Concentrate all executive power in CEOs, relegating presidents to ceremonial roles
En España, la autoridad que vela por los mercados financieros se dispone a redefinir cómo se distribuye el poder en las cúpulas empresariales del país. La Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores ha redactado un código de gobierno corporativo que obligaría a las grandes cotizadas a separar la figura del presidente ejecutivo de la del consejero delegado, poniendo fin a una concentración de poder que ha caracterizado al capitalismo español durante décadas. Aunque la norma no tendrá fuerza legal, su peso simbólico y práctico ante inversores institucionales y asesores de voto la convierte en una presión difícil de ignorar para líderes como Ana Botín o Carlos Torres.
- La CNMV exige que las empresas con capitalización superior a 500 millones de euros transfieran todo el poder ejecutivo al consejero delegado, convirtiendo al presidente en una figura de representación y coordinación del consejo.
- Algunos de los ejecutivos más influyentes de España —al frente de Santander, BBVA, Iberdrola y Telefónica— se verían obligados a elegir entre el título y el mando real antes de junio de 2030.
- Aunque el código carece de fuerza legal, los inversores institucionales y los proxy advisors lo utilizan como criterio de evaluación en las juntas de accionistas, lo que convierte el incumplimiento en un riesgo reputacional y financiero tangible.
- El Banco Central Europeo avanza en paralelo con su propia guía de gobernanza para entidades bancarias, lo que multiplica la presión sobre las instituciones financieras españolas para adoptar el modelo de presidente no ejecutivo.
- El proceso regulatorio sigue abierto: el borrador actual está siendo revisado por un comité de expertos y no se someterá a consulta pública hasta 2027, dejando margen para cambios sustanciales antes de su versión definitiva.
El regulador bursátil español se prepara para transformar la arquitectura del poder en las grandes empresas cotizadas del país. La CNMV ha elaborado un borrador de nuevo código de gobierno corporativo que obligaría a las compañías con una capitalización de mercado superior a 500 millones de euros a separar las funciones ejecutivas de las representativas: los consejeros delegados concentrarían toda la autoridad operativa, mientras que los presidentes quedarían relegados a coordinar y organizar el consejo sin intervenir en la gestión diaria.
La medida afectaría directamente a figuras como Ana Botín en Santander, Carlos Torres en BBVA, Ignacio Sánchez-Galán en Iberdrola o Marc Murtra en Telefónica. Cada uno de ellos tendría hasta el 30 de junio de 2030 para adaptarse, aunque las empresas deberían presentar planes de sucesión antes de junio de 2028. El modelo que promueve la CNMV replica el esquema anglosajón tradicional, en el que un presidente independiente supervisa el consejo mientras el CEO dirige el negocio.
El código no tiene rango legal, pero su influencia es real: los inversores institucionales y los asesores de voto lo emplean como referencia para evaluar los nombramientos en las juntas de accionistas, y las empresas que se aparten de sus recomendaciones deben justificarlo públicamente en sus informes anuales de gobierno corporativo. La CNMV argumenta que concentrar el poder ejecutivo y representativo en una sola persona debilita la independencia del consejo y su capacidad de supervisión.
La presión no viene solo de dentro. El Banco Central Europeo lleva cerca de dos años desarrollando su propia guía de gobernanza para bancos de la eurozona, que apunta en la misma dirección. Botín y Torres han defendido hasta ahora sus estructuras actuales, recordando que tanto el BCE como la CNMV las habían avalado previamente. Ese argumento podría perder pronto su validez.
El borrador, fechado en febrero de 2026, está siendo revisado por un comité presidido por el presidente de la CNMV, Carlos San Basilio, y su vicepresidenta Paloma Marín, con participación de representantes del Banco de España, la Abogacía del Estado, grandes despachos jurídicos y asociaciones empresariales. El texto se someterá a consulta pública en el primer trimestre de 2027 y se espera que la versión definitiva se publique a mediados de 2028, aunque el proceso sigue abierto a cambios significativos.
Spain's financial regulator is preparing to reshape how power flows through the boardrooms of the country's largest companies. The National Securities Market Commission, known as the CNMV, has drafted a new corporate governance code that would require major listed firms to strip executive authority from their chairmen and concentrate it entirely in the hands of their chief executives. The move, detailed in an early draft obtained by the Spanish press, represents a fundamental challenge to a governance model that has defined Spanish business for decades.
