US-China tech rivalry will persist under Biden despite diplomatic shift

Joe Biden's victory in the 2020 presidential election promised a different tone in America's relationship with China—less inflammatory rhetoric, more diplomatic procedure. But experts across the economic and policy world are nearly unanimous on one point: the fundamental competition between Washington and Beijing will not soften. If anything, it will deepen.

The rivalry between the two largest economies has roots that run deeper than any single administration's style or temperament. Throughout Trump's presidency, China became the named adversary—the country accused of stealing American technology, propping up state-owned corporations at the expense of foreign competitors, and using manufacturing capabilities that could threaten U.S. national security. These grievances did not emerge from Trump's rhetoric alone. They reflect structural tensions that economists and trade experts expect to persist and intensify regardless of who occupies the White House. Alex Capri, a researcher at the Hinrich Foundation and professor at the National University of Singapore, put it plainly: there exists a fundamental and systemic rivalry between these two political and economic systems, and in many respects, that rivalry will only grow sharper.

The year 2020 laid bare the depth of mistrust. Despite reaching a trade agreement in January, the two nations remained locked in disputes over technology transfer, the preferential treatment Beijing extends to state-owned enterprises, and American fears that Chinese manufacturing could be weaponized for surveillance. Congress, with rare bipartisan agreement, moved to sanction Huawei and restrict Chinese companies from listing on American stock exchanges. The pandemic added another layer of acrimony, with each nation blaming the other for its origins and mishandling. Disputes over Hong Kong and allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang widened a political chasm that shows no signs of closing.

William Reinsch, a trade expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies who spent 15 years leading the National Foreign Trade Council, noted that Biden had been explicit about his intentions, and that bipartisan support existed for a tougher line on China. With the Senate likely to remain under Republican control or held by Democrats with only the narrowest majority, the incoming president would face constant pressure from Republican China hawks in Congress to be more aggressive. There was little room to maneuver in the short term beyond complaint, and the atmosphere would likely worsen.

Yet a change in tone is almost certain. Trump was known for pettiness—declaring that America could no longer allow China to "rape our country," repeatedly calling COVID-19 the "China virus." Biden's approach will be more measured, more diplomatic, more willing to follow established procedures before imposing new tariffs or sanctions. Capri noted that thousands of American companies had sued the U.S. government over tariffs on Chinese goods, arguing the duties severely damaged their business. The Trump administration's Commerce Department had operated in what Capri called chaos, departing from the historical practice of consulting with American industry before taking action. China, too, appeared to be preparing for less heated rhetoric. On the Monday after the election, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said Beijing had "noted" Biden's victory and called for strengthened communication and dialogue, expressing hope for "healthy and stable" relations.

Yet beneath the diplomatic niceties lies an inexorable logic. Both nations are preparing for deeper economic separation. Analysts at JP Morgan predicted that under Biden, the two countries would continue battling for dominance in 5G networks, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and biotechnology. To compete in these domains, the U.S. and China have committed themselves to decoupling—reducing cooperation, restricting technology transfer, and in some cases closing off trade entirely. For China, this separation is not a threat to be avoided but a reality to be managed. The country has been preparing for a larger rupture between the world's two largest economies. Capri observed that China was not changing course; it was doubling down, working to reduce its dependence on American products and technology. Beijing has made technological self-sufficiency a centerpiece of its next five-year plan, underscoring how central this competition has become to Communist Party strategy. As Capri put it, the party views dependence on American technology as an enormous problem—as simple as that.

One advantage Biden's administration may hold is the ability to build international coalitions against Chinese practices in ways Trump could not. Relations between the U.S. and European Union had been strained under Trump as the two allies fought over trade. A Biden administration, more aligned with traditional partners, might prove far more effective in challenging China over state subsidies, foreign business rights, and intellectual property protection. The absence of a unified position among developed nations in recent years had stemmed largely from the current American government's tendency to act alone. That isolation may end, but the competition itself will not.