The absence of traceability only benefits the criminal
Em um momento em que democracias ao redor do mundo debatem os limites entre segurança e vigilância, o Congresso brasileiro escolheu a privacidade em detrimento do rastreamento — removendo do Programa Celular Seguro os mecanismos que permitiriam às autoridades seguir dispositivos roubados pelas redes criminosas que lucram com sua revenda. A decisão, conduzida pelo deputado Júlio César com base na Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados, preserva a forma do programa, mas esvazia sua função essencial. O que resta é uma resposta ao crime, não uma interrupção dele.
- O Comitê de Ciência e Tecnologia aprovou o Programa Celular Seguro, mas retirou justamente o que o tornaria eficaz: a rastreabilidade dos aparelhos roubados.
- Especialistas em segurança alertam que, sem a capacidade de seguir um celular após o roubo, o programa não consegue identificar nem desmantelar as redes criminosas que alimentam o mercado ilegal.
- O deputado Júlio César defende que manter o histórico completo de propriedade dos aparelhos violaria a LGPD, priorizando a proteção de dados sobre a proteção de bens.
- Cássio Thyone, do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, resume o impasse com clareza: 'A ausência de rastreabilidade só beneficia o criminoso.'
- O programa agora bloqueia IMEI, linha celular e aplicativos bancários após o roubo — uma trava colocada depois que o dano já foi feito, sem capacidade de interromper o ecossistema do crime.
O Congresso brasileiro aprovou nesta semana a legislação formal do Programa Celular Seguro, mas o fez de uma forma que, segundo especialistas, compromete sua razão de existir. O deputado Júlio César, Republicanos do Distrito Federal, apresentou um substitutivo que eliminou as disposições de rastreabilidade — aquelas que permitiriam registrar a origem e o histórico de propriedade de cada aparelho, tornando possível seguir dispositivos roubados pelo mercado negro e identificar as redes que lucram com sua revenda.
O que sobrou do programa é funcional, mas limitado: bloqueio de IMEI, linha telefônica e aplicativos bancários após o registro de roubo ou perda. É uma resposta ao crime consumado, não um instrumento para interrompê-lo. César justificou os cortes com base na LGPD, argumentando que manter registros completos de propriedade excederia o princípio da necessidade previsto na lei de proteção de dados.
A comunidade de segurança pública discorda da escolha. Sem rastreabilidade, ninguém pode seguir o aparelho roubado enquanto ele circula por redes criminosas, identificar receptadores ou desarticular as operações organizadas que fazem do furto de celulares um dos crimes patrimoniais mais persistentes do Brasil. Cássio Thyone, conselheiro do Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, reconheceu a tensão entre privacidade e segurança, mas foi direto sobre o que o Congresso decidiu: 'A ausência de rastreabilidade só beneficia o criminoso.'
A decisão ecoa um dilema mais amplo enfrentado por democracias ao redor do mundo. O Brasil optou por proteger o histórico de propriedade dos dispositivos em detrimento da capacidade de rastrear bens roubados em mercados criminosos. Se essa escolha vai desacelerar os roubos de celular — ou simplesmente garantir que os aparelhos continuem circulando livremente — ainda está por ser visto.
Brazil's Congress has gutted a signature security initiative by stripping away the very mechanisms designed to make it work. The Science and Technology Committee approved the formal legislation for the Secure Phone Program this week, but in doing so, removed the tracking provisions that would have allowed authorities to follow stolen devices through the black market and identify the networks profiting from their resale.
Deputy Júlio César, a Republican from the Federal District, authored the revised bill. His report eliminated language that would have created a complete record of each phone's origin and ownership history—the backbone of any system meant to interrupt the flow of stolen devices back into circulation. What remains is a skeleton: the ability to block a phone's IMEI number, its cellular line, and banking applications once a theft or loss is reported. It is, in other words, a lock on the barn door after the horse has already fled.
César justified the cuts by invoking Brazil's data protection law. The full ownership history, he argued, exceeded what the LGPD—the General Data Protection Law—permits. The principle of necessity, he said, did not justify collecting and maintaining such comprehensive records. His substitutive, as the revised version is called, preserves the program's logic while respecting privacy boundaries. That is the official position.
Security experts see it differently. Without the ability to track where a stolen phone goes after it leaves the original owner's hands, the program loses its teeth. The absence of traceability means no one can follow the device as it moves through criminal networks, no one can identify the fences and receivers who profit from the trade, and no one can dismantle the organized operations that have made phone theft one of Brazil's most persistent property crimes. The program becomes reactive rather than preventive—useful only after someone has already lost their device, not useful in stopping the theft ecosystem itself.
Members of Brazil's security establishment have made their concerns public. The removal of tracking mechanisms, they argue, eliminates the program's core capacity to interrupt illegal resale and identify the criminal networks behind it. Cássio Thyone, a council member of the Brazilian Public Security Forum, acknowledged the tension between two legitimate interests: the need to protect people's privacy and the need to protect people's property. But he was clear about the trade-off Congress has made. "The absence of traceability only benefits the criminal," he told the panel.
The decision reflects a broader debate playing out across democracies about where to draw the line between security and surveillance. Brazil's Congress chose to draw it in a way that prioritizes the privacy of device ownership records over the ability to track stolen goods through criminal markets. Whether that choice will slow phone theft, or simply ensure that stolen devices continue to circulate freely, remains to be seen.
Notable Quotes
The absence of traceability only benefits the criminal— Cássio Thyone, Brazilian Public Security Forum council member
Our revised version maintains the program's logic by blocking the IMEI, phone line, and banking apps after theft is reported— Deputy Júlio César
The Hearth Conversation Another angle on the story
Why did Congress remove the tracking provisions if the whole point was to stop phone theft?
Because the rapporteur decided that keeping a complete ownership history of every phone violated Brazil's data protection law. He saw it as excessive—more information than necessary to accomplish the goal.
But can you actually stop phone theft without knowing where the stolen phones end up?
That's exactly what security experts are asking. You can block a phone after it's stolen, sure. But you can't follow it into the black market, identify who's selling it, or dismantle the networks profiting from the trade.
So the program still exists, it just can't do what it was supposed to do?
Essentially. It's like having a law against speeding but no way to measure how fast anyone is going. The structure is there, but the enforcement mechanism is gone.
Who benefits from this decision?
The people running the phone theft and resale operations. They can still move stolen devices through the market without fear of being tracked or identified. The criminals, not the victims.
Is there any way to fix this?
Congress could amend the law, but that would require them to revisit the privacy question they just decided. It's not clear they're willing to do that.