This part of Europe belongs within the EU's future
On the Montenegrin coast, the European Union gathered its most powerful leaders with six western Balkan nations to reckon with a quiet failure: thirteen years without a single new member, while the world grew more dangerous and the queue grew longer. Russia's invasion of Ukraine transformed what had been a bureaucratic delay into a geopolitical vulnerability, forcing the bloc to ask whether its own machinery had become an obstacle to its survival. The summit in Tivat was less a celebration of progress than an admission that credibility, once lost, must be deliberately rebuilt — and that the nations waiting at the door cannot wait forever.
- Thirteen years without a new member has eroded trust on both sides of the EU's door, and the bloc's leaders arrived in Montenegro knowing the process itself had become the problem.
- Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine added Ukraine and Moldova to an already crowded queue, turning an abstract enlargement debate into an urgent question of energy security, migration, and regional stability.
- Even Montenegro — the most advanced candidate, with its application filed eighteen years ago — is only targeting 2028 entry, a timeline many insiders consider optimistic given the requirement for unanimous approval from all twenty-seven members.
- France and Germany proposed 'gradual integration' as a workaround: letting aligned countries participate in EU structures before full membership, with some candidates already offering to accept restricted voting rights in exchange for faster access to the single market.
- EU officials are weighing whether to deny new members veto power for years after accession — a direct lesson drawn from Hungary's repeated obstruction — while in Serbia, public support for EU membership has quietly slipped below fifty percent.
The European Union brought its most prominent leaders to the Montenegrin coastal town of Tivat on Friday to confront an uncomfortable truth: the bloc has not admitted a single new member in thirteen years, and the world has grown far more dangerous in the interim. Ursula von der Leyen, Friedrich Merz, Emmanuel Macron, and Giorgia Meloni sat across from counterparts from six western Balkan nations — Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia — to discuss how to make enlargement faster and, crucially, more believable.
Merz was candid with reporters, saying the EU had to demonstrate both the will and the capability to grow. Von der Leyen called for a process that was not just quicker but more credible — an implicit acknowledgment that the current machinery had lost the confidence of those waiting to join. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 had sharpened the stakes considerably, adding Ukraine and Moldova to the queue and prompting Macron to frame enlargement as a matter of European independence, touching energy, security, and migration.
The structural obstacles remained formidable. Montenegro, the frontrunner with a population of just 630,000, filed its application eighteen years ago and is now targeting 2028 — a date many consider optimistic. Every step requires unanimous approval from all twenty-seven existing members, meaning a single holdout can freeze the entire process.
To ease the logjam, France and Germany proposed 'gradual integration': allowing candidate countries that meet EU standards in specific areas to begin participating in certain EU structures before formal membership. Macron floated the idea of candidates attending European Council summits with a voice but no vote. Serbia's Vučić and Albania's Rama had already signaled willingness to accept restricted voting rights in exchange for faster access to the single market and the Schengen zone.
That trade-off reflected a deeper concern within the bloc. Officials have begun considering whether to deny new members veto rights for several years after accession — a response shaped directly by Hungary's repeated use of its veto to obstruct EU decisions. The human cost of delay was becoming visible: in Serbia, public support for EU membership had fallen below fifty percent. Officials acknowledged that Tivat would produce no dramatic breakthroughs, but the message was clear — the EU had to prove it was serious, and it was running out of time to do so.
The European Union gathered its leadership in the Montenegrin coastal town of Tivat on Friday to confront a problem that has haunted the bloc for over a decade: it has not admitted a single new member in thirteen years, and the world has changed dramatically since then. Ursula von der Leyen, the European Commission president, sat alongside Germany's Friedrich Merz, France's Emmanuel Macron, and Italy's Giorgia Meloni to meet with counterparts from six western Balkan nations waiting at the door. The message was direct. The EU needed to prove it could still grow, and it needed to do so faster.