The proposal targets companies with market capitalizations exceeding 500 million euros—a threshold that captures most of Spain's blue-chip firms. Under the draft rules, chairmen would become ceremonial figures responsible for coordinating and organizing the board itself, while CEOs would hold sole command over day-to-day operations. The change would directly affect some of Spain's most powerful executives: Ana Botín at Santander, Carlos Torres at BBVA, Ignacio Sánchez-Galán at Iberdrola, and Marc Murtra at Telefónica, among others. Each would face a choice—retain the title of chairman or keep operational control, but not both.
The CNMV began drafting this updated code late last year, with a target completion date of 2027. The regulator set a deadline of June 30, 2028, for affected companies to develop succession plans explaining how they would transfer executive powers from presidents to CEOs. The actual implementation of those plans must occur no later than June 30, 2030. While the governance code itself carries no legal force, it functions as a powerful soft law. Institutional investors and their proxy advisors treat it as a framework for evaluating board appointments at shareholder meetings. Companies that deviate from its recommendations must publicly explain their reasoning in annual governance reports—a disclosure that can influence how major shareholders vote.
The regulator's rationale centers on a fundamental governance principle: concentrating executive and representative power in a single person undermines board independence and weakens oversight of management. The draft states that separating these roles ensures a proper balance of power and strengthens the board's ability to supervise executive performance effectively. The CNMV exempts smaller companies—those below the 500 million euro threshold—arguing that the structural changes would impose disproportionate costs. The model the regulator is promoting mirrors the traditional British system, where an independent chairman coordinates the board while the CEO manages the business.
Pressure for this shift extends beyond Spain's securities regulator. The European Central Bank, which supervises major eurozone banks, has spent roughly two years developing its own governance guidance for financial institutions. That guidance, still in draft form, similarly calls for separating the chairman and CEO roles. Both Botín and Torres have repeatedly defended their current governance structures, noting that both the ECB and CNMV have previously approved their arrangements. That approval may soon become irrelevant. Among their competitors, the picture is mixed: Josep Oliu at Sabadell, María Dolores Dancausa at Bankinter, and José Sevilla at Unicaja already serve as non-executive chairmen. At CaixaBank, Tomás Muniesa lost his executive powers when José Ignacio Goirigolzarri became president, though Muniesa retains an executive role representing the bank's largest shareholder, Criteria Caixa.
The CNMV's draft, dated February 2026, remains under review by an expert committee led personally by the regulator's president, Carlos San Basilio, and vice president Paloma Marín. The committee includes representatives from Spain's State Secretariat for Economy, the Attorney General's office, the Bank of Spain, major law firms including Garrigues and Uría Menéndez, and business associations representing banks, insurance companies, and investment funds. The regulator plans to release the text for public consultation in the first quarter of 2027, allowing three months for stakeholder feedback before publishing the final version in mid-2028. The process remains fluid—the current draft is already being revised, and significant changes could still emerge before public review begins.
Citas Notables
Concentrating executive and representative power in one person compromises board independence and weakens oversight of management; international best practice recommends separating these roles in large listed companies.— CNMV draft code
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would a regulator push this change now, after decades of Spanish companies operating with combined chairman-CEO roles?
The pressure is coming from multiple directions at once. The ECB is moving on bank governance, institutional investors increasingly expect it, and there's a sense that Spain's corporate structure is out of step with international best practice. It's not sudden—it's accumulated weight.
But these are recommendations, not rules. What makes them actually matter?
That's the crucial part. Companies can ignore them, but then they have to publicly explain why in their annual reports. Institutional investors—pension funds, asset managers—use these codes to decide how to vote on board appointments. Ignore the code and you risk shareholder rebellion.
So Ana Botín and Carlos Torres could theoretically refuse to split their roles?
They could. But they'd be swimming against the current. Their own regulators would be on record saying it's bad governance. Their major shareholders would have ammunition to challenge them. It's not legally binding, but it's practically binding.
Why exempt smaller companies from this requirement?
The regulator argues that splitting the roles—hiring a separate chairman, restructuring the board—costs money that smaller firms can't easily absorb. It's a pragmatic concession. The real concern is concentrated power in large, systemically important companies.
What happens if a company misses the 2030 deadline?
That's still unclear. The code itself doesn't specify penalties. But missing a deadline that's been publicly announced, with the ECB watching and investors paying attention, would be its own kind of pressure. Non-compliance becomes a governance red flag.
Is this actually about better oversight, or is it about limiting the power of individual executives?
Both, probably. The stated rationale is that a chairman focused on board coordination, separate from a CEO managing operations, creates better checks and balances. Whether that's true in practice is debatable. But the intent is genuine—to prevent one person from being both the boss and the person supposed to oversee the boss.