A decade of talks, three governments, and finally a shift in the wind
A decade after negotiations first began, Colombia's government and the ELN guerrilla group have agreed to resume peace talks in early November, marking the most ambitious attempt yet to end a conflict that has displaced millions and outlasted three presidential administrations. Under President Gustavo Petro's sweeping 'Total Peace' initiative, roughly forty armed groups have signaled willingness to negotiate, transforming what was once a bilateral dialogue into a potential reshaping of the country's entire security landscape. The announcement, made from Caracas with Cuba, Venezuela, and Norway as guarantors, reflects both the weight of history and the fragile hope that political will, this time, might hold.
- Extradition warrants against ELN commanders were quietly withdrawn — a calculated concession that cleared the path for both sides to return to the table without losing face.
- The announcement lands after a decade of stalled talks, broken promises, and three governments that could not sustain the process long enough to reach agreement.
- Petro's 'Total Peace' framework dramatically raises the stakes, pulling nearly forty armed groups into a single negotiating orbit and betting that comprehensive settlement is more durable than piecemeal deals.
- Guarantor nations Cuba, Venezuela, and Norway are repositioning around the process, lending international legitimacy while the ELN's own commanders frame the resumption as a consequence of Colombia's changed political winds.
- The talks are underway, but the road ahead is shadowed by a long history of collapse — success will require sustained political will across multiple actors, and that has never been easy to hold.
On a Tuesday morning in Caracas, the ELN announced what had been quietly anticipated: peace talks with Colombia's government would resume in early November. The moment carried a decade of weight behind it. Negotiations had first opened in 2012, survived — and stalled under — three successive presidents, and were now being revived as the heart of Gustavo Petro's 'Total Peace' initiative.
The Colombian government had cleared the way with a significant gesture, withdrawing extradition warrants and arrest orders against the ELN's top commanders. Some of those commanders had been waiting in Cuba since the failed attempts under Santos and the subsequent freeze under Duque. Cuba confirmed that the ELN's peace delegation had departed the island on October 2nd, with Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez reaffirming Havana's role as a neutral guarantor. Venezuela's vice president Delcy Rodríguez pledged her country's continued support, and Norway would join as a third guarantor nation.
Colombia's negotiating team — Peace Commissioner Danilo Rueda, Senator Iván Cepeda, and Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva — had already been laying groundwork in Cuba. Across the table, ELN commanders Antonio García and Pablo Beltrán would lead the guerrilla delegation. García acknowledged the decade-long arc of the process, attributing past delays not to the ELN but to the rhythms of successive governments. In his view, Petro represented a genuine shift — one that might finally allow agreements to take root.
What distinguished this attempt was its scale. The peace commissioner released a list of nearly forty armed groups willing to enter the Total Peace framework alongside the ELN, from major insurgent organizations to city-based criminal structures. Each carried its own identity and motivations, but all had signaled openness to negotiation.
The stakes could not be higher. Colombia's armed conflict has displaced millions and scarred the country across generations. If Petro's gamble holds — if the ELN and the broader constellation of armed groups can be brought into durable agreements — the nation's security landscape could be fundamentally transformed. But the history of these talks is also a history of false starts, and political will has a way of dissolving with each change of government. Whether this time is different remains the central, unresolved question.
On a Tuesday morning in Caracas, the National Liberation Army—the ELN, as it is known—held a press conference to announce what had been whispered about for days: peace talks with Colombia's government would resume in early November. The moment carried weight. These negotiations had begun in 2012, stalled repeatedly through three presidential administrations, and now, under Gustavo Petro, they were being revived as the centerpiece of his "Total Peace" initiative.
The path to this announcement had been cleared by a significant gesture. The Colombian government had withdrawn extradition warrants and arrest orders against the ELN's top commanders—a symbolic removal of obstacles that had hung over the process for years. Some of those commanders had been waiting in Cuba since the failed attempts under Juan Manuel Santos and the subsequent freeze under Iván Duque. Now, with new political winds in Bogotá, the conditions had shifted enough for both sides to return to the table.
