criminals only respect what they fear
Em toda sociedade que enfrenta o peso da violência cotidiana, a segurança pública deixa de ser apenas política e passa a ser promessa existencial. No Brasil de 2026, com pesquisas apontando o crime como a principal insatisfação com o governo Lula, candidatos de direita constroem suas candidaturas sobre esse terreno fértil — propondo punições mais duras, redução da maioridade penal e a classificação de facções criminosas como organizações terroristas. É o momento em que o medo coletivo se converte em estratégia eleitoral, e a resposta do Estado é medida não apenas em bilhões de reais, mas em credibilidade.
- A segurança pública tornou-se o calcanhar de Aquiles do governo Lula: 16% dos eleitores a apontam como o maior problema da administração, superando saúde, economia e corrupção.
- Flávio Bolsonaro, Ronaldo Caiado e Romeu Zema disputam o mesmo eleitorado com propostas endurecidas — maioridade penal aos 16 anos, classificação de facções como terroristas e penas mais rígidas para reincidentes.
- O programa federal 'Brasil Contra o Crime Organizado', de R$ 11 bilhões, enfrenta ceticismo imediato: especialistas alertam que cerca de R$ 10 bilhões são linhas de crédito do BNDES que estados precisam contratar, não repasses diretos.
- Enquanto o governo aposta no desmantelamento financeiro das redes criminosas, a oposição explora o vazio deixado nos crimes de rua — roubos, furtos e homicídios que moldam a percepção diária de insegurança.
- Com a campanha se acelerando, a direita mantém vantagem narrativa sobre o tema: o governo constrói um programa de longo prazo enquanto o eleitor quer resposta para o medo de hoje.
À medida que a corrida presidencial de 2026 ganha forma, a direita brasileira identificou o flanco mais vulnerável do governo Lula: a segurança pública. Uma pesquisa Datafolha de maio revelou que 16% dos eleitores apontam o crime como o maior problema da administração — à frente de saúde, economia e corrupção. Para a oposição, o número funciona como um convite.
Flávio Bolsonaro lidera essa ofensiva. Uma pesquisa Nexus/BTG Pactual de 25 de maio o coloca a 43% em um segundo turno hipotético contra Lula, que marca 47% — empate técnico dentro da margem de erro. Sua estratégia passa por dois eixos de apelo conservador: a redução da maioridade penal para 16 anos e o endurecimento geral das leis criminais. Em encontro de prefeitos em Brasília, foi direto ao ponto, dirigindo-se publicamente a integrantes do CV e do PCC com um ultimato: deixar o Brasil até dezembro ou enfrentar prisão ou 'neutralização'. Também defendeu o armamento das guardas municipais.
Ronaldo Caiado e Romeu Zema percorrem caminho semelhante. Caiado ataca o programa federal de segurança, acusando Lula de transferir responsabilidades aos estados, e propõe classificar facções criminosas como organizações terroristas. Zema apresentou plataforma detalhada com a mesma proposta, acrescida de penas obrigatórias para reincidentes e mudanças nas audiências de custódia. Ambos buscam nacionalizar modelos que dizem ter funcionado em seus estados.
O governo respondeu com o 'Brasil Contra o Crime Organizado', programa de R$ 11 bilhões anunciado em maio. Mas especialistas são céticos. O advogado Arcênio Rodrigues avalia que a iniciativa é mais construção narrativa do que solução prática, com impacto perceptível para o cidadão comum apenas no longo prazo. André Santos Pereira, presidente da Associação dos Delegados de Polícia de São Paulo, reconhece o valor do estrangulamento financeiro das organizações criminosas, mas aponta o vazio deixado nos crimes violentos do cotidiano. Há ainda um problema de escala real: dos R$ 11 bilhões anunciados, cerca de R$ 10 bilhões são linhas de crédito do BNDES que estados e municípios precisam contratar — não repasses diretos. Se a adesão for fraca, o alcance do programa pode ficar muito aquém do prometido.
As Brazil's 2026 presidential race takes shape, the right wing has identified what it sees as Lula's most vulnerable flank: public safety. With urban violence ranking as the electorate's top concern, opposition candidates are building their campaigns around a simple calculation—that the government's handling of crime and security has become a political liability they can exploit.
A Datafolha survey released in May found that 16 percent of voters named security as the biggest problem with Lula's administration, outpacing complaints about health care, the economy, and corruption. The poll, which interviewed 2,004 voters across the country between May 12 and 13, carries a margin of error of two percentage points. For the right, the number reads like an invitation. Security is not a marginal issue. It is the leading source of public dissatisfaction with the sitting president.
