A policy this important shouldn't be improvised
In Brazil, a government debt relief program called Desenrola 2 has been revealed to rest not on formal technical study, but on informal assessments and conversations with the financial sector — a foundation as improvised as the crisis it seeks to address. Of the 82 million Brazilians carrying debt, only one in four will qualify for relief, leaving the majority to shoulder their burdens alone. This moment invites a deeper question about the relationship between political ambition and the patient, rigorous work that durable public policy demands.
- Brazil's Finance Ministry admitted that Desenrola 2 — a flagship debt relief program tied to President Lula's reelection — was built without a single consolidated technical study to justify its design.
- With 82 million Brazilians in debt, the program's narrow focus on bank and credit card arrears between 90 days and two years old means nearly 62 million people are simply left out.
- Government debts are explicitly excluded, even as the program draws billions from the national treasury — a contradiction the ministry has struggled to explain coherently.
- A political scientist described the Finance Minister as operating more like a campaign strategist than a policy architect, a pattern echoed in the Pé-de-Meia education program, which also launched without rigorous justification and has never been formally evaluated.
- Even the program's own rules shifted mid-explanation: the ministry first denied it would forgive small debts, then clarified it would clear all balances under 100 reais — and admitted it does not know how many people that affects.
Brazil's Finance Ministry has acknowledged that Desenrola 2, the government's headline debt relief initiative, was assembled without a formal technical foundation. When pressed on whether a study had been conducted to justify the program's scope and eligibility criteria, officials conceded that no consolidated document existed — only internal assessments and conversations with the financial sector.
The gap between ambition and reach is striking. Serasa counts 82 million Brazilians in debt; the ministry projects the program will serve roughly 20 million — about 24 percent. The initiative focuses exclusively on financial and banking debts, such as credit card balances and personal loans, delinquent between 90 days and two years. Government debts are excluded, even as the program draws from the national treasury's Guarantee Operations Fund, with 2 billion reais already authorized and 5 billion more under consideration.
Political scientist Sérgio Praça described the approach as shocking but consistent with a broader pattern. The Pé-de-Meia education program, launched in early 2024 with a 12.5 billion real budget, followed a similar trajectory — no rigorous study identified school dropout as the primary problem to solve, and the ministry's claim that every real invested would return seven has never been published. More than a year later, no formal evaluation exists.
The ad hoc nature of Desenrola 2 surfaced even in the ministry's own responses: officials first denied the program would forgive small debts, then clarified it would clear all balances under 100 reais from participating institutions — and admitted they do not know how many people that provision will ultimately reach. What remains is a portrait of major public policy shaped more by political momentum than by the technical discipline that lasting reform requires.
Brazil's Finance Ministry has acknowledged that Desenrola 2, the government's flagship debt relief program and a centerpiece of President Lula's reelection campaign, was built without a formal technical foundation. When asked directly whether a study had been conducted to justify the program's scope and eligibility rules, the ministry responded that no single consolidated study existed. Instead, officials said they had structured the initiative based on internal government assessments and conversations with the financial sector, factoring in publicly available debt data and available budget.
The numbers tell a stark story. Serasa, a major credit bureau, counted 82 million Brazilians carrying debt. The Finance Ministry projects that Desenrola 2, across all its components, will reach approximately 20 million people. That is 24 percent of the country's indebted population. Nearly three-quarters of those struggling with unpaid bills will not qualify.
The program focuses narrowly on financial and banking debts—credit card balances, overdraft charges, and personal loans—contracted by January 31, 2026, and delinquent for between 90 days and two years. It explicitly excludes government debts, a decision the ministry justified by saying it wanted to prioritize obligations that did not stem from public subsidies or resources. The irony is that the government is funding part of the program through the Guarantee Operations Fund, which draws from the national treasury. The ministry initially authorized 2 billion reais from this fund and is considering an additional 5 billion.
Sérgio Praça, a political scientist, called the approach shocking but unsurprising. He characterized the Finance Minister as acting more like a campaign operative than a sober technical voice, making decisions without regard for consequences. This pattern extends beyond Desenrola 2. The Pé-de-Meia education program, launched in January 2024 with a 12.5 billion real budget, followed a similar path. The Ministry of Education never produced a rigorous study identifying school dropout as the nation's primary education problem or justifying the program's specific rules. Instead, officials cited 2022 data, a report from the Insper institute from that year, and a study from 2009 about an Israeli program. The Finance Ministry claimed that every real invested in Pé-de-Meia would generate seven reals in future returns, but that study was never published. More than a year after launch, neither the Education Ministry nor the Planning Ministry—which is supposed to evaluate such initiatives—has formally assessed how Pé-de-Meia is actually working.
On the question of interest rates, the Finance Ministry confirmed that public banks like Caixa Econômica Federal and Banco do Brasil operate under market rules and charge rates comparable to or sometimes higher than private competitors. When asked whether the government would intervene to lower these rates, the ministry cited legal constraints and cited studies suggesting that direct intervention in official bank interest rates could harm financial system competition. The message was clear: even government-owned institutions would not be directed to offer relief.
The Finance Ministry's own response to the column's questions reveals the ad hoc nature of the work. On the question of debt forgiveness for amounts under 100 reals, the ministry initially denied it would forgive such debts, then clarified that the program would remove negative credit marks as a condition for participation, and that all debts under 100 reals from each participating institution would be cleared regardless of their age or type. The ministry admitted it does not know how many people will ultimately benefit from this provision.
What emerges is a portrait of major public policy being assembled without the technical rigor one might expect. The government has chosen to help one in four indebted Brazilians while leaving the rest to navigate their financial obligations alone. Whether that represents a reasonable allocation of limited resources or a missed opportunity to address a broader crisis depends partly on questions the government apparently never formally asked.
Citas Notables
It is shocking, but not surprising, that a policy this important was improvised. The current Finance Minister acts more like a campaign operative than a sober technical voice.— Sérgio Praça, political scientist
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would a government launch a major debt relief program without commissioning a proper technical study first?
The Finance Ministry's own answer was that they relied on internal assessments and conversations with banks. It's faster, less transparent, and it lets you avoid hard questions about whether your approach actually works.
But they must have had some rationale for choosing 90 days to 2 years as the delinquency window, or January 31, 2026 as the cutoff date?
Presumably. But they never documented it in a way they could share. That's the point—there's no paper trail showing the reasoning, no external validation, no way to know if those numbers were chosen because they made sense or because they fit the political calendar.
And reaching only 24 percent of indebted Brazilians seems like a failure, doesn't it?
It depends on your measure. If the goal was to help as many people as possible, yes. If the goal was to create a visible campaign achievement with limited budget, 20 million people is a respectable number. The problem is we don't know which goal the government actually had.
Why exclude government debts entirely?
The ministry said it wanted to avoid using public money to forgive debts that came from public resources. But that logic breaks down when you realize they're using public money anyway—through the Guarantee Operations Fund—to subsidize private bank debts. It's a distinction without much difference.
And the public banks charging market rates—that seems like another missed opportunity?
It does. If you own the bank, you could theoretically direct it to offer better terms. But the ministry said that would harm competition. So even the government's own institutions operate at arm's length from government policy.
Is this pattern unique to Desenrola 2?
No. The education program, Pé-de-Meia, followed the same script—launched without rigorous study, justified after the fact with old data and unpublished claims. It suggests a broader problem with how this government designs and implements major initiatives.