Brazil is trapped: continuing is expensive, but stopping is almost as costly.
In a country where infrastructure ambitions have long outlasted political will, J&F Investimentos has appointed Reynaldo Passanezi — a seasoned energy executive with over three decades of experience — to lead its nuclear operations following the conglomerate's acquisition of a controlling stake in Eletronuclear. The move places private capital at the threshold of one of Brazil's most constitutionally guarded sectors, where the state retains sovereign authority even as it seeks partners to carry the financial weight. At the center of this arrangement stands Angra 3, a reactor 65 percent complete and frozen in time since 2015, embodying the tension between a nation's aspirations and its capacity to see them through.
- Angra 3 has consumed R$12 billion over four decades and sits unfinished — abandoning it now would cost nearly as much as completing it, leaving Brazil caught in a costly limbo with no painless exit.
- J&F's acquisition of 67.95% of Eletronuclear's capital reshapes the nuclear sector, but Brazil's constitution bars private control, forcing an uneasy coexistence with the state's retained voting majority through ENBPar.
- Passanezi steps into the role of essential intermediary — the human bridge between the Batista brothers' capital and a government whose political will on Angra 3 remains fragmented across ministries and postponed agendas.
- Minister Alexandre Silveira has voiced support for the nuclear project, but the National Council on Energy Policy has repeatedly deferred a decision, leaving the restart of construction in a state of suspended political negotiation.
- With thermal, hydro, solar, and now nuclear assets under its Âmbar subsidiary, J&F is assembling a portfolio that positions it to influence the very architecture of Brazil's energy future — if Passanezi can unlock the government's commitment.
J&F Investimentos, the conglomerate run by brothers Joesley and Wesley Batista, has named Reynaldo Passanezi to lead its nuclear energy operations. Passanezi left the helm of Cemig just a month ago after six years as CEO, and now faces a far more politically intricate assignment: charting the course for Angra 3 and the broader public-private partnership that governs Brazil's nuclear sector.
Last October, J&F acquired the stake previously held by Axia in Eletronuclear, the state company that operates Brazil's nuclear reactors. Once finalized, the deal will make J&F the largest shareholder with 67.95% of capital. Yet the government, through ENBPar, retains 64.1% of voting shares — a constitutional requirement that forbids private entities from controlling nuclear operations. J&F paid R$535 million for the stake and pledged an additional R$2.4 billion in bond purchases.
Passanezi brings credibility to this delicate arrangement. Before Cemig, he spent seven years leading ISA Energia and has held roles at BBVA and on São Paulo's privatization committee. At J&F, he becomes the visible face of the partnership — the intermediary tasked with translating private ambition into government cooperation.
The defining challenge is Angra 3. Construction began in the 1980s, was halted in 2015 amid the Lava Jato investigations, briefly resumed in 2022, and has stalled again. With R$12 billion already spent and 65% of the work done, BNDES estimates another R$24 billion is needed to finish it — while walking away would cost between R$22 billion and R$26 billion. Brazil is effectively trapped between two expensive paths.
The decision to restart lies with the National Council on Energy Policy, chaired by the Energy Ministry. Minister Alexandre Silveira has expressed support, but the council has repeatedly postponed the discussion. Passanezi's central task is to gather that scattered political will and turn it into a concrete commitment — one that would finally close a chapter Brazil has been unable to finish for four decades.
J&F Investimentos, the sprawling conglomerate controlled by brothers Joesley and Wesley Batista, has brought in Reynaldo Passanezi to steer its nuclear energy operations. Passanezi, who stepped down as CEO of Cemig a month ago after six years leading the utility, will now navigate one of Brazil's most complex and politically fraught infrastructure challenges: the future of the Angra 3 nuclear plant.
The appointment signals how seriously the Batista brothers are taking their entry into nuclear power. Last October, they acquired Axia's stake in Eletronuclear, the state-controlled company that operates Brazil's three nuclear reactors. The deal, still being finalized, will give J&F 67.95 percent of the company's capital—making them the largest shareholder by far. The government, however, retains control through ENBPar, which holds 64.1 percent of voting shares. This structure exists because Brazil's constitution forbids private companies from controlling nuclear energy operations. J&F paid R$535 million for Axia's stake and committed an additional R$2.4 billion to buy Eletronuclear bonds.
Passanezi arrives with deep roots in Brazil's energy sector. Before Cemig, he spent seven years running ISA Energia, a major transmission company, starting there as chief financial officer. His career also includes stints at BBVA and a role on São Paulo's privatization committee in the late 1990s. At J&F, he becomes the public face of the Batista brothers' partnership with the state—the essential intermediary between private capital and government interests in a sector where politics and engineering are inseparable.
The real test, though, is Angra 3. The reactor has been under construction since the 1980s, a monument to Brazil's inability to finish what it starts. Work halted in 2015 during the Lava Jato corruption investigations, resumed briefly in 2022, and has stalled again. The project has already consumed roughly R$12 billion and is 65 percent complete. The BNDES estimates another R$24 billion is needed to finish it. Abandoning the project entirely would cost between R$22 billion and R$26 billion in decommissioning and debt settlement. In other words, Brazil is trapped: continuing is expensive, but stopping is almost as costly.
Passanezi's main job is to negotiate with Brasília about restarting construction. The decision rests with the National Council on Energy Policy, a body of cabinet ministers chaired by the Energy Ministry. Minister Alexandre Silveira has publicly backed the nuclear project on several occasions, and the topic has appeared on the council's agenda, but discussions have been repeatedly postponed. The political will exists in fragments, scattered across different offices, waiting for someone to assemble it into a decision.
J&F's entry into nuclear energy marks a shift in Brazil's energy landscape. Through its Âmbar subsidiary, the group has already become one of the country's largest power sector players, operating thermal plants, small hydroelectric dams, solar farms, and distribution networks in the Amazon region. Adding nuclear to that portfolio signals ambition to shape Brazil's energy future at the highest level. But that future depends on whether Passanezi can convince the government to commit to finishing what Angra 3 started four decades ago.
Citas Notables
Minister Alexandre Silveira has publicly backed the nuclear project on several occasions, though discussions about restarting Angra 3 have been repeatedly postponed.— Brazil Journal reporting on Energy Ministry position
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would a private company want to own most of a nuclear plant if the government keeps control anyway?
Because nuclear plants generate enormous amounts of power and run for decades. Even with the government holding voting control, owning 68 percent of the capital means J&F captures most of the profits and has a seat at every strategic table. It's influence without the legal liability.
And Passanezi—why him specifically? What does his background tell us?
He's spent thirty years in utilities and transmission. He knows how to talk to regulators, how to manage massive infrastructure projects, how to navigate the gap between what engineers want to build and what politicians will fund. He's not a nuclear scientist; he's a translator.
The Angra 3 numbers are staggering. R$12 billion spent, still not finished. Why hasn't someone just killed it?
Because killing it costs almost as much as finishing it. You still have to dismantle the structure, settle the debt, pay the workers. So the government is stuck in a kind of paralysis—too expensive to continue, too expensive to stop.
Does Silveira's public support for nuclear actually mean anything?
It means something, but not everything. Ministers say things. The real test is whether the full council votes to restart. That requires consensus across multiple ministries, and consensus on infrastructure spending in Brazil is rare.
What's the timeline? When would Passanezi actually start seeing results?
Unknown. The source doesn't say when he even begins the job. But Angra 3 has been waiting since 2015. He's not walking into a situation where momentum is building.