A man defined by ferociously anti-Israel rhetoric now appears as a possible alternative for Iran's future.
In the fog of war and its aftermath, even the most improbable figures can surface as instruments of geopolitical calculation. The New York Times reported that American and Israeli officials explored whether Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — the former Iranian president whose career was built on confrontation with the West and denial of the Holocaust — might serve as a transitional leader for a post-conflict Iran, a plan that allegedly unraveled when a rescue operation left him wounded. The claim has drawn swift and broad skepticism from security analysts on both sides of the Atlantic, who question whether either power would genuinely embrace a figure whose entire public legacy runs counter to their stated interests. What endures beyond the disputed details is a deeper uncertainty: how well those seeking to reshape Iran actually understand the country they wish to transform.
- A bombshell Times report placed one of Israel's most vocal historical enemies at the center of a secret Western plan for Iran's future — a revelation that strained credulity across the security establishment.
- The alleged operation collapsed almost immediately, with a botched rescue attempt reportedly leaving Ahmadinejad wounded and his whereabouts now unknown, adding a layer of chaos to an already implausible account.
- Analysts from Northeastern University to the American Enterprise Institute lined up to call the story fanciful, absurd, or dangerously misinformed, citing Ahmadinejad's Holocaust denial and nuclear advocacy as disqualifying factors.
- Israeli experts warned that the plan exposed a fundamental misreading of Iranian power — Ahmadinejad commands no military loyalty and could only rise if the entire Revolutionary Guard structure had already collapsed.
- The Times defended its reporting with confidence, but the episode has left a more lasting question hanging: in a moment of strategic desperation, did Western powers mistake name recognition for political viability?
In late May, the New York Times published a striking claim: that American and Israeli officials had explored Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — the former Iranian president synonymous with anti-Israel rhetoric and Holocaust denial — as a potential post-war leader for Iran. According to the account, the plan fell apart early in the conflict when a rescue operation meant to free him from house arrest went wrong and left him wounded. He has not commented, and his location remains unknown.
For those who followed Iranian politics across the 2000s, the idea carries a surreal quality. Ahmadinejad spent his presidency, from 2005 to 2013, constructing an international identity almost entirely through confrontation — questioning the Holocaust, calling Israel a fabricated regime, and championing Iran's nuclear program in defiance of global sanctions. Ironically, former Mossad chief Efraim Halevy later acknowledged that Ahmadinejad's inflammatory statements had served Israeli interests by reinforcing the case that Iran posed an existential threat.
After leaving office, Ahmadinejad's relationship with Iran's ruling structure deteriorated sharply. He clashed with Supreme Leader Khamenei, was repeatedly blocked from running for president again, and began an unusual image rehabilitation online — posting in English, quoting Tupac Shakur, and praising Donald Trump. Whether this represented genuine change or tactical repositioning remained unclear.
The report drew immediate and widespread dismissal. Political scientist Max Abrahms called it worthy of deep skepticism given the volume of wartime misinformation. Ilan Berman doubted any serious coordinated plan existed. Michael Rubin criticized the Times for leaning on anonymous sources. Israeli analysts went further, arguing the plan revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of how Iranian power works: Ahmadinejad has no real base within the Revolutionary Guard and could only ascend if the entire existing structure had already collapsed — something military strikes had not achieved.
The Times stood by its reporting, citing conversations with American, Israeli, and Iranian officials. Some analysts offered a partial explanation for why Ahmadinejad's name might have surfaced at all: he is nationally known, has governed before, understands the Islamic Republic from the inside, and his break with Khamenei makes him appear, at least superficially, as someone outside the loyalist core. In a scenario of chaos, he might widen fractures rather than fill a vacuum.
The episode revives a question that has shadowed Iranian politics for years: who is Ahmadinejad, really — a rigid ideologue or a tactically flexible operator willing to redefine himself as circumstances demand? No concrete evidence links him to Israel or the United States. But the very fact that such a figure could be considered, even in preliminary discussions, raises an uncomfortable question about how deeply those seeking to reshape Iran actually understand the country they were trying to change.
The New York Times reported in late May that American and Israeli officials had considered an unlikely figure for Iran's post-war future: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former president whose name had become synonymous with anti-Israel rhetoric for two decades. According to the account, the two countries explored whether Ahmadinejad might break with Iran's security apparatus and present himself as a potential leader once the conflict ended. The plan, if it existed in any operational form, apparently collapsed early in the war when a rescue operation meant to free him from house arrest left him wounded instead. Ahmadinejad has not commented on the allegations, and his current location remains unclear.
For anyone who followed Iranian politics in the 2000s, the idea reads as a kind of geopolitical inversion. Ahmadinejad had spent his presidency—from 2005 to 2013—building an international profile almost entirely through confrontation. In October 2005, he declared at a Tehran conference that "a world without America and Zionism is possible." A year later, the Iranian capital hosted a gathering of Holocaust deniers that drew global condemnation. He questioned the historical reality of the Holocaust, called Israel a "fabricated regime," and championed Iran's nuclear program despite international sanctions. Israeli officials, including Efraim Halevy, the former head of Mossad, later acknowledged that Ahmadinejad's inflammatory statements had actually served Israel's interests by reinforcing the narrative that Iran posed an existential threat.
