Even ceremonial offices can become instruments of obstruction
In Budapest, a newly elected government confronts the unfinished architecture of its predecessor — not through revolution, but through constitutional procedure. Péter Magyar, who won a sweeping mandate in April to undo sixteen years of Viktor Orbán's rule, now faces a president installed by that very regime who refuses to leave. The struggle over Tamás Sulyok's office is, at its core, a question as old as democratic transitions themselves: how completely can a new order remake the institutions shaped by the old one, and how long can those institutions resist?
- Magyar set a May 31st deadline for President Sulyok to resign — the president ignored it entirely, forcing the government toward a constitutional confrontation.
- Sulyok, appointed by Orbán in 2024 without a public vote, now warns that his forced removal will deepen social divisions and risk Hungary's access to €16.4 billion in frozen EU funds.
- Magyar's Tisza party holds the two-thirds parliamentary supermajority needed to amend the constitution, giving it the legal power — but not the speed — to act.
- Even as the amendment process begins, Sulyok is actively using his remaining authority, announcing military appointments via Facebook in a pointed display of his powers.
- The removal process is expected to take roughly a month, during which the president retains the ability to refer laws to court and slow the government's reform agenda.
Hungary's new prime minister, Péter Magyar, is heading toward a constitutional confrontation with President Tamás Sulyok — a man appointed to office by Viktor Orbán in February 2024 and now the most visible symbol of the old regime's lingering presence. After months of public pressure and a formal deadline that passed unheeded, Magyar has announced his government will amend the constitution to remove Sulyok by force.
Sulyok shows no sign of yielding. When the two men met, the president doubled down, arguing that the engineered crisis would harm Hungary's international reputation and potentially jeopardize the release of some €16.4 billion in EU funds that Brussels froze during Orbán's tenure — money that could now flow to Budapest if Magyar's democratic reforms hold course. Magyar, for his part, has accused Sulyok of never defending the vulnerable or the rule of law, and of having no legitimate claim to represent Hungarian unity.
The mechanics favor Magyar. His Tisza party holds a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly — the supermajority required to amend the constitution and dismantle Orbán-era institutional arrangements. The process to remove Sulyok is expected to take about a month. In the meantime, the presidency, though largely ceremonial, is not without teeth: Sulyok can confirm appointments, refer legislation to parliament for reconsideration, and send laws to the constitutional court — tools that, in hostile hands, can meaningfully obstruct reform.
The Magyar government is thinking beyond this single confrontation. It has proposed a constitutional amendment capping any prime minister's tenure at eight years — a direct reckoning with the sixteen-year consolidation of power that Orbán achieved. Orbán himself left parliament in April following his electoral defeat, but his institutional legacy remains embedded in Hungary's courts, appointments, and laws. What is unfolding now is the central test of Magyar's early tenure: whether democratic transitions can truly undo the architecture of the regimes they replace, or whether that architecture finds ways to endure.
Hungary's new prime minister is preparing for a constitutional showdown. Péter Magyar, who swept to power in April with a mandate to dismantle the legacy of Viktor Orbán's sixteen-year rule, has run out of patience with President Tamás Sulyok. After months of public demands that Sulyok resign, Magyar set a deadline of May 31st. The president ignored it. Now Magyar says the government will amend the constitution to remove him by force.
Sulyok was installed in the presidential office in February 2024 by Orbán's party, appointed rather than elected, a choice that rankled many Hungarians who saw it as a consolidation of power by a departing regime. When Magyar won his landslide victory in April, he promised swift action against the remnants of Orbán's apparatus—and Sulyok became a symbol of unfinished business. On social media, Magyar accused the president of never standing up for the vulnerable or for the rule of law, of being unworthy to represent Hungarian unity. The message was clear: this man does not belong in that office.
