87.5% of voters would reject the AKP under his leadership
In Ankara, the ancient question of succession stirs once more — not through proclamation, but through the quiet accumulation of presence. Bilal Erdogan, son of Turkey's long-dominant president, has been edging toward the threshold of formal power through civil society roles, state-adjacent networks, and carefully managed visibility, even as he publicly disavows ambition. The tension between dynastic logic and democratic legitimacy is laid bare by polling that shows an overwhelming majority of Turks — including more than half of the ruling party's own supporters — would reject his leadership, reminding us that proximity to power and the consent of the governed are not the same inheritance.
- Bilal Erdogan's expanding footprint — on pro-government media, at foreign state visits, and within influential foundations — signals a political grooming process that his own denials cannot fully obscure.
- Analysts warn that a direct presidential bid would be premature; the more viable path runs through AKP party leadership first, where his father's endorsement could override internal resistance.
- A survey of nearly 8,000 Turkish voters delivered a stark verdict: 87.5% across the political spectrum said they would definitively not support the AKP under Bilal's leadership.
- Even within the AKP's own base, a majority — over 53% — oppose the transition, exposing a dangerous fracture between institutional momentum and grassroots legitimacy.
- The architecture of Turkey's 2018 executive presidency, which concentrated authority in the office Erdogan holds, means that whoever controls the party and the presidency controls the state — making the succession stakes extraordinarily high.
In the corridors of Ankara, a quiet calculation is underway. Bilal Erdogan, 44-year-old son of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has begun appearing in public opinion surveys — a development that has ignited succession speculation in political circles. He has publicly denied any political ambitions, yet his movements suggest otherwise: more frequent appearances on pro-government television, high-profile attendance at state visits across Asia and the Gulf, and a deepening presence within the networks surrounding his father.
Bilal has been building his profile through channels that stop short of formal party politics — chairing a conservative education group, sitting on the advisory board of TUGVA, a youth foundation tied to Turkey's Islamist movement, and cultivating a public identity around traditional Turkish archery. Bloomberg reported this month that his entry into formal politics is under active consideration within the ruling AKP, and that he is receiving informal political leadership training.
Analysts argue his most logical first step would be a bid for AKP party leadership rather than a direct presidential run. Political scientist Metin Ozkan explained that controlling the party would allow Bilal to consolidate internal legitimacy and test his footing before any larger ambition — but only if his father openly endorses him. Research director Nurettin Kalkan sketched the most plausible scenario: Erdogan retains the presidency while handing his son the party, keeping the security bureaucracy aligned and internal dissent suppressed. Commentators have also noted Bilal's growing informal influence over state institutions, including the national broadcaster and news agency.
Yet the polling data exposes a profound vulnerability. A survey of nearly 8,000 respondents found that 87.5% would definitively not vote for the AKP under Bilal's leadership — and more than 53% of current AKP supporters share that rejection. The gap between institutional positioning and popular consent defines the challenge ahead. Whether a father's endorsement can overcome that resistance, and whether Bilal's denials will hold as elections approach, remains the open question at the heart of Turkey's political future.
In the corridors of Ankara, a quiet calculation is underway. Bilal Erdogan, the 44-year-old son of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has begun appearing in public opinion surveys—a development that has set off a particular kind of speculation in political circles about what comes next. The younger Erdogan has not declared himself a candidate for anything. He has, in fact, publicly insisted he harbors no political ambitions. Yet his movements tell a different story: more frequent appearances on pro-government television, higher-profile attendance at official state visits to Malaysia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Gulf states, and a growing presence within the networks of power that surround his father.
For the past several months, Bilal has been building his profile through channels that stop short of formal party politics. He sits on the High Advisory Board of TUGVA, a youth foundation with deep ties to Turkey's Islamist movement, and chairs a conservative education group. A Harvard graduate in public administration, he is known as a traditionalist and has become something of a public figure for his work reviving traditional Turkish archery. According to reporting from Bloomberg this month, his entry into formal politics is under active consideration within the ruling Justice and Development Party, and he is receiving informal political leadership training, though the specifics remain opaque.
