If the US weaponizes finance, Latin America must stop depending on it
Jeffrey Sachs, one of the world's most prominent development economists, has leveled a serious charge against the United States: that financial crises in Latin America are not accidents but instruments, deliberately shaped by Washington to maintain geopolitical leverage over weaker economies. Speaking at a moment when the Trump administration's openly transactional posture has stripped away older pretenses of partnership, Sachs is urging Latin American nations to treat this clarity as an opening — a chance to build the regional autonomy that dependency has long deferred. His words arrive not as a verdict on the past alone, but as a challenge to what the region might yet choose to become.
- Sachs is not hedging: he claims the United States actively engineers financial instability in Latin America as a tool of geopolitical control, not merely tolerates it.
- The Trump administration's blunt, transactional approach to the region has shattered the diplomatic veneer that once made American dominance easier to accept — and harder to name.
- Across Brazil, Peru, and beyond, regional media and leaders are amplifying Sachs's message, framing it as a mandate for strategic and financial independence from Washington.
- The path forward — regional integration, homegrown financial institutions, diversified partnerships with China and others — is long and has stumbled before, but the political window may be widening.
- The deeper tension is not just economic: it is whether Latin America will treat this moment of American crudeness as a temporary disruption or a permanent invitation to reorder its place in the world.
Jeffrey Sachs, whose decades of work in development economics have made him one of the field's most recognized voices, has made a pointed accusation: the United States does not simply allow financial crises to unfold in Latin America — it manufactures them. In commentary directed at regional audiences, he argued that Washington wields financial instability as a deliberate instrument of geopolitical control, shaping outcomes through American institutions, capital flows, and policy architecture rather than leaving them to market chance.
The moment he chose to speak matters. The Trump administration's return has replaced the soft language of partnership with openly transactional demands, making the nature of American influence harder to obscure. For Sachs, this is not a reason for Latin America to accommodate — it is a reason to break free. Currency collapses, unpayable debts, capital flight: these, he argues, are not natural disasters but the consequences of choices made in Washington and New York.
What distinguishes his intervention is less the argument itself — Latin American economists and leaders have long harbored similar suspicions — than the stature of the person making it plainly, and the receptiveness of those now listening. Outlets across Brazil, Peru, and the broader region have framed his words as a call for strategic autonomy: reduce dependence on American capital, deepen integration among Latin American nations, build regional financial mechanisms, and diversify partnerships toward China and other powers.
Whether governments will act on this logic remains open. Regional integration has a complicated history, and constructing institutions capable of rivaling Washington's influence is a generational undertaking. But the current combination of American unpredictability, eroding trust in US leadership, and the availability of alternative partners may create the political conditions for such efforts to take hold. Sachs is not issuing a forecast so much as extending an invitation: the capacity for a different course exists, if the will to pursue it can be found.
Jeffrey Sachs, the economist whose work on development and international finance has shaped policy debates for decades, made a stark claim in recent commentary: the United States does not merely allow financial crises to occur in Latin America—it engineers them. Speaking to regional audiences and media outlets across the continent, Sachs argued that Washington uses financial instability as a deliberate instrument of geopolitical control, a tool deployed against adversaries and weaker economies alike.
The timing of his remarks is significant. The Trump administration's return to power has prompted a recalibration of how Latin American governments view their relationship with the United States. Where previous administrations maintained a veneer of partnership, the current approach has been more openly transactional, more explicitly tied to alignment with American interests. Sachs sees in this moment an opportunity—not for Latin America to accommodate further, but to break free.
His argument rests on a reading of recent history. Financial crises in the region, he suggests, are not accidents of market mechanics or the inevitable result of poor domestic policy. Rather, they are outcomes shaped by American financial institutions, policy decisions, and the architecture of global capital flows that Washington influences. When a country's currency collapses, when debt becomes unpayable, when capital flees—these are not natural disasters. They are consequences of choices made in Washington and New York.
What makes Sachs's intervention noteworthy is not that he is alone in holding this view. Economists and policymakers across Latin America have long questioned the fairness of a global financial system that seems to punish the region's nations while enriching creditors in the Global North. What is notable is that someone of Sachs's stature is saying it plainly, and that he is doing so at a moment when Latin American governments are listening.
The response from regional leaders and commentators has been receptive. Multiple outlets across Brazil, Peru, and other nations have amplified his message, framing it as a call for strategic autonomy. The idea is straightforward: if the United States is willing to weaponize finance, then Latin America must reduce its dependence on American capital, American institutions, and American goodwill. This means deeper integration among Latin American nations themselves, the development of regional financial mechanisms, and a deliberate diversification of economic partnerships away from Washington.
Sachs's framing also challenges the assumption that Latin America has no choice but to accept American dominance. Under the Trump administration, that dominance is being asserted more crudely than before—less through the soft power of institutions like the IMF and more through direct pressure and transactional demands. For some in the region, this crudeness is clarifying. It removes the pretense. It makes the case for independence harder to ignore.
The question now is whether Latin American governments will act on this logic. Regional integration has been attempted before, with mixed results. Building financial institutions that can rival or replace those controlled by Washington is a generational project. But the current moment—with the Trump administration's unpredictability, with growing skepticism toward American leadership, with China and other powers offering alternative partnerships—may provide the political space for such efforts to gain traction. Sachs's words are less a prediction than an invitation: Latin America has the capacity to chart its own course, if it chooses to do so.
Citas Notables
The US uses financial instability as a deliberate instrument of geopolitical control against weaker economies— Jeffrey Sachs, economist
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
When Sachs says the US deliberately creates financial crises, is he claiming active conspiracy or something more structural?
Both, really. He's pointing to how American policy—interest rates, capital controls, trade rules—shapes the conditions where crises happen. It's not necessarily a room full of people plotting. It's a system that benefits from instability in weaker economies.
But couldn't those crises just be the result of bad domestic policy in Latin America itself?
That's the standard defense, and sometimes it's true. But Sachs is asking: why does the same kind of mistake in a wealthy country get managed quietly, while in Latin America it triggers a collapse? The answer often involves who controls the money and who can force a country to accept painful terms.
So what does strategic autonomy actually look like? Can Latin America really decouple from the US?
Not completely. But it means building regional institutions, trading more with each other, borrowing in their own currencies instead of dollars. It means not being forced to choose between Washington and Beijing—having real options.
Is Sachs suggesting this is possible right now, or is he being idealistic?
He's saying the moment is ripe. Trump's approach is so openly transactional that it's harder for Latin American leaders to pretend partnership is mutual. That clarity can be a gift if they use it.
What would success look like in five years?
A functioning regional development bank that doesn't answer to Washington. Trade agreements that prioritize intra-Latin American commerce. Countries that can weather external shocks without immediately surrendering sovereignty to the IMF.