Merz put it plainly to reporters: the European Union had to demonstrate both the capability and the will to enlarge. "There are a whole range of questions we must answer together, but above all it must be clear that this part of Europe belongs within the EU's future," he said. The thirteen-year drought of new members, he suggested, revealed genuine shortcomings in how the bloc operated. Von der Leyen echoed the urgency, calling for an enlargement process that was not just faster but also more credible—a tacit acknowledgment that the current machinery had lost the trust of those waiting to join.
The timing was not accidental. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 had redrawn the map of European ambitions. Ukraine and Moldova, suddenly desperate to anchor themselves to the West, had joined the queue alongside the Balkan hopefuls: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. Eight countries now seeking entry where there had been six. The geopolitical stakes had shifted from abstract principle to survival. Macron framed it in those terms: enlargement mattered "because this region is also where Europe's independence is at stake in terms of energy, security and migration routes."
Yet the machinery of accession remained brutally slow. Montenegro, the most advanced candidate with a population of 630,000, had submitted its application eighteen years ago and was now targeting 2028 as its entry date—a goal many officials considered optimistic. The process demanded years of negotiation, sweeping legal reforms, and the unanimous approval of all twenty-seven existing members at every step. Even one holdout could freeze the entire process indefinitely.
To break the logjam, France and Germany proposed a new concept: gradual integration. Rather than forcing candidates to wait outside the door until every criterion was met, countries that aligned themselves with EU standards on specific issues could begin participating in certain EU structures before formal membership. Macron suggested that a country might attend European Council meetings of EU leaders, gaining a voice if not yet a vote. The Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, and Albania's prime minister, Edi Rama, had already called for faster access to the single market and the Schengen travel zone in exchange for accepting restrictions on their voting rights.
That last point reflected a deeper anxiety within the bloc. EU officials had begun considering whether to deny new members veto power for several years after accession—a direct response to the experience of Viktor Orbán's Hungary, which had repeatedly used its veto to block EU decisions. Merz had even suggested that Ukraine might receive a new status of "associate member," allowing Ukrainian officials to participate in summits and meetings without voting rights, as a stepping stone toward full membership.
The human cost of delay was becoming visible. In Serbia, which maintained close ties with Moscow, public support for EU membership had fallen below fifty percent. The longer the process dragged, the more skeptical ordinary people became. Brussels had long insisted that the six Balkan states would join together, but now Montenegro and Albania were pulling ahead, leaving the others behind. Officials acknowledged that the Tivat summit itself would likely produce no dramatic breakthroughs—the focus instead was on how the EU could improve daily life in the region and rebuild faith in the enlargement project itself. The bloc had to prove it was serious, and it had to do so soon.
Citações Notáveis
The European Union has to show that it is capable of enlarging and willing to enlarge— Friedrich Merz, German Chancellor
The EU needed to make the enlargement process faster and more credible— Ursula von der Leyen, European Commission President
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why did the EU wait thirteen years before seriously addressing this? That's a long time to leave countries in limbo.
The bloc was consumed with its own internal crises—the eurozone, Brexit, migration. Enlargement felt like a future problem. Then Ukraine happened, and suddenly the geopolitics shifted overnight. Russia's war made the EU realize it needed to secure its eastern flank, not just for principle but for survival.
This "gradual integration" idea—is that a real solution or a way to avoid making hard decisions?
It's both. It lets countries participate in EU structures before they're fully ready, which builds momentum and shows good faith. But it also lets the EU avoid the messy question of whether it's actually willing to absorb eight new members with all the complications that brings.
You mentioned veto rights. Why would the EU want to strip new members of that power?
Because they watched Orbán use Hungary's veto to block everything from LGBTQ protections to sanctions on Russia. They're terrified of admitting another government that might do the same thing. It's a way of saying: you can join, but not as equals, not yet.
And the public in Serbia—support below fifty percent. What's driving that?
Fatigue, mostly. Eighteen years of waiting, of being told you're almost there, of having to reform your entire legal system while your neighbors move ahead. People start asking: do we actually want this? And when you're close to Russia, as Serbia is, there's real pressure not to choose the West.
So what happens if this summit doesn't produce results?
The skepticism deepens. The EU loses credibility. And countries like Serbia drift further toward Moscow, which is exactly what the EU was trying to prevent by speeding up enlargement in the first place.