In Brazil, the sovereign is the Brazilian people, not Donald Trump
Trump's State Department designated PCC and CV as terrorist organizations two days after Flávio Bolsonaro requested the measure at the White House. Brazilian law defines terrorism narrowly; Cardozo argues the U.S. designation violates Brazil's constitutional sovereignty and sets precedent for foreign intervention.
- U.S. State Department designated PCC and CV as terrorist organizations on May 28, 2026
- Designation came two days after Flávio Bolsonaro met Trump at the White House and requested the action
- Brazilian law defines terrorism narrowly under Law 13.260 (2016), requiring xenophobic or discriminatory intent
- José Eduardo Cardozo served as Justice Minister 2011-2016
Former Brazilian Justice Minister José Eduardo Cardozo condemns Trump administration's designation of PCC and CV as terrorist organizations, calling it an abusive violation of Brazilian sovereignty following Senator Flávio Bolsonaro's White House meeting.
On Thursday, May 28th, the U.S. State Department announced it was designating two major Brazilian criminal factions—the First Command of the Capital and the Red Command—as terrorist organizations. The declaration came from Secretary of State Marco Rubio. What made the timing notable was that it arrived just two days after Senator Flávio Bolsonaro had met with Donald Trump at the White House and, by his own account, requested exactly this action.
José Eduardo Cardozo, who served as Brazil's Justice Minister from 2011 to 2016, called the move abusive and a direct affront to Brazilian sovereignty. In an interview with CartaCapital, he laid out his objection with precision. Brazilian law, he noted, has a specific definition of terrorism. Law 13.260, passed in 2016, describes terrorist acts as those committed for reasons of xenophobia, discrimination, or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, or religion—and only when the intent is to provoke widespread social terror, endangering people, property, public peace, or public safety. The American designation, by contrast, appeared to operate under a different framework entirely.
Cardozo's core argument was constitutional. The United States, he said, had no authority to make determinations about what constitutes a terrorist organization within Brazilian territory. "It is an offense against national sovereignty," he told CartaCapital, "and it will certainly be used by the Trump government—which sees itself as the world's sheriff—to intervene in our national territory with measures that only a sovereign nation can take. In Brazil, the sovereign is the Brazilian people, not Donald Trump."
The political dimension added another layer. Flávio Bolsonaro, positioning himself as a presidential candidate, immediately took to social media to celebrate the designation. "This fight belongs to all of us," he posted. "Let's put an end to these groups! Brazil deserves peace! Brazil has a future!" The message was celebratory, triumphant—the tone of someone who had successfully lobbied a foreign power to act on his behalf.
Cardozo found this particularly galling. The Bolsonaro family, he pointed out, had previously celebrated sanctions imposed against Brazilian citizens by foreign governments. Now they were applauding what he saw as a fundamental erosion of the nation's constitutional authority. "I find it incredible that the Bolsonaro family, which celebrated sanctions applied against Brazilians, now comes once again to applaud the denial of the sovereignty that our Constitution grants to the Brazilian people," Cardozo said. "This is absolutely unacceptable."
The episode raised a question that extended beyond the immediate dispute over two criminal organizations. It suggested a pattern: a Brazilian political figure requesting action from a foreign government, that government delivering, and then the Brazilian politician claiming credit at home. The precedent, if allowed to stand, could reshape how external powers engaged with Brazilian security matters—no longer as partners in a sovereign nation's decisions, but as enforcers of preferences expressed by particular Brazilian politicians. Cardozo's objection was not merely about the designation itself, but about what it signaled for the future of Brazilian independence.
Citas Notables
It is an offense against national sovereignty, and it will certainly be used by the Trump government to intervene in our national territory with measures that only a sovereign nation can take.— José Eduardo Cardozo, former Justice Minister
This is absolutely unacceptable. The Bolsonaro family celebrated sanctions against Brazilians and now applauds the denial of sovereignty that our Constitution grants to the Brazilian people.— José Eduardo Cardozo
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why does Cardozo think this particular designation matters so much? It's just a label, isn't it?
It's not just a label. Once the U.S. designates something as terrorist, American law kicks in—financial sanctions, asset freezes, restrictions on anyone dealing with them. But the real issue is who gets to decide. Cardozo is saying Brazil has its own legal definition of terrorism. The U.S. is imposing its own definition on Brazilian territory without Brazilian consent.
But don't the two countries work together on crime? Isn't some coordination normal?
Coordination is one thing. A foreign government making unilateral declarations about what's criminal in your country is another. Cardozo's point is that Flávio Bolsonaro asked Trump to do this, Trump did it, and now Flávio is taking credit. It looks less like partnership and more like a Brazilian politician using American power to advance his own position.
What's the actual harm? These are criminal organizations. Doesn't the designation help?
Maybe it does operationally. But Cardozo is worried about the precedent. If a Brazilian politician can call up the U.S. and get them to designate something as terrorist, what stops the next request? What stops the U.S. from designating things that serve American interests but not Brazilian ones? Sovereignty means you get to make those calls yourself.
Is Cardozo alone in this view?
The article doesn't say. But his position is rooted in Brazilian constitutional law, not ideology. He's not defending the criminal organizations. He's defending the principle that Brazil decides what's a crime in Brazil.
What happens next?
That's unclear. The designation is already in place. The question is whether Brazil's government challenges it, or whether it becomes the new normal—foreign powers making security decisions for Brazil based on requests from Brazilian politicians.