Iran loses leverage over them, and over anyone buying their oil
For nearly eleven weeks, Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has forced the United Arab Emirates to confront a fundamental vulnerability: the world's most critical energy passage has become a weapon wielded against it. In response, Abu Dhabi is accelerating the construction of a second oil pipeline to Fujairah, seeking by 2027 to double its bypass capacity to 3.6 million barrels daily — a quiet but consequential act of infrastructure sovereignty. The move signals not merely an engineering decision but a deeper realignment of Gulf power, as nations that once accepted the strait's risks now race to render them irrelevant.
- Iran's eleven-week blockade has slashed UAE oil production by more than half and disrupted roughly a fifth of the world's daily petroleum supply, sending shockwaves through global energy markets.
- Drone strikes on an ADNOC tanker and bombing raids on the ports of Fujairah and Khor Fakkan — the UAE's primary bypass outlets — have forced temporary halts to loading operations, tightening the chokehold further.
- Iran has dramatically expanded its claimed maritime zone to nearly 500 kilometers wide, while the UAE and its buyers have resorted to disabling tanker tracking systems to move trapped crude through the strait.
- Abu Dhabi's crown prince has ordered ADNOC to accelerate a previously secret second pipeline, targeting 3.6 million barrels daily by 2027 and a production ceiling of five million barrels by next year — three years ahead of schedule.
- The UAE's withdrawal from OPEC after six decades frees it from production quotas, signaling an era of independent energy ambition that could fundamentally redraw the Gulf's geopolitical and economic landscape.
The United Arab Emirates is racing to build a second oil pipeline bypassing the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian forces have maintained a blockade for nearly eleven weeks. The blockade has already cut UAE production by more than half and disrupted roughly a fifth of the world's daily petroleum supply. The new line, ordered by Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan in early May, will complement the existing Habshan-Fujairah pipeline — currently moving 1.8 million barrels daily — with a target of doubling that capacity to 3.6 million barrels by 2027.
That volume would place the UAE close to Saudi Arabia's export scale, and the two countries remain the only Gulf producers with infrastructure capable of moving oil outside the strait. Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Bahrain have no such alternative. The UAE's ports at Fujairah and Khor Fakkan have become critical lifelines not only for oil but for food imports — and both have been struck in attacks attributed to Iran, forcing temporary suspensions of operations in April. Iran has also expanded its claimed maritime zone to nearly 500 kilometers wide, deepening its grip on the region's energy arteries.
Before the blockade, the UAE produced just under 3.4 million barrels daily. ADNOC now aims to reach five million barrels next year — a target accelerated by three years. The country's energy minister has suggested output could climb to six million barrels if circumstances required it. The announcement came two weeks after the UAE withdrew from OPEC after six decades, freeing itself from production quotas and signaling a decisive turn toward energy independence. Meanwhile, Saudi Aramco raised its own bypass pipeline capacity to seven million barrels daily within eight days of the conflict's start. Across the Gulf, regional powers are scrambling to insulate themselves from Iran's leverage over one of the world's most consequential waterways.
The United Arab Emirates is racing to build a second oil pipeline that will let it export crude without threading the Strait of Hormuz, where Iranian forces have maintained a blockade for nearly eleven weeks. The goal is to have the new line operational by 2027, and the stakes are enormous: the blockade has already cut the UAE's oil production in half and disrupted roughly a fifth of the world's daily petroleum supply.
In early May, Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi, convened his executive committee and ordered the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to accelerate the project—which had been kept confidential until that moment. The Abu Dhabi Media Office confirmed the decision and noted that construction was already underway. The new pipeline will complement the existing Habshan-Fujairah line, which currently moves 1.8 million barrels a day and has been the UAE's main escape route since Iran closed the strait. The declared target is to double that capacity to roughly 3.6 million barrels daily by the end of the decade.
