China could not afford to depend on American goodwill for its technological future
Hang transformed Nvidia's China market share from under 50% to over 80% before departing in 2020 to launch Moore Threads as a homegrown competitor. US export restrictions on Chinese semiconductor firms in 2023 validated Moore Threads' mission for technological autonomy, accelerating domestic chip substitution.
- Hang Jianzhong grew Nvidia's China market share from under 50% to over 80% in fourteen years
- Moore Threads IPO in 2025 valued the company at 300 billion yuan ($37.6 billion), a 425% surge from the 8 billion yuan raised
- US export restrictions on Moore Threads in 2023 accelerated China's domestic semiconductor substitution efforts
- Hang's personal wealth estimated at 9.1 billion yuan ($1.14 billion) following the IPO
Hang Jianzhong, former Nvidia VP in China, founded Moore Threads to develop indigenous GPU technology amid US export restrictions, recently achieving a spectacular IPO valuation of $37.6 billion.
In 2020, a man walked away from one of the world's most powerful technology companies at the height of his influence there. Hang Jianzhong had spent fourteen years at Nvidia, transforming its presence in China from a struggling foothold into a commanding position—capturing more than eighty percent of the market where the company had once struggled to claim even half. Then he left to build a competitor.
The narrative that followed was almost too clean: the betrayer, the traitor, the executive who abandoned Jensen Huang and Nvidia's trust to pursue his own ambitions. But the story beneath that headline is more interesting, and more revealing about the shape of global technology competition right now.
Hang was born in 1966 and studied computer science at Nanjing University of Science and Technology, an institution with deep roots in Chinese engineering education stretching back to its founding in 1953 as a military engineering department. After graduating, he spent a year as a researcher at a national computing laboratory before moving into the private sector in 1992. He worked as a general manager at Hewlett-Packard for nine years, then moved to Dell in 2001 in a similar role managing global customer operations. These were solid positions at major corporations, but they were not the work that would define him.
That began in 2005 when he joined Nvidia. For the next fourteen years, he climbed methodically through the ranks until he reached the position of global vice president and general manager for China. The reason was straightforward: he worked. Nvidia had been trying to establish itself in the Chinese market for years without success. Under Hang's leadership, that changed entirely. The company went from controlling less than fifty percent of the market to commanding more than eighty percent—a transformation that demonstrated the opportunity had always existed; it simply required the right person to see it and execute.
But Hang had his own ambitions. In 2020, as US-China tensions were sharpening and Beijing was beginning to restrict semiconductor imports, he saw an opening. China needed its own chip technology infrastructure, independent from American companies and American policy. He left Nvidia and founded Moore Threads, naming it after Gordon Moore's observation about transistor density doubling every two years—a deliberate echo of the law that had guided Nvidia's own trajectory, and a signal of his intentions.
The timing was not accidental. In 2020, China had begun imposing restrictions on semiconductor imports. By 2023, the US government had moved to block Moore Threads from exporting its products, citing national security concerns. The ban stung immediately, but it also validated everything Hang had argued when he launched the company: China could not afford to depend on American goodwill or American policy for its technological future. The restrictions accelerated what Moore Threads was already attempting—a domestic substitution of GPU technology, with the company and its rival MetaX emerging as the leading Chinese alternatives to Nvidia.
In 2025, Moore Threads went public on the Shanghai exchange. The company raised 8 billion yuan—roughly 1 billion euros—in its initial offering. On the first day of trading, its valuation exceeded 300 billion yuan, or approximately 37.6 billion euros. That represented a 425 percent surge from the IPO price. The numbers were extraordinary by any measure. Hang's personal wealth, calculated at around 9.1 billion yuan or 1.14 billion euros, placed him in a rarefied position, though not among China's wealthiest individuals.
What Moore Threads represents is not betrayal but competition—the kind that has become the defining feature of the relationship between the United States and China in technology. Hang saw an opportunity, recognized the moment, and built something. That he did it by leaving Nvidia and building a direct competitor is presented as a scandal, a personal affront to Huang. But it is simply business, executed at the moment when geopolitical pressure made it not just possible but necessary. China is consolidating its position in semiconductor technology, and it is not interested in ceding ground. The paranoia surrounding Hang—the whispers about disloyalty, the accusations of betrayal—says more about how the West views defection from its companies than it does about what Hang actually did.
Citas Notables
Moore Threads and MetaX are considered the leading GPU firms in China— He Hui, semiconductor research director at Omnia
US export restrictions on GPUs from China have led companies in the country to accelerate domestic substitution— Moore Threads statement
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why did Hang wait until 2020 to leave Nvidia? He'd already proven he could build markets. Why not start Moore Threads earlier?
Because the moment wasn't right. Nvidia was still dominant globally, and China hadn't yet felt the full weight of American export restrictions. In 2020, those restrictions were beginning. By 2023, they were explicit. Hang was reading the room—reading the geopolitical room—and he moved when the conditions made it not just possible but inevitable.
The story frames him as a traitor. Do you think Huang actually felt betrayed, or is that just the narrative that sells better?
It probably stung. Hang had made Nvidia's China operation work when nothing else had. But calling it betrayal requires believing that loyalty to a corporation supersedes loyalty to your own country's technological independence. That's a Western frame. In China's context, what Hang did looks like patriotism.
Moore Threads went public and jumped 425 percent. That's not normal. What does that valuation actually mean?
It means investors believe in the mission. It means China's tech sector is willing to bet enormous sums on domestic alternatives to American companies. The valuation might be inflated—IPO surges often are—but the underlying conviction is real. China wants off the American supply chain.
Is Moore Threads actually competitive with Nvidia, or is this mostly political will?
It's both. Moore Threads isn't at Nvidia's level yet, but it doesn't need to be. It needs to be good enough for Chinese applications, good enough to keep money and talent inside China. That's a different measure of success than global dominance.
What happens if the US restrictions ease? Does Moore Threads collapse?
Probably not. The company now has capital, talent, and a domestic market that needs it. Even if restrictions eased tomorrow, China would likely continue building its own capacity. The trust is broken. They're not going back to depending on American companies.