Cuba and Venezuela, the neighboring nations that had hosted and sheltered these negotiations before, confirmed their roles as guarantors. Cuba's foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez, stated that the ELN's peace delegation had departed the island on October 2nd, in accordance with protocols signed between Bogotá and the guerrilla group. He emphasized Cuba's commitment to remain a neutral seat and guarantor of whatever agreements might emerge. Venezuela's vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, echoed the sentiment, welcoming the resumption and pledging her country's continued support. Norway would join them as a third guarantor nation.
The Colombian government assembled its negotiating team from figures who had already been working the channels: Danilo Rueda, the peace commissioner; Iván Cepeda, a senator from Petro's coalition; and Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva. These three had traveled to Cuba in recent weeks to meet with ELN representatives and lay groundwork for this moment. On the guerrilla side, two commanders would lead: Antonio García and Pablo Beltrán, both seasoned figures in the organization's hierarchy.
What made this restart different from previous attempts was the scope of Petro's ambition. The peace commissioner had released a list of armed groups willing to join the Total Peace framework—not just the ELN, but roughly forty organizations in total. The list included the Central Command, Second Marquetalia, the AGC, and various city-based criminal structures, among them the Self-Defense Forces of the Sierra Nevada. Each group, Rueda noted, carried its own identity and motivations, but all had signaled willingness to negotiate.
Commander García himself addressed the historical arc of these talks. The process had begun on August 22, 2012—a decade prior. It had survived three complete presidential cycles and was now entering a fourth. The delays, he insisted, had not come from ELN negligence but from the rhythms imposed by successive governments. What had changed, in his view, was Colombia's political landscape. Petro represented a genuine shift in peace policy, one that might finally create space for agreements to take root and, perhaps, open doors for other armed groups to follow.
The stakes were immense. Colombia had endured decades of armed conflict that had displaced millions and left deep scars across the country. If these talks succeeded—if the ELN and the forty other groups could be brought into a negotiated settlement—the security landscape of the nation could be fundamentally redrawn. But success was far from guaranteed. The history of these talks was a history of false starts, broken promises, and political will that evaporated with each change of government. Petro's Total Peace was an audacious gamble that this time would be different.
Notable Quotes
The process has a history spanning ten years across three Colombian governments, and we are entering a fourth. The delays have not come from ELN negligence but from the rhythms imposed by successive governments. These new political circumstances in Colombia have allowed us to restart negotiations.— Commander Antonio García, ELN
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did it take a decade for these talks to restart? What broke down so badly under Duque?
Duque's government essentially froze the process. He withdrew from the negotiating framework and pursued a hardline security approach instead. The ELN saw it as a betrayal of commitments made to the international community. When Petro took office, he signaled a complete reversal—not just willingness to talk, but a whole new architecture called Total Peace.
The withdrawal of extradition warrants—that's a huge concession. How does that work politically?
It's a gesture of good faith, but also pragmatic. You can't negotiate with someone you're actively hunting. Petro needed to clear the table of obstacles. The warrants were symbols of the previous government's hostility. Removing them says: we're serious about dialogue, not prosecution.
Forty armed groups willing to join? That seems almost too broad. Are they all the same kind of organization?
No. You have ideological guerrillas like the ELN, criminal organizations like the AGC, and smaller regional groups. They have different origins and different motivations. Some want political legitimacy, others want to launder money or negotiate territorial control. The challenge is designing a peace framework flexible enough to accommodate all of them.
Cuba and Venezuela as guarantors—doesn't that complicate things for the U.S. or other Western allies?
It's a delicate balance. Cuba and Venezuela have their own interests, but they've also proven willing to host these talks discreetly for years. Norway brings Western credibility. The real test is whether guarantor nations can actually enforce agreements if one side breaks them.
What happens if the talks fail again?
Then you're back to armed conflict, and Petro's entire political project loses credibility. But there's also a risk if they succeed too quickly—other groups might feel they got a bad deal. The timing and sequencing of these negotiations will be as important as the substance.