The fact that Trump is in the wrong place doesn't mean the U.S. isn't our greatest ally
Spain risks economic damage by pursuing independent policies instead of coordinating with EU partners on critical issues like energy security and trade. US remains Spain's largest investor ($120B+, 600K jobs) and key energy supplier (40% gas, 20% oil), making diplomatic isolation counterproductive despite Trump administration tensions.
- Spain invests over €80 billion annually in the U.S.; U.S. invests €120+ billion in Spain with 600,000+ direct jobs
- 1.6 million Spanish workers absent daily; 50% under age 35, concentrated on Mondays and Fridays
- Spain sources 40% of gas and 20% of oil from the U.S.
- Government collected €50 billion in taxes but borrowed €80 billion more in one year
- Climate and energy plan requires €300 billion in investment
CEOE president Garamendi warns Spain against isolating itself from European partners while maintaining strategic US relations, criticizing government policies on energy, labor absenteeism, and interventionism.
Antonio Garamendi, president of Spain's business confederation CEOE, stood before an audience in Bilbao and delivered a message that cut against the grain of recent Spanish political posturing: this is not the moment to antagonize the United States, no matter how much the Trump administration's inward turn might tempt it.
The context matters. Europe, Garamendi argued, faces a genuine crisis of cohesion. Multilateralism has collapsed under the current U.S. administration. The world has sorted itself into what he called two clear blocs—one of freedom, one without it—and Spain must choose its position carefully. But choosing a position, he insisted, does not mean abandoning your largest economic partner out of spite toward its leader. "The fact that Trump is in the wrong place doesn't mean the United States isn't one of our greatest partners and allies," he said. It was a plea for clarity of thinking in muddled times.
The numbers underscored his point. Spain invests more than 80 billion euros in the United States annually. The U.S. is Spain's largest foreign investor, with over 120 billion euros in direct investment and more than 600,000 direct jobs flowing from American companies operating in Spain. For energy, the dependency is stark: 40 percent of Spain's gas and 20 percent of its oil come from America. These are not relationships you casually discard. Yet Garamendi watched as the Spanish government pursued policies that seemed to ignore this reality—most pointedly, the plan to close the Almaraz nuclear power plant while Europe grappled with supply security concerns, and the government's simultaneous criticism of Israel, another source of critical technology.
His real worry, though, was about Europe itself. The continent suffers from serious structural problems: Byzantine bureaucracy, no unified energy market, no true financial or digital single market. Strategic industrial autonomy remains a distant goal. Mario Draghi's recent report had laid out the homework, and it all pointed to one requirement: private investment at scale. But here Garamendi saw a contradiction at the heart of Spanish policy. Companies need to make money to invest. They need legal certainty, regulatory stability, and clear rules. Instead, the government was imposing targeted taxes on energy companies and banks—precisely the sectors that would need to drive the 300 billion euro investment required by the climate and energy plan. "If we don't give them security, they'll leave," he warned.
Beyond macroeconomic policy, Garamendi identified a labor crisis that seemed almost willfully ignored. Of 18 million private-sector workers in Spain, more than 1.6 million people fail to show up for work on any given day. Half of those absences are people under 35. Conveniently, most absences cluster on Mondays and Fridays. Garamendi suspected fraud—not illness, but systematic gaming of the system—and he was frustrated that unions refused to engage seriously on the problem. "There's obvious fraudulent absenteeism here, and we need to say it," he said. The government, meanwhile, seemed content to let the issue fester.
On the broader question of inequality, Garamendi rejected the standard narrative. It wasn't low wages or corporate greed driving the gap. It was the state itself. The government had collected over 50 billion euros in taxes the previous year, yet borrowed an additional 80 billion. How would pensions be paid if growth slowed during a crisis? How far would debt spiral? The problem, he argued, was public management, not private enterprise. When the government blamed property owners for housing shortages instead of acknowledging its own failure to invest in housing policy, it was scapegoating rather than governing.
His final complaint was procedural but revealing. The government was using Royal Decrees—executive orders—to reshape labor law wholesale, bypassing Parliament. These were the same tools Franco's regime had used. Real change, Garamendi insisted, required consensus and dialogue, not legal shortcuts and radical swings. Spain had grown faster than the European average. It had assets and potential. But it was squandering them through interventionism, regulatory whiplash, and a refusal to align with its actual partners. The choice before Spain was not between Trump and Europe. It was between coherent strategy and drift.
Citas Notables
This is not the moment to antagonize the United States, despite the Trump administration's inward turn.— Antonio Garamendi, CEOE president
There is obvious fraudulent absenteeism, and we need to say it. Unions refuse to engage seriously on the problem.— Antonio Garamendi
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When Garamendi says Spain shouldn't "antagonize" the U.S., is he really defending Trump, or is he just being pragmatic about money?
He's being pragmatic, but it's more subtle than that. He's not defending Trump at all—he's explicit that Trump is in the wrong place. What he's saying is that you can dislike a leader and still need the country. Spain can't afford to let political theater override economic reality.
But doesn't that put Spanish business leaders in an awkward position? If the government wants to distance itself from the U.S., aren't they contradicting their own government?
Absolutely. That's the tension he's pointing to. He thinks the government is mixing electoral politics with economic strategy, and it's a mistake. He wants them separated.
The absenteeism number is striking—1.6 million people missing work every day. Is he saying half of those are faking it?
He's saying there's "obvious fraudulent absenteeism," and the pattern—Mondays and Fridays, concentrated in younger workers—suggests it's not all genuine illness. But he's also frustrated that no one wants to talk about it seriously.
Why does he keep coming back to the idea that companies need to make money? That sounds almost defensive.
Because he sees a government that seems hostile to profit, imposing taxes on the sectors it needs most. He's saying you can't ask companies to invest 300 billion euros in climate transition while simultaneously taxing them and making them uncertain about the rules. They'll just leave.
Is his critique of the state's spending—collecting 50 billion but borrowing 80 billion—a fair point, or is he cherry-picking?
It's a fair structural observation. The question is what you do with it. He's using it to argue the state is the problem, not business. Others would say the state needs to spend more on investment, not less. But the math itself is real.
What does he want to happen?
Alignment with Europe on strategy, security for private investment, honest conversation about labor problems, and Parliament making law instead of the government ruling by decree. Basically: coherence, dialogue, and respect for the rules.