After leaving office in 2013, Ahmadinejad's relationship with Iran's power structure fractured. He clashed with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The Guardian Council blocked multiple attempts to run for president again. Yet in recent years, he has worked to reshape his image, particularly online. He began posting in English, congratulated the University of Michigan football team, quoted the rapper Tupac Shakur, and even praised Donald Trump for fighting political corruption in America. The transformation suggested either genuine evolution or shrewd political repositioning—or perhaps both.
The Times report triggered immediate skepticism from American and Israeli security analysts. Max Abrahms, a political scientist at Northeastern University specializing in counterterrorism, called the story worthy of "great skepticism" given the volume of misinformation surrounding the conflict. He noted that Israel would be unlikely to embrace someone with Ahmadinejad's record of Holocaust denial and nuclear advocacy, and that such a figure would not fit Trump's narrative of successful regime change. Ilan Berman of the American Foreign Policy Council doubted that Washington and Tel Aviv had developed any serious, coordinated plan around Ahmadinejad, though his name may have surfaced in preliminary discussions. Michael Rubin of the American Enterprise Institute dismissed the report as "fanciful," criticizing the Times for relying too heavily on anonymous sources.
Israeli security experts raised a different objection: the plan revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of how Iranian power actually works. Danny Citrinowicz of Israel's Institute for National Security Studies wrote that any attempt to install Ahmadinejad would demonstrate ignorance of the Iranian political system. Ahmadinejad has no real power base and would never command the loyalty of the Revolutionary Guard, the country's dominant military force. He could only rise to power if the entire existing structure collapsed—something American and Israeli strikes had not achieved. Yossi Melman, a veteran Israeli security analyst, called the story "absurd on multiple levels," suggesting that whoever conceived such a plan was operating in a "fantasy world."
The Times stood by its reporting, stating on social media that it had "full confidence" in the account and that it was based on conversations with American, Israeli, and Iranian officials as well as other sources with knowledge of the matter. Yet the central mystery remained: Why Ahmadinejad at all? The answer, some analysts suggested, lay in an unusual combination of three traits. He is known throughout Iran, has governed before, understands how to speak to ordinary Iranians, and knows the mechanics of the Islamic Republic from the inside. At the same time, his conflicts with Khamenei mean he is not seen as a regime loyalist. In a scenario of chaos, he might serve not as an ally but as a figure capable of widening fractures within Iran's ruling elite.
The episode has revived a question that has haunted Iranian politics for years: Who is Ahmadinejad, really? His career suggests a politician of tactical flexibility rather than rigid ideology—someone willing to shift positions and redefine alliances as circumstances change. Some Iranian critics argue that his policies during his presidency isolated Iran internationally, deepened the nuclear crisis, and handed Israel some of its most effective arguments against Tehran. After leaving office, he reportedly sought reconciliation with figures he had opposed, though such efforts never materialized. The contradiction persists: a man defined for decades by ferociously anti-Israel rhetoric now appears, in some accounts, as a possible alternative for Iran's future. No concrete evidence links Ahmadinejad to Israel or the United States. Yet the very possibility that such a figure could be considered raises uncomfortable questions about what those powers actually understand about the country they were trying to reshape.
Citas Notables
Ahmadinejad is a figure known throughout Iran with government experience, but he has no real power base and would never command the loyalty of the Revolutionary Guard.— Danny Citrinowicz, Israeli Institute for National Security Studies
This story is absurd on multiple levels, suggesting those responsible for planning in Israel and the US were living in a world of fantasy.— Yossi Melman, Israeli security analyst
La Conversación del Hearth Otra perspectiva de la historia
Why would the US and Israel even consider someone so hostile to them?
That's the question everyone's asking. The theory is that Ahmadinejad had three things they wanted: he's known, he's experienced, and he's at odds with the current power structure. In chaos, he might widen cracks in the regime.
But he spent decades saying Israel should be wiped off the map.
Exactly. Which is why Israeli analysts call the whole thing absurd. They're saying whoever planned this didn't understand how Iran actually works. Ahmadinejad has no real military backing. The Revolutionary Guard would never follow him.
So the plan failed because he got wounded in a rescue attempt?
That's what the Times reported. But we don't know where he is now or if he's even commented on any of it. The whole thing is murky.
Do people believe the Times story?
Not really. American experts say it's implausible given the volume of misinformation around the war. Even if his name came up in discussions, it probably wasn't serious. The Times says it has sources, but critics say it relies too much on anonymous ones.
What does this say about how the West understands Iran?
That's the real story. If this was even considered, it suggests a profound misreading of Iranian politics—the idea that you could install someone without the backing of the actual power structure. It's fantasy planning.