished. Six years later, his own party was campaigning for withdrawal. Johnson may believe Brexit is behind him. The evidence suggests otherwise.
Five years have passed since Britain voted to leave the European Union, and the country has done far more than simply exit. It has withdrawn from the single market, severed ties with the customs union, and negotiated a new trade arrangement with Europe. The immediate economic catastrophe that David Cameron's government had warned about never materialized. No recession came. The Conservative Party, which many predicted would splinter over the issue, instead consolidated power and reshaped the political landscape entirely. Labour's traditional coalition of working-class and middle-class voters fractured instead.
Matthew Elliott, who ran the Vote Leave campaign, has reflected on how differently things might have unfolded. Had the opposition benches backed Theresa May's softer version of Brexit, the Tories would likely have torn themselves apart. Jeremy Corbyn might be prime minister now. Britain might still be in the EU, dependent on a European vaccination programme that stumbled badly in its early months. Instead, Boris Johnson seized on the mandate to "get Brexit done," won a landslide, and the country's vaccine rollout succeeded where the continent's initially faltered. Over 80 per cent of British adults received a first dose. The political narrative shifted. What looked like a catastrophic miscalculation began to look, at least on the surface, like vindication.
But victory has come with costs that cannot be wished away. In Northern Ireland, the sectarian wounds that the 1998 Good Friday Agreement had helped to heal have reopened. The border question was always going to be thorny—the New Statesman warned of it before the referendum even happened—and it has proved exactly as intractable as predicted. The machinery of peace, built painstakingly over decades, now creaks under the weight of new trade barriers and old grievances.
Scotland presents a different but equally serious fracture. Sixty-two per cent of Scottish voters chose to remain in the EU, yet they are bound by a UK decision they rejected. The Scottish National Party has seized on this as proof that Scotland is being held in a union against its will—the very charge that Leavers once levelled at Brussels. The irony is sharp and the political consequences are real. The UK government now faces the accusation it once made.
These ruptures trace back to the carelessness with which Cameron called the referendum in the first place. He made no provision for the four nations of the UK to separately approve the outcome. He arranged no confirmatory second vote. He simply assumed he would win and moved on. When he lost, the country was left to sort out the wreckage.
The Leave vote itself was never simply about the EU. It was a howl of disaffection from small cities and towns across England, from places that had endured the largest public spending cuts in postwar history, that had watched living standards fall for longer than anyone could remember, and that had lost faith in the institutions and the people who ran them. Both major parties now want to move past 2016, but neither can escape its consequences. The Conservatives have captured seats in the old Labour heartland—Hartlepool among them—and are trying to remake themselves as a party of regional investment and "levelling up." But this has triggered a backlash in affluent, pro-Remain areas like Chesham and Amersham, where the Liberal Democrats won a by-election in mid-June. The country remains divided, volatile, and uncertain of its direction.
Harold Wilson, who led Labour through the last great European question, declared in 1975 that "14 years of national argument are over." Six years later, his own party was arguing for withdrawal. He should have known better. History does not end. The European question simply returns in new forms, asked by new voices, with new stakes. Johnson may believe he has finished with Brexit. But Brexit is far from finished with him, or with the United Kingdom.
Notable Quotes
Had Labour backed Theresa May's softer Brexit, the Tories would probably have split, Jeremy Corbyn would now be in No 10, and Britain would have relied on the EU's vaccination programme— Matthew Elliott, former chief executive of Vote Leave campaign
The European question has been asked in a new form whenever it has been declared settled; Johnson may believe he is done with Brexit, but Brexit is not done with the United Kingdom— New Statesman editorial reflection
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did the referendum fracture Labour but strengthen the Conservatives?
Because Labour tried to split the difference—they backed a second referendum, which alienated Leave voters in their traditional strongholds. The Tories, meanwhile, had a clear message: get it done. That clarity won them seats in places Labour had held for generations.
But didn't the economic warnings come true?
Not in the way people expected. There was no immediate recession, and the UK's vaccine programme actually outpaced Europe's. That gave Johnson political cover. But the warnings about Northern Ireland and Scotland were exactly right—those fractures are real and deepening.
So Brexit succeeded economically but failed politically?
It's more complicated. The economic picture is mixed—the pound weakened, trade became harder. But the political realignment was decisive. The question now is whether that realignment can hold when the costs become clearer.
What does the Northern Ireland border actually mean for people living there?
It means goods moving between Great Britain and Northern Ireland face new checks. It means the old sectarian tensions have a new focal point. The peace agreement assumed an open border; now there's friction where there was supposed to be flow.
Is Scottish independence inevitable now?
Not inevitable, but far more plausible than it was. The SNP has a powerful argument: Scotland voted Remain and got Leave anyway. That's a legitimacy problem the UK government can't easily solve.