They want to turn Brazil into a colony
Quando Washington classificou o Comando Vermelho e o PCC como organizações terroristas, o governo Lula se viu diante de um dilema que transcende a política criminal: como defender a soberania nacional sem parecer conivente com o crime organizado. A designação, anunciada pelo secretário Marco Rubio em meio a uma visita de Flávio Bolsonaro a Washington, expõe as tensões entre cooperação bilateral e autonomia nacional que sempre marcaram as relações entre Brasil e Estados Unidos. No horizonte, a questão não é apenas jurídica ou diplomática — é sobre quem, afinal, define os termos da segurança pública brasileira.
- A designação americana pegou o Planalto de surpresa em plena tentativa de aproximação diplomática com Washington, transformando um momento de diálogo em crise de soberania.
- O governo teme menos as facções criminosas em si do que as consequências jurídicas e institucionais imprevisíveis que a classificação terrorista pode desencadear no plano bilateral.
- A visita simultânea de Flávio Bolsonaro a Trump, Vance e Rubio inflamou os aliados de Lula, que rapidamente enquadraram o episódio como prova de que a família Bolsonaro age contra os interesses nacionais.
- Parlamentares petistas foram à ofensiva antes mesmo de uma resposta oficial, acusando os Bolsonaros de abrir o país à intervenção estrangeira e de comprometer investimentos e a economia brasileira.
- O Planalto busca um equilíbrio delicado: protestar com firmeza suficiente para preservar sua imagem soberanista, sem soar como defensor do crime organizado às vésperas de 2026.
O governo brasileiro foi apanhado de surpresa quando o secretário de Estado Marco Rubio anunciou, na quinta-feira, a classificação do Comando Vermelho e do PCC como organizações terroristas. A medida chegou no meio de um esforço do Planalto para estreitar laços com Washington — e transformou um período de aproximação diplomática em um problema político e jurídico de difícil manejo.
A preocupação central do governo não é com as facções em si, mas com o que a designação pode desencadear: exposição legal imprevisível, redesenho da cooperação em segurança e, sobretudo, a sinalização de uma ação unilateral americana sobre território brasileiro. O Planalto havia trabalhado justamente para evitar essa classificação, preferindo aprofundar a cooperação policial e de inteligência. Celso Amorim resumiu a posição oficial: cooperação internacional é bem-vinda; pretexto para intervenção, não.
O timing piorou o impacto político. Flávio Bolsonaro estava em Washington nessa mesma semana, reunido com Trump, Vance e o próprio Rubio. Os aliados de Lula não perderam tempo: a designação foi imediatamente enquadrada como evidência de que a família Bolsonaro age contra os interesses do Brasil, incentivando pressão estrangeira e sacrificando a soberania nacional por ganho político.
No Congresso, o deputado Lindbergh Farias lançou um vídeo acusando os Bolsonaros de irresponsabilidade e traição, alertando para consequências negativas à economia e ao investimento estrangeiro. O líder do PT na Câmara, Pedro Uczai, foi além: listou as ofertas da família ao governo Trump — desde sanções à economia brasileira até a abertura de minerais críticos — como partes de um padrão de entrega do país a interesses externos.
O desafio do Planalto é calibrar uma resposta que proteja sua imagem soberanista sem soar como defesa do crime organizado, num momento em que Lula tem endurecido o discurso contra as facções. A designação americana é uma prerrogativa legal dos Estados Unidos, reconhecem os oficiais — mas é também uma mudança que o Brasil não escolheu e não controla plenamente. O episódio já foi incorporado à narrativa eleitoral de 2026, onde a soberania nacional promete ser um dos eixos centrais do debate.
The Brazilian government found itself in an awkward position this week when the United States abruptly designated two of the country's largest criminal organizations—the Comando Vermelho and the PCC—as terrorist entities. The announcement, made by Secretary of State Marco Rubio on Thursday, caught the Planalto off guard in the middle of what officials had been cultivating as a period of closer diplomatic ties with Washington. Now the Lula administration faces a delicate calculation: how to respond without appearing to defend criminals, even as it grapples with what it sees as a genuine threat to Brazilian sovereignty.