Flávio Bolsonaro, the senator from Rio de Janeiro, is positioning himself as the hardline alternative. A Nexus/BTG Pactual survey from May 25 showed him at 43 percent support in a hypothetical runoff against Lula, who polled at 47 percent—technically a statistical tie given the two-point margin of error, though with the incumbent holding a slight edge. Bolsonaro's strategy is to accelerate the rollout of his security proposals, leaning heavily on two pillars with strong appeal among conservative voters: lowering the age of criminal responsibility to 16 and toughening criminal law across the board. He is expected to publicly champion a constitutional amendment now being debated in the Chamber's Constitutional and Justice Committee that would reduce the age threshold. Beyond that, his campaign is developing proposals to restrict benefits granted to prisoners and to strengthen police operations. At a gathering of mayors in Brasília last week, Bolsonaro raised his voice on the subject, issuing a direct warning to members of the Comando Vermelho and Primeiro Comando da Capital, two major drug trafficking organizations. "Criminals from CV and PCC, listen up: get out of Brazil by December this year, because if you don't, starting next year, everyone will be arrested or neutralized by our police," he said, drawing applause from the largely mayoral audience. He also called for expanding gun access to municipal civil guard members, arguing that criminals only respect what they fear.
Two other right-wing hopefuls are pursuing similar terrain. Ronaldo Caiado, the former governor of Goiás running under the PSD banner, has begun attacking Lula's federal crime-fighting program, accusing the government of trying to shift responsibility for organized crime to the states and municipalities. He is pushing for criminal factions to be classified as terrorist organizations—a move that would allow broader deployment of the armed forces and intelligence agencies. Romeu Zema, the ex-governor of Minas Gerais representing the Novo party, has released a detailed security platform that includes the same terrorist designation proposal, along with mandatory prison sentences for repeat offenders, stricter sentencing rules, and changes to custody hearings. Both men see in these proposals a way to nationalize security models they claim worked in their home states.
Meanwhile, Lula launched his own anti-crime initiative this month: "Brasil Contra o Crime Organizado," a program budgeted at 11 billion reais aimed at dismantling criminal organizations. The scale of the announcement is substantial, but security experts are skeptical about its near-term impact. Arcênio Rodrigues, a lawyer specializing in economic law and political analysis, argues that the program is more narrative construction than practical solution. "In the short term, there will be little perceptible impact for ordinary people," he said. "What we see is mostly an attempt to build a story about fighting crime rather than an effective answer to the daily insecurity Brazilians face." For Rodrigues, the opposition's advantage on security remains intact. The government's package focuses on the financial strangulation of trafficking networks and macro-level criminal structures, leaving in the background the street-level crimes—robbery, theft, homicide—that shape how people actually experience danger.
André Santos Pereira, president of the Association of Police Delegates in São Paulo state, echoes the concern. He acknowledges that financial pressure on criminal organizations is ultimately the most damaging blow to their sustainability, but notes that such pressure requires complex investigations, warrant breaches, and court proceedings that take time. The program, he says, leaves a gap precisely where it matters most to ordinary citizens: violent property crimes. There is another problem with the numbers. While the government announced 11 billion reais, roughly 10 billion comes from BNDES credit lines that states and municipalities must borrow. Only about 1 billion is direct federal funding. If uptake is weak or credit terms prove unfavorable, the actual reach of the program could fall far short of what was promised. As the campaign season accelerates, security will remain the terrain where Lula's government appears most exposed, and where the opposition sees its clearest opening.
Citações Notáveis
In the short term, there will be little perceptible impact for ordinary people. What we see is mostly an attempt to build a story about fighting crime rather than an effective answer to the daily insecurity Brazilians face.— Arcênio Rodrigues, lawyer and political analyst
The program leaves a gap precisely where it matters most to ordinary citizens: violent property crimes.— André Santos Pereira, president of the Association of Police Delegates in São Paulo state
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why has security become the dominant issue for the right when there are so many other angles they could attack?
Because it's where Lula is weakest and where people feel it most directly. A voter worried about their kid getting robbed doesn't care about macroeconomic policy. Security is visceral.
But Lula just announced an 11 billion real program. Doesn't that blunt the opposition's advantage?
Not really, and that's the trap. Most of that money is loans states have to take out themselves. The real federal commitment is much smaller. And experts say the results—if they come at all—won't show up before the election.
So the opposition gets to attack on security while Lula's response won't be visible in time to help him?
Exactly. Bolsonaro, Caiado, and Zema are all offering simple, aggressive answers: lower the age for prosecution, call cartels terrorists, lock people up longer. Those are easy to communicate. Lula's approach is more complex and slower.
Do these hardline proposals actually work?
That's beside the point electorally. What matters is that they sound like action. The security experts I read are skeptical—they say you can't arrest your way out of organized crime. But in a campaign, perception often beats reality.
What happens if one of these candidates wins?
Then Brazil gets a president who ran on toughness and has to deliver results on crime. That's when the gap between campaign promises and what's actually possible becomes very real.