There is room for everyone, if both are willing to invest
Deep beneath the red soil of southeastern Congo, a quiet contest is unfolding between the world's two great powers — one that will shape the energy systems, defense industries, and economic futures of billions of people. The Democratic Republic of Congo, home to 68 percent of the world's cobalt and Africa's largest copper reserves, has spent two decades under the shadow of Chinese investment, but a December 2025 strategic partnership with Washington has opened a new chapter. As global demand for these minerals accelerates toward historic highs, Congo finds itself at the center of a geopolitical struggle it did not choose — rich in what the world needs, yet home to some of the world's deepest poverty.
- The Kamoa copper mine processes ore four times richer than the global average, making it a physical symbol of the mineral wealth that Washington and Beijing are now openly competing to control.
- China has spent 20 years embedding itself into Congo's mining economy — accounting for roughly 70 percent of all mining activity — so deeply that Chinese characters line the shop fronts of Kolwezi and locals have never known a world without Chinese engineers.
- A December 2025 US-Congo strategic partnership and a February 2026 deal granting an American-led consortium a potential 40-percent stake in Glencore's Congo assets signal that Washington is moving fast to break Beijing's grip.
- Congolese officials are deliberately playing both sides, insisting the US-China rivalry is 'not our war' and pointing to 2.4 million square kilometers of largely unexplored territory as proof there is room for every investor.
- With copper demand projected to rise 40 percent by 2040 and cobalt demand set to quadruple by 2030, the window for securing these resources is narrowing — and nearly two-thirds of Congo's 100 million people remain in poverty despite sitting atop the world's most coveted reserves.
At the Kamoa copper mine in southeastern Congo, the machines run without pause — processing reddish ore of extraordinary richness, containing 2.8 percent copper, four times the global average. Managing director Annebel Oosthuizen oversees an operation already producing 300,000 tonnes annually, with expansion to half a million tonnes planned by 2028. It is one of the world's largest copper deposits, and it sits at the heart of a growing contest between Washington and Beijing.
The Democratic Republic of Congo holds 68 percent of the world's cobalt and is Africa's top copper producer, having extracted 3.4 million tonnes in 2025 alone. Copper conducts electricity; cobalt stores it. Both are essential to electric vehicles, smartphones, and modern weapons systems. The United Nations projects copper demand will rise more than 40 percent by 2040, while cobalt demand could quadruple by 2030. The world will need vastly more of what Congo has.
Yet Congo remains one of the poorest nations on Earth, with nearly two-thirds of its 100 million people living below the poverty line. For two decades, China has dominated the country's mining sector — accounting for an estimated 70 percent of all activity. In Kolwezi, the town nearest Kamoa, Chinese characters mark the shop fronts. A 26-year-old taxi driver named Kevin Mwarabu put it simply: 'I've always seen mines and Chinese people here.'
That dominance is now being challenged. In December 2025, Kinshasa signed a strategic partnership with Washington, and Congo submitted 25 mining sites for potential US investment. In February 2026, Swiss commodities giant Glencore signed a memorandum of understanding with the US-led Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, potentially granting the American-led group a 40-percent stake in Glencore's Congo assets. Marie-Chantal Kaninda of Glencore DRC was direct: 'This will allow the United States to benefit from production coming out of the DRC.'
Kamoa itself remains a joint venture between Canada's Ivanhoe Mines and China's Zijin Mining, with the Congolese state holding a 20-percent stake — a structure that mirrors the complexity of the moment. Congolese officials appear unbothered. Eric Kalala, head of the state-owned General Cobalt Company, said at a May business meeting: 'The US–China rivalry in the global race for strategic minerals is not our war. There is room for everyone.' He noted that much of Congo's 2.4 million square kilometers remains unexplored.
Whether that pragmatic optimism endures as competition intensifies remains an open question. The minerals are vast. The poverty is real. And the race has only just begun.
At the Kamoa copper mine in southeastern Congo, the machines never stop. Day and night, they process mountains of reddish ore stacked in vast warehouses—the physical manifestation of one of Africa's largest copper deposits and a prize that has become central to a quiet but intensifying struggle between Washington and Beijing.
The ore here is exceptional. It contains 2.8 percent copper, four times the global average, which is why international markets prize it so heavily. Kamoa's managing director, Annebel Oosthuizen, describes the operation with the precision of someone overseeing something genuinely consequential: the mine currently produces 300,000 tonnes annually and is expanding to half a million tonnes by 2028, positioning it as potentially the fourth-largest copper mine on Earth. The scale is staggering, but it is only one piece of a much larger story.
