A bank can be liquid and still be insolvent
Uma das instituições financeiras mais antigas da Europa chegou a uma encruzilhada histórica: o Credit Suisse, pressionado por custos de captação insustentáveis e perdas crescentes, viu suas ações despencarem a mínimas históricas enquanto analistas e mercados questionavam abertamente sua viabilidade como banco unificado. O momento revela algo mais amplo sobre a fragilidade das grandes instituições quando a confiança se esvai mais rápido do que os balanços conseguem responder — e sobre a diferença, sempre cruel, entre ter dinheiro em caixa e ser capaz de prosperar.
- As ações do Credit Suisse perderam quase um terço do valor em um único dia, atingindo o menor patamar de sua história e arrastando bancos europeus em queda conjunta.
- O maior acionista do banco, o Saudi National Bank, descartou ampliar sua participação por restrições regulatórias — um sinal de que o apoio externo tem limites claros e conhecidos.
- O analista da Morningstar Johann Scholtz colocou o dilema sem rodeios: captar novo capital com os acionistas ou iniciar o desmembramento do banco em unidades separadas que possam sobreviver por conta própria.
- A liderança do banco rejeitou comparações com o Silicon Valley Bank e negou qualquer necessidade de socorro governamental, mas o mercado de títulos já precificava níveis de estresse financeiro genuíno.
- O nó central não é liquidez — o banco pode suportar saques — mas sim a incapacidade estrutural de gerar lucro, uma distinção que separa um banco em dificuldade de um banco inviável.
Na tarde de quarta-feira, as ações do Credit Suisse afundaram a seu menor nível histórico, perdendo quase um terço do valor em um único pregão. O gatilho foi uma análise direta e sem concessões do analista Johann Scholtz, da Morningstar, que traçou um futuro binário para o gigante bancário suíço: captar capital novo ou se fragmentar.
Scholtz argumentou que o custo de captação do banco havia subido a ponto de se tornar insustentável, e que as perdas esperadas ao longo de 2023 ameaçavam os índices de adequação de capital — a reserva regulatória que determina se um banco pode continuar operando. A alternativa à captação seria o desmembramento: vender ou separar a unidade de varejo suíça, a gestão de ativos e as operações de gestão de patrimônio, transformando uma instituição integrada em partes que talvez sobrevivessem de forma independente.
A direção do banco reagiu com firmeza. O CEO Ulrich Koerner havia pedido paciência no dia anterior, e o presidente do conselho Axel Lehmann foi ainda mais categórico na quarta-feira, descartando qualquer discussão sobre ajuda governamental e rejeitando comparações com o colapso do Silicon Valley Bank, que havia sacudido os mercados globais dias antes.
O mercado, porém, não se deixou convencer. Os títulos do Credit Suisse já negociavam em níveis que sinalizam estresse financeiro real. O Saudi National Bank, maior acionista, descartou ampliar sua participação por restrições regulatórias — um limite que o próprio mercado interpretou como sinal de alerta. A queda das ações contaminou os bancos europeus de forma ampla, num momento em que investidores já estavam em retirada após o colapso americano.
Scholtz reconheceu que o banco dispunha de liquidez suficiente para enfrentar saques e que o Banco Nacional Suíço poderia oferecer crédito emergencial. Mas liquidez, ele sublinhou, não era o problema central. Um banco pode ter caixa e ainda assim ser inviável. O Credit Suisse parecia se aproximar exatamente desse território — não à beira de uma corrida bancária, mas diante de uma incapacidade estrutural de gerar lucro que nenhuma injeção de liquidez consegue resolver.
By Wednesday afternoon, Credit Suisse's stock had collapsed to its lowest point ever recorded, losing nearly a third of its value in a single day. The plunge was not random. It followed a stark warning from Morningstar analyst Johann Scholtz, who laid out a binary future for the Swiss banking giant: raise fresh capital, or break apart.
Scholtz's reasoning was straightforward and unsparing. The bank's cost of borrowing had climbed so steeply that it was becoming unsustainable. Worse, he expected losses to mount through 2023 at a pace that would threaten the bank's capital adequacy—the regulatory cushion that determines whether a bank can stay open. "We believe Credit Suisse needs another rights offering," Scholtz wrote, referring to an invitation to existing shareholders to buy new shares. The alternative, he suggested, was dismantling: selling off or spinning out the Swiss retail unit, the asset management division, the wealth management operations—essentially breaking the institution into pieces that might survive separately.
The bank's leadership pushed back hard. CEO Ulrich Koerner had asked for patience just the day before, insisting the bank's financial position remained solid. Board chairman Axel Lehmann went further on Wednesday, dismissing the notion that government help was even being discussed. He also rejected any comparison between Credit Suisse's troubles and the sudden collapse of Silicon Valley Bank in California, which had sent shockwaves through global finance only days earlier.
But the market was not listening to reassurance. Credit Suisse's bonds had already begun trading at levels that signal genuine financial distress. The bank's largest shareholder, Saudi National Bank, had ruled out increasing its stake, citing regulatory constraints—a signal that even insiders saw limits to how much more they could or would support the institution. The stock's freefall dragged down European banking stocks broadly as investors, spooked by the Silicon Valley Bank implosion, began a rapid retreat from bank exposure across the continent.
Scholtz acknowledged that Credit Suisse had enough liquid cash to weather deposit outflows. The Swiss National Bank, the country's central bank, could also provide emergency lending against the bank's bond holdings. But liquidity, he noted, was not the real problem. The bank could survive a run on deposits. What it could not survive was the underlying inability to make money. "This does not resolve the profitability challenge at Credit Suisse, nor does it address capital concerns," Scholtz wrote. The distinction was crucial: a bank can be liquid and still be insolvent. Credit Suisse appeared to be approaching that territory.
Citações Notáveis
We expect 2023 losses to grow to the point where capital adequacy could be threatened. We believe Credit Suisse needs another rights offering.— Johann Scholtz, Morningstar analyst
This does not resolve the profitability challenge at Credit Suisse, nor does it address capital concerns.— Johann Scholtz, Morningstar analyst
A Conversa do Hearth Outra perspectiva sobre a história
Why did Morningstar think the situation was so dire that breakup was even on the table?
The financing costs had become prohibitive. When it costs too much to borrow, and you're losing money operationally, the math stops working. Scholtz was saying the losses would be large enough to erode the capital buffer the regulators require.
But the CEO said the bank was solid. Why would he say that if things were this bad?
Leadership has to say that. Admitting weakness accelerates the very crisis you're trying to prevent. But the market doesn't listen to words—it listens to bond prices and deposit flows. Both were screaming distress.
The board chairman said government help wasn't being discussed. Do you believe that?
It's technically possible. But when a bank's largest shareholder won't increase its stake and the stock is at all-time lows, the question isn't whether help is being discussed—it's whether it will be offered, and on what terms.
What did the Silicon Valley Bank comparison matter?
It mattered because investors were already panicked about banks. SVB's collapse was sudden and total. Lehmann was trying to say Credit Suisse was different, more stable. But when you're denying you're like a bank that just failed, you've already lost the argument.
Could the bank actually break itself up and survive?
Possibly. The wealth management and asset management divisions had real value. But breaking up a global bank is complicated, takes time, and requires buyer confidence. In a panic, you don't have time.