The core of the government's anxiety is not the designation itself, but what it might trigger. Officials worry less about the criminal organizations than about the legal, diplomatic, and institutional consequences that could follow. A terrorist classification opens doors to unpredictable legal exposure, could reshape how the two countries cooperate on security matters, and—most troubling to the Planalto—signals a kind of unilateral American action on Brazilian soil that undermines the principle of national sovereignty. The government had actually been working to prevent this designation, hoping instead to deepen police and intelligence cooperation with the United States in combating transnational organized crime. Celso Amorim, the president's international affairs adviser, offered the first official response: international cooperation is welcome, he said, but using it as a pretext for intervention is not.
The timing made the political sting worse. Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, Lula's principal rival in the last election, had traveled to Washington this week to meet with President Trump, Vice President J.D. Vance, and Rubio himself. The coincidence was not lost on the Lula camp. Allies of the president immediately began framing the terrorist designation as evidence that the Bolsonaro family acts against Brazilian interests, that they encourage foreign pressure on the country, and that they are willing to sacrifice national sovereignty for political gain. The narrative fit neatly into a larger strategy: the Lula government has made the defense of Brazilian sovereignty a defining theme of its third term, and it has already used Trump's tariffs on Brazilian goods last year to damage the Bolsonaros politically.
While the Planalto deliberated on its official response, allies in Congress did not wait. Deputy Lindbergh Farias, a vice-leader of the government in the Chamber and a sharp political operator, released a video calling the designation a decision that would have negative consequences for Brazil's economy, foreign investment, and sovereignty. He called the Bolsonaro brothers irresponsible and traitors who do not actually want to combat organized crime. "They want to make us vulnerable and open space for US military intervention in Brazil," he said. "They want to turn Brazil into a colony." PT floor leader Pedro Uczai issued a statement accusing the Bolsonaros of wanting to "hand Brazil over to Trump" and warning that the measure could produce "catastrophic financial consequences" and compound the damage already done by tariffs. He pointed to the family's earlier calls for foreign sanctions and pressure on the Brazilian economy, their offers to open the country's critical minerals to American interests, and now this move on national security—all, he suggested, part of a pattern of betrayal.
The government's challenge is real. It needs to object to the American action loudly enough to protect its image as a defender of national interests, but carefully enough not to sound like it is protecting criminals at a moment when Lula has been hardening his rhetoric against organized crime. The designation itself is a legal American prerogative, officials acknowledge, but they see it as a move that could reshape the bilateral security relationship in ways Brazil did not choose and cannot fully control. As the Planalto calibrates its next steps, the political opposition has already seized the moment to paint the Bolsonaros as agents of foreign interference—a message that will likely echo through the 2026 electoral cycle.
Citas Notables
International cooperation is welcome, but using it as a pretext for intervention is not acceptable— Celso Amorim, presidential adviser for international affairs
This decision will have negative consequences for Brazil's economy, foreign investment, and sovereignty— Deputy Lindbergh Farias, PT vice-leader in the Chamber
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why did the US move surprise the Brazilian government so much? Hadn't they seen this coming?
They had heard rumors from contacts in Washington that it might happen eventually, the way it has with criminal organizations from other countries. But the timing—right after Flávio Bolsonaro met with Trump—made it feel less like a routine policy decision and more like a political move. That's what stung.
But the Lula government was actually trying to prevent the designation, right? So what changed?
The government wanted deeper cooperation on crime-fighting instead. They thought they could convince Washington to work with them rather than act unilaterally. But the Trump administration apparently decided otherwise. Whether Bolsonaro's visit influenced that decision is what the Lula camp is now arguing.
Is the government actually worried about the criminal organizations themselves, or something else?
Something else entirely. The organizations are already being fought. What worries the Planalto is the legal and diplomatic machinery the designation sets in motion—the unpredictable consequences, the ways it might reshape how the two countries work together, and the signal it sends about American authority over Brazilian security decisions.
So this becomes about sovereignty?
Exactly. And that's the perfect political frame for Lula's government right now. They've made sovereignty defense a centerpiece of this term. Now they can point to the Bolsonaros and say: this is what happens when you align with foreign powers against your own country's interests.
Will that argument stick with voters?
It might. The government already used Trump's tariffs last year to damage the Bolsonaros. This gives them another concrete example to point to—another moment where the opposition appears to be working against Brazilian interests. Whether voters see it that way depends on how the government frames it and whether the economic consequences actually materialize.