The Democratic Republic of Congo sits atop mineral wealth that shapes global industry. It produces 68 percent of the world's cobalt and is Africa's leading copper producer, having extracted 3.4 million tonnes in 2025 alone. Copper conducts electricity. Cobalt stores it. Together, they are woven into every smartphone, every electric vehicle battery, every weapons system that matters. The United Nations estimates that global copper demand will rise by more than 40 percent by 2040, while cobalt demand is expected to quadruple by 2030. The math is simple: the world will need vastly more of what Congo has.
Yet Congo remains one of the poorest countries on Earth. Nearly two-thirds of its roughly 100 million people live below the poverty line. The contradiction is not accidental—it is structural. For nearly two decades, China has dominated Congo's mining sector, accounting for an estimated 70 percent of all mining activity. Chinese investment has been relentless and deep. In Kolwezi, the town nearest Kamoa, shop signs display Chinese characters. Chinese workers and engineers are woven into the local fabric. A 26-year-old taxi driver named Kevin Mwarabu, born and raised in Kolwezi, said simply: "I've always seen mines and Chinese people here."
That dominance is now being contested. In December 2025, Kinshasa signed a strategic partnership agreement with Washington, part of a broader peace accord aimed at ending more than three decades of conflict in the country's east. The accord itself has not stopped the fighting, but it opened a door. Congo submitted an initial list of 25 mining sites to the United States for potential investment or exploitation licenses. In February 2026, the Swiss commodities giant Glencore signed a memorandum of understanding with the US-led Orion Critical Mineral Consortium, potentially granting the American-led group a 40-percent stake in Glencore's Congo mining assets. Marie-Chantal Kaninda, president of Glencore DRC, framed it plainly: "This will allow the United States to benefit from production coming out of the DRC through Glencore."
Kamoa itself remains a joint venture between Canada's Ivanhoe Mines and China's Zijin Mining, with the Congolese state holding a 20-percent minority stake. The ownership structure reflects the complexity of the moment—Chinese capital and American ambition coexist in the same operation, neither yet dominant.
Congolese officials have signaled they are comfortable with this arrangement. Economy Minister Daniel Mukoko noted that mining "drives the entire Congolese economy." Eric Kalala, head of the state-owned General Cobalt Company, which holds a monopoly over non-industrial cobalt marketing, was even more direct. Speaking at the Katanga Business Meeting in Kolwezi in May, he said: "The US–China rivalry in the global race for strategic minerals is not our war. There is room for everyone." He pointed out that Congo covers 2.4 million square kilometers, much of it still unexplored for minerals. The implication was clear: there is enough here for both powers, if both are willing to invest and negotiate.
What remains to be seen is whether that optimism holds as demand accelerates and the stakes grow higher. The minerals are there. The poverty is real. And the competition is only beginning.
Citas Notables
Kamoa is growing to become the largest copper mine in Africa and probably the fourth largest in the world, aiming to produce half a million tonnes by 2028.— Annebel Oosthuizen, managing director of Kamoa Copper
The US-China rivalry in the global race for strategic minerals is not our war. There is room for everyone.— Eric Kalala, head of the state-owned General Cobalt Company
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does it matter that Kamoa's ore has 2.8 percent copper when the global average is 0.7 percent?
Because it means less rock needs to be moved to get the same amount of metal. It's cheaper, faster, and more profitable. That's why everyone wants access to Congo's deposits—the economics are simply better.
China has been there for 20 years. Why is the US only now showing up?
The US was focused elsewhere for a long time. But as electric vehicles and renewable energy became central to industrial strategy, the supply chain vulnerability became impossible to ignore. Suddenly, having 68 percent of the world's cobalt concentrated in one country—especially one where China has deep roots—looked like a strategic problem.
The peace accord hasn't actually stopped the fighting in the east. So what does the strategic partnership actually accomplish?
It opens the door. It gives the US a legal framework to negotiate mining rights and investment. The fighting is a separate problem, but the partnership creates the conditions for American capital to flow in, which changes the balance of power over time.
Congo is desperately poor despite all this mineral wealth. Why hasn't mining made the country richer?
Mining creates jobs and government revenue, but the wealth doesn't distribute evenly. Much of the profit flows out—to foreign companies, to corrupt officials, to debt repayment. The infrastructure that would turn minerals into broader prosperity was never built.
Kalala said there's room for everyone. Do you believe that?
In theory, yes. Congo has 2.4 million square kilometers and most of it is unexplored. But in practice, competition tends to intensify as demand grows. The question is whether Congo can negotiate hard enough to ensure it benefits from both sides, or whether it becomes a proxy battleground.