But Sulyok has refused to budge. He says he intends to serve out his full five-year term, and when he met with Magyar on Monday, he doubled down, warning that the constitutional crisis being engineered by the new government would deepen social divisions and damage Hungary's international standing. He even suggested that the standoff could jeopardize the unlocking of European Union funds—some €16.4 billion that Brussels has held back due to democratic backsliding under Orbán, and which the EU has signaled could soon flow to Budapest if Magyar's reforms proceed.
Magyar's Tisza party holds a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly, the supermajority needed to amend the constitution. This is the crucial lever that will allow the new government to unpick Orbán-era reforms and reshape the institutions that were bent to serve the previous regime. Magyar told reporters the process to remove Sulyok would take roughly a month. Orbán's Fidesz party, still a force in parliament, has denounced the move as an unlawful ultimatum.
The presidency in Hungary is mostly ceremonial, but it is not powerless. The president confirms public appointments—Sulyok announced several military appointments via Facebook on Monday, a small assertion of his remaining authority. More significantly, the president can refer laws back to parliament for reconsideration or send legislation to the constitutional court. These tools, wielded by someone opposed to the government's agenda, could slow or even block reforms. It is a reminder that even ceremonial offices, in the hands of a determined opponent, can become instruments of obstruction.
Orbán himself stepped down from parliament in April after his electoral defeat, closing one door to a return. But Magyar's government is taking no chances. It has proposed a constitutional amendment that would limit any prime minister to eight years in power, a direct response to Orbán's sixteen-year tenure. The new government is not simply trying to remove Sulyok; it is trying to ensure that the conditions that allowed Orbán to entrench himself cannot easily be recreated.
What unfolds now is a test of whether a newly empowered government can actually dismantle the institutional architecture of its predecessor, or whether the remnants of the old regime can use the tools left to them to mount a credible resistance. The constitutional amendment process will take weeks. Sulyok will remain in office, able to make appointments and refer laws to court. The standoff has already begun to define Magyar's early months in power, and it will shape how quickly and thoroughly he can reshape Hungary's democratic institutions.
Citações Notáveis
Tamás Sulyok has never stood up for the vulnerable, for those under attack, or for the rule of law.— Péter Magyar, Prime Minister
The constitutional crisis situation emerging as a result deepens the social divisions and damages the international judgement of Hungarian democracy.— Tamás Sulyok, President
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why does it matter that Sulyok was appointed rather than elected?
Because it signals how Orbán consolidated power in his final months—he didn't leave the presidency to chance. He installed someone he trusted, someone who would protect his interests after he stepped down. That's the whole reason Magyar sees Sulyok as a problem.
But the presidency is mostly ceremonial, right? Why not just leave him there and move on?
Because ceremonial doesn't mean powerless. Sulyok can confirm or block appointments. He can send laws to the constitutional court to slow them down. If you're trying to reform a system that was bent by the previous regime, having someone from that regime in a position to obstruct you is a real problem.
What happens if Sulyok refuses to leave even after the constitutional amendment?
He can't. If the amendment passes, it removes him. The question is whether it will pass—Magyar has the two-thirds majority he needs, but these things can be messy. And in the meantime, Sulyok stays in office, still able to make trouble.
Is this about revenge, or is it actually necessary?
It's both, probably. Magyar clearly has personal animosity toward Sulyok and everything he represents. But there's also a structural argument: if you're trying to undo sixteen years of institutional capture, you can't leave the other side's people in key positions. Even ceremonial ones.
What's the EU's stake in this?
Money. Sixteen billion euros in funding that's been frozen because of democratic backsliding. The EU has signaled it will release those funds if Magyar's reforms are genuine. But Sulyok is arguing that this constitutional crisis could spook Brussels, make them think Hungary is still unstable. It's a gamble on both sides.
Could Orbán come back?
Not easily. He stepped down from parliament, and Magyar's government is amending the constitution to limit prime ministers to eight years. They're closing the doors behind them. But Orbán's party still has seats, still has supporters. This fight with Sulyok is partly about making sure there's no institutional foothold left for a return.