Analysts who study Turkish politics are watching this unfold with a particular focus. They argue that if Bilal does move into electoral politics, his most logical first step would not be a direct run for the presidency but rather a bid for leadership of the AKP itself. Metin Ozkan, a political scientist at Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University, explained to Al-Monitor that taking control of the party would allow him to consolidate power within the organization, build legitimacy among its members, and test his political footing before any larger ambition. "There is a great deal of deference toward Mr. Bilal Erdogan within the Justice and Development Party," Ozkan said. The critical variable, he added, is whether his father openly endorses him—a move that would dramatically shift the internal dynamics.
Nurettin Kalkan, director of the Ankara-based Angora Research company, sketched out what he sees as the most plausible scenario: Erdogan wins another presidential term while handing party leadership to his son. This arrangement would give Bilal significant institutional advantages. With his father still in the presidency, the security bureaucracy would remain aligned behind him, and internal party dissent would be minimized. The younger Erdogan could run as a parliamentary candidate in 2028, or earlier if elections are called sooner. Ismail Saymaz, a commentator for the opposition-aligned Halk TV, has noted that Bilal's influence is already expanding across government institutions, including the state broadcaster TRT and the state news agency. He has become, in effect, an informal conduit for those seeking direct access to the president.
But there is a problem embedded in these calculations, and it emerges starkly in the polling data. When Saros Arastirma surveyed nearly 8,000 respondents between mid-January and late January, the results suggested a significant vulnerability. Asked whether they would vote for the AKP if Bilal took over party leadership after his father, 87.5% of all respondents across the political spectrum said they would "definitely not." Only 12.5% said they would "definitely" support the party under his leadership. The weakness runs deeper than opposition voters. Among self-identified AKP supporters themselves, more than 53% said they would "definitely not" back the party with Bilal at the helm.
This gap between institutional positioning and popular support defines the challenge ahead. The transition to executive rule in 2018 concentrated decision-making power in the presidency and gave the president sweeping authority over party structures, state institutions, and the security apparatus. That concentration of power makes AKP leadership a crucial mechanism for managing governance and internal party dynamics. Yet translating control of those levers into votes from ordinary Turks appears to be a different proposition entirely. Bilal Erdogan has denied any political ambitions in interviews with Russian media and Turkish podcasts. Whether that denial holds, and whether his father's endorsement could overcome the polling headwinds, remains an open question as Turkey moves toward elections that could reshape the country's political landscape.
Citas Notables
There is a great deal of deference toward Mr. Bilal Erdogan within the Justice and Development Party, but he is unlikely to publicly assert political ambitions unless his father openly endorses him.— Metin Ozkan, political scientist at Ankara Haci Bayram Veli University
Without Erdogan's presence, Bilal Erdogan would not find favor among Justice and Development Party voters. The most plausible scenario would involve Erdogan securing another term as president while handing party leadership to his son.— Nurettin Kalkan, director of Angora Research
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would Bilal Erdogan pursue party leadership instead of running directly for president if his father's endorsement is so powerful?
Because the party is where the machinery actually lives. If he takes the presidency without controlling the AKP first, he'd face internal resistance and no real base of his own. The party is how you govern in Turkey now.
But the polls show 87% of voters would reject him. How does party leadership solve that problem?
It doesn't solve it immediately. But it gives him time and institutional cover. He'd be learning the job, building relationships, proving he can manage the party apparatus while his father is still there to back him up. The legitimacy question is real, though.
What does "informal political leadership training" actually mean? Who trains him?
The reporting doesn't say, which is telling. It's probably happening in closed rooms with senior AKP figures, advisors, maybe people from the security establishment. It's not something you announce.
Is there any chance this doesn't happen at all?
Of course. Bilal keeps saying he has no political ambitions, and he might mean it. But the visibility, the positioning, the training—it all points in one direction. His father would have to actively discourage it for it to stop.
What happens to the AKP if Bilal takes over and those polls hold?
The party fractures. You'd see defections, internal challenges, possibly a real opposition movement within the AKP itself. The security apparatus might hold, but voters would leave.