That volume would position the UAE nearly alongside Saudi Arabia, which exports about five million barrels a day through the Red Sea port of Yanbu. The two countries are the only Gulf producers with infrastructure to move oil outside the strait; Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and Bahrain remain almost entirely dependent on that chokepoint. The UAE's ports at Fujairah and the nearby Khor Fakkan have become critical outlets since the blockade began, serving not only as oil terminals but as vital arteries for general commerce—the Emirates rely heavily on food imports. Both ports have been struck by attacks attributed to Iran, forcing temporary suspensions of loading operations in April. Saudi Arabia's Yanbu facility has also been hit.
One incident involved a drone strike on an ADNOC tanker and a bombing in the Fujairah oil zone. The UAE's Foreign Ministry called these acts an "unacceptable transgression" and "economic blackmail." The attacks coincided with Iran's expansion of its territorial claims: the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps redefined the strait as a vast operational zone stretching up to 482.8 kilometers wide, further enlarging the maritime area it asserts control over. In response, the UAE and its oil buyers have sent several tankers through the strait with tracking systems disabled, attempting to move crude trapped in the Gulf.
Before the conflict began, the UAE was producing just under 3.4 million barrels daily. After the strait effectively closed, that figure plummeted to less than half, forcing ADNOC to suspend some production. The company now aims to reach five million barrels daily next year—a target it moved up by three years from its original schedule. In May 2024, ADNOC reported reaching 4.85 million barrels daily, though it has offered no update since. The country's energy minister suggested the figure could climb to six million barrels daily if circumstances demanded it. This week, ADNOC Drilling, one of six publicly traded subsidiaries of the parent company, confirmed it stands ready to support any expansion the group requires.
The announcement came two weeks after the UAE withdrew from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries after six decades of membership, freeing itself from the production quotas that OPEC uses to manage global crude prices. Saudi Arabia has historically pushed those limits to prop up prices. On the Saudi side, Aramco, the kingdom's state oil company, raised its East-West pipeline capacity to seven million barrels daily in just eight days after the conflict started, maintaining roughly sixty percent of its pre-war export flow. The company's chief executive called it a "lifeline." As the UAE pushes forward with its own infrastructure, the broader picture is one of regional powers scrambling to insulate themselves from Iran's grip on one of the world's most critical energy passages.
Notable Quotes
The UAE's Foreign Ministry called attacks on its ports and tankers an 'unacceptable transgression' and 'economic blackmail.'— UAE Foreign Ministry
Saudi Aramco's chief executive described the East-West pipeline as a 'lifeline' after raising its capacity to seven million barrels daily in eight days.— Amin Nasser, Aramco CEO
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why does the UAE need a second pipeline when it already has one moving oil out?
The first pipeline can only handle 1.8 million barrels a day. The blockade has cut their total production in half, and they want to get back to exporting what they were before—and then some. A second line lets them reach 3.6 million barrels daily, which is nearly what Saudi Arabia exports.
But couldn't Iran just attack the new pipeline too?
That's the risk. The ports at Fujairah have already been hit multiple times. But a pipeline is harder to target than a port, and it's on land rather than water. It's not foolproof, but it's more resilient than relying on a single route through contested waters.
What does it mean that the UAE just left OPEC?
For sixty years, OPEC set production quotas to keep prices stable—usually high. The UAE is saying it doesn't want those limits anymore. It wants to pump and sell as much as it can, independent of what the cartel decides. That's a break with decades of strategy.
Is this pipeline going to change who has power in the Gulf?
Potentially. If the UAE can export 3.6 million barrels daily without using the strait, Iran loses leverage over them. Right now, Iran controls a chokepoint that affects a fifth of the world's oil. A functioning alternative reduces that leverage—not just for the UAE, but for anyone buying their oil.
How fast can they actually build this?
They're targeting 2027, which is aggressive. They've already started construction, and the crown prince ordered ADNOC to accelerate it. But the blockade is ongoing, attacks are happening, and geopolitical risk is high. Delays are possible.
What happens if they succeed?
The global oil market becomes less dependent on the strait. Prices might stabilize differently. And the UAE becomes a more independent player—no longer held hostage by Iran